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Using data from the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (1993 
through 2001), the first essay examines how wage differences between working age 
people with and without disabilities changed over time. Using Oaxaca-Blinder and 
Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce techniques to measure the share of the wage gap that 
remains unexplained after controlling for differences in observed wage-determining 
characteristics, the essay finds a substantial and growing wage gap between persons 
with and without disabilities that varies significantly throughout the distribution. Low 
skilled/low wage disabled workers are less seriously impacted by wage discrimination 
than their higher skilled/higher wage counterparts.  
Using retrospective data from the 1990 Panel of the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation, the second essay exploits state-level variation in legislation 
prohibiting disability discrimination prior to the passage of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of the 1990 to test the effect of such laws on the timing of Social 
Security Disability Insurance (DI) application following the onset of a health 
condition. Using hazard models, the essay finds that workers who lived in states that 
had traditional disability discrimination prohibitions or such prohibitions plus a 
reasonable accommodation requirement were significantly slower in applying for DI  
benefits than were workers in states with no such prohibitions. Increasing the 
likelihood of acceptance onto the program increases the speed of application. 
Using data from the United States Current Population Survey, the British 
Household Panel Study, the German Socio-Economic Panel and the Japanese Survey 
of Income Redistribution, the third essay uses kernel density estimation to show how 
the income distribution changed between the peak years of the 1990s business cycle in 
these four major OECD countries. The entire after-tax household size-adjusted income 
distribution moved to the right in the United States and Great Britain. Germany and 
Japan experienced a decline in the middle mass of their income distributions that 
spread mostly to the right. In the United States and Japan, younger persons fared better 
than older persons, while the opposite was the case in Great Britain and Germany. 
Income inequality fell in all four countries among the older population. 
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CHAPTER 1 
DISABILITY AND THE LABOR MARKET IN CANADA:  
AN ANALYSIS OF WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
1.1 Introduction 
Canada guarantees equal access, economic integration and effective 
participation for people with disabilities (Council of Canadians with Disabilities, 
1991). The Charter of Human Rights and Human Rights legislation is meant to 
eliminate discrimination on the basis of disability. The Employment Equity Act’s goal 
is to increase employment opportunities for people with disabilities. Employers are 
required to eliminate employment barriers faced by disabled persons. This legislation 
assumes that low wages and low employment rates for persons with disabilities are the 
result of discrimination caused by prejudice. Prejudice against persons with disabilities 
is well-documented in the literature (see Hahn, 1987; Clogston, 1990; Haller, 1995), 
but, unlike other vulnerable populations protected by civil right laws, all persons with 
disabilities have health problems that can limit their productivity and affect the 
employment participation decision as well as wage level. 
An individual considering whether or not to enter the labour market will 
compare the wage offers of potential employers with his or her reservation wage. To 
participate in the labour market, a disabled individual has to incur additional expenses, 
such as the costs of rehabilitation, special transportation and equipment or personal 
assistance services, which increases his or her reservation wage and reduces labour 
supply. In addition, the possibility of disability income transfers may distort the 
leisure/work time allocation, resulting, again, in a lower labour supply and a higher 
reservation wage. On the labour demand side, the disability itself may be viewed by   2
the employer as a signal of lower productivity, implying a lower wage offer. If the 
firm has to, or believes it has to, incur additional costs to accommodate disabled 
workers, the cost of such accommodations will be considered by employer in the 
hiring decision. Thus, disabled persons’ wages could on average be lower then the 
wages of non-disabled individuals for two reasons - lower productivity and increased 
accommodation costs. Individuals with disabilities for whom the lower wage does not 
justify participation in the labour market will not enter it.  
To date, no comprehensive empirical study has been conducted to measure and 
explain the wage differentials between workers with and without disabilities in the 
Canadian labour market.  This paper aims to fill this gap by estimating the wage 
differential in each year from 1993 to 2001, decomposing it by its causes -differences 
in wage-determining characteristics, and the returns to those respective characteristics- 
and, finally, calculating the relevant employment effects associated with different 
wage structure for persons with disabilities. In measuring the magnitude of the wage 
gap and its components, we distinguish between the wage observed and the wage 
offered in the labour market, since the observed wage reflects the decisions people 
make about employment-participation as well as the wage offer they face.  
Past studies of the wage gap between persons with and without disabilities 
found that persons with disabilities receive lower wages than those without 
disabilities, and most of the earlier studies have typically found that the majority of the 
wage differential remains unexplained after controlling for human-capital and other 
productivity-related characteristics.  
Baldwin and Johnson (1994) using the 1984 panel of the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation found that the offer wages for handicapped men were 33.2   3
percent lower than for non-disabled men. Approximately 40 percent of this differential 
is left unexplained by differences in measured characteristics and is attributable to 
discrimination and a residual. Hotchkiss (2003) analyzing Current Population Survey 
data to investigate the status of disabled workers in 1981-2000 reports that workers 
without disabilities earned, on average, wages that were 23 percent higher than wages 
earned by workers with disabilities. In addition, she finds that the unexplained portion 
of wage differential averages 77 percent of the difference in wages between non-
disabled and disabled workers. Kidd, Sloane and Ferko (2000) analyze data for males 
from the 1996 British Labour Force Survey and document the wage offer gap at 15.2 
percent, with differences in the wage-determining characteristics explaining about 50 
percent of the wage differential between persons with and without disabilities. 
Another study of non-disabled/disabled wages for the United Kingdom by Jones, 
Latreille, and Sloane (2003) has confirmed the presence of substantial wage 
differential in the UK and reported that disabled men earned 83.1 percent of the non-
disabled men’s level, with the corresponding figure for women being 88.4 percent.  
In contrast to the studies mentioned above, Hum and Simpson (1996) in the 
only available Canadian study on wage differentials between persons with and without 
disabilities use the 1989 Canadian Labour Market Activity Survey to argue that the 
wage gap between employed persons with and without disabilities can be explained 
entirely by differences in wage-determining characteristics; they find no evidence of 
different returns to those characteristics. There are several problems with this result. 
First, Hum and Simpson do not correct for possible self-selection into the labour 
market. To accurately measure the magnitudes of the components of the wage gap one 
must distinguish between the offer wage and observed wage. Second, Hum and 
Simpson (1996) use annual earnings to measure the pay gap between non-disabled and   4
disabled workers. An hourly wage rate is a better measure than annual earnings for 
studying pay differentials. First, because of fluctuation of the number of hours worked 
per week and weeks worked per year in the population, one has to limit the sample to 
full-year full-time workers if annual earnings are used. Second, since annual earnings 
is the sum of wages and salaries received from all jobs, the effect of any particular job 
remains unclear.  
This paper provides an alternative approach to Hum and Simpson (1996) with 
respect to Canadian labour market.  It will answer the following questions: How big is 
the non-disabled/disabled wage differential, on average, and how does the wage 
differential vary throughout the distribution? How much of the wage gap is explained 
by differences in various wage-determining characteristics? How much is left 
unaccounted for due to different pricing of these characteristics and/or our ability to 
control for productivity differences? In addition, using the longitudinal nature of the 
Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID), we are able to identify persons with 
longer-lasting and presumably, more severe, work limitations and compare the results 
to those obtained for a sample that includes persons with short-term limitations. 
1.2 The Data and Sample 
Annual data from the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics for years from 
1993 to 2001 are used in this paper. The sample is limited to people aged 20-59
1. 
Observations for full-time students, self-employed and individuals not reporting 
relevant information are removed from the sample considered. 
                                                 
1 Morisette (1997) reports that there has been a significant increase in the school enrolment among 
young adult individuals aged 17-19, which might affect our inference if we include population younger 
than 20 years old. Application for a public pension in Canada can be made as early as age 60.   5
The SLID contains extensive information on demographic characteristics and 
labour force activity, from which we extract a number of variables that potentially 
could account for differences in employment and wages between workers with and 
without disabilities. For definitions of each variable used in analysis see Appendix A. 
Cross-sectional analyses are performed in this paper
2. The result is a 
comparison of the experiences of one group (the disabled) with that of another group 
(the non-disabled). Although, cross-sectional data limit the analysis to those persons 
with and without disabilities at a given time, yearly comparisons of such data allow us 
to follow gross movements in the labour market outcomes of these two populations. 
1.2.1 Weighting and Accounting for Sample Design 
The sample for each SLID panel is based on a stratified, multi-stage design 
that uses probability sampling. First, each province is divided into economic regions 
(set by federal-provincial agreements). These are further subdivided by Employment 
Insurance Regions (EIR). Each of the resulting strata is in turn divided into one or 
more “urban” areas, one “rural” area, and various “special areas” (where applicable). 
Generally, the “urban” areas are large or medium-sized urban centres. For the most 
part, they respect geographical boundaries established for the census, such as census 
metropolitan areas. The area of the stratum not covered by these urban centres is 
considered “rural”. Each selected urban centre is further divided into strata, such that 
each stratum has a relatively homogeneous population in terms of socioeconomic 
characteristics as identified in the census. Within each of the strata, groups of 
dwellings are identified, generally city blocks, groups of blocks, or block faces. These 
                                                 
2 Although SLID is intended primarily to support longitudinal analysis, both longitudinal weights and 
cross-sectional weights are available, and by choosing an appropriate cross-sectional weight it is 
possible to calculate estimates based on data from single years.   6
“clusters” are the primary sampling units (PSUs). The PSU is most often the 
enumeration area (EAs are geographic areas covered by individual enumerators for the 
census).  
When data are obtained from complex sampling, standard errors of estimates 
are frequently inaccurate, leading to inaccuracies in the results of hypothesis tests. The 
use of sampling weights alone does not adjust the standard errors of point estimates. 
Generally the standard errors under a complex sample design are larger than standard 
errors under the assumption of a simple random sample, by a factor equal to the design 
factor. Therefore, adjustments for the sampling design of the SLID are taken into 
account: weights are used and standard errors of estimates are computed in a manner 
that reflects the aforementioned sample design. 
1.2.2 Defining Population with Disabilities 
To measure the labour market outcomes of the working-age population with 
disabilities it is first necessary to define that population. Unfortunately, there is no 
universal agreement on the most appropriate definition of the population with 
disabilities; it frequently varies by research discipline and policy purpose.  
Nagi (1965, 1969, and 1991) conceptualizes disability as a dynamic process 
with three stages: pathology, impairment, and disability. Pathology is the presence of a 
physical or mental condition that interrupts the physical or mental process of the 
human body. Impairment is a physiological, anatomical, or mental loss or abnormality 
that limits a person’s capacity to function. Disability is defined as an inability to 
perform (or a limitation in performing) socially expected roles and tasks, like work. 
Hence Nagi sees both a social environmental and medical component to disability.   7
In the economic literature, researchers’ definitions of disability often depend 
on the data available. In most labour issues related surveys, the data on health come 
from self-reported answers to a small set of questions that ask respondents to assess 
whether their health limits the kind or amount of work they can perform. Although, 
potential problems in these measures have led some researchers (Myers 1982, 1983; 
Hale, 2001) to conclude that no useful information can be obtained from self-reported 
data on health, numerous researchers (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999) have shown that 
such data are capable of identifying people with serious functional limitations and 
allow for consistent measurement of the population of people with disabilities over 
time.  
For the purpose of this paper, the population of persons with disabilities is 
defined along the lines of the definition given in the federal Employment Equity Act. 
The Employment Equity Regulations state that persons with disabilities are considered 
to be persons whose prospects of employment are substantially reduced as a result of 
recurring physical, mental, sensory, psychiatric or learning impairment, and if they 
consider themselves to be, or who believe a potential employer would be likely to 
consider them, disadvantaged in employment because of their impairment
3. This work 
limitation
4 definition is consistent with Nagi’s framework of a disability developing 
from a pathology that limits a social activity, work. However, Burkhauser, Daly, 
Houtenville and Nargis (2002) show that it fails to capture persons who objectively 
would be considered impaired, but do not categorize themselves to be work limited. 
                                                 
3 See Appendix for details on construction of work limitation variable. 
4 Note that in the following, we will use the terms “disability”, “work limitation”, interchangeably to 
ease the flow of reading. Importantly, one can still have a work limitation and be able to work.   8
Moreover, other critics
5 argue that a single period self-reported work limitation 
question captures neither the actual working age population with disabilities nor its 
employment or wage trends over time (See especially Hale, 2001, Kirchner, 1996, and 
Stapleton and Burkhauser, 2001). The longitudinal nature of the SLID allows us to 
address this issue and investigate the differences in disability prevalence, employment 
and wages of a population defined as having a work limitation at a given moment 
(both short and longer-term work limitations) and the subcomponent of that population 
whose work limitations are longer lasting. We match individuals over a one-year time 
interval to create a two-period SLID sample. Individuals in this sub-sample are asked 
the work limitation questions in two consecutive waves. Two definitions of disability 
are then applied: The first is a one-period measure, i.e., individuals experiencing a 
work limiting condition in any given year are considered to be disabled in that year. 
The other definition is a two-period measure, which defines people to be disabled only 
if the individual has a work limitation in two consecutive periods one year apart. This 
longitudinal aspect of the SLID is important, since one of the criticisms of cross-
sectional data is that a single period data set cannot distinguish between those people 
with temporary and longer-term disabilities (Hale, 2001). 
It is possible to match individuals over three-, four-, five-, and six-year periods 
in SLID and create a definition of disability based on a three-, four-, five-, and six-
period measure. However, small sample sizes do not allow us to perform extensive 
analysis of wages for longer periods. While we provide the results for the mean 
prevalence, employment, and wage rates for all periods (see Figures 1.1- 1.5 and 
Appendix Tables I.2-1.6), analysis of the wage differentials that follows is performed 
on one- and two-period samples. 
                                                 
5 See Stapleton and Burkhauser (2003) for a discussion of these criticisms.   9
Figure 1.1 shows that a lower percentage of the overall population is work 
limited using our second measure of disability. On average, about 9.4 percent of the 
one-period sample reports a work limiting disability. The respective number for the 
two-period sample is 5.9 percent. This is not surprising, since temporary health 
limitations are included in the first but not second measure. The population defined by 
two-period measure has lower employment levels (Figure 1.2), lower relative 
employment rates (Figure 1.3), and lower wages (Figure 1.4) and higher non-disabled-
disabled wage gap
6 (Figure 1.5) than its one-period counterpart. This is consistent with 
the argument that the two-period series capture more severe cases, i.e. there are more 
people within this subset of individuals with work limitation that have both longer-
term and more severe impairments.
7 
Comparing the results obtained from multiple-period samples, we continue to 
observe relatively large differences in employment levels between our single- and 
multi-period samples, but the differences between the longer-term disability measures 
(e.g., at least two, three or four periods) are much smaller. This may be because the 
severity of work limitation in a sample is relatively stable once individuals with short-
term limitations are omitted. While clearly different in levels, it seems that the 
employment trends among all samples are closely related. All series show 
improvement in employment over the second half of the 1990s. 
                                                 
6 The wage data in all tables and figures refer to real composite hourly wages in reference year in 
constant 2001 dollars. 
7 We could use a regression analysis to formally test for difference in the level and trends of disability 
prevalence, wage and employment rates between two definitions of disability. Note however, that the 
value of such analysis is questionable in the light of the few observations available, as these are only 
eight (nine) data points for the two-period (one-period) samples.    10
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Figure 1.1: Disability Prevalence Rates among Working Age Population in the SLID 
one-, two-, three-, four-, five, and six-period samples. 
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Figure 1.2: Employment Rates among Working Age Population with Work Limitation 
in the SLID one-, two-, three-, four-, five, and six-period samples 
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Figure 1.3: Ratio of Employment Rates for Work-Limited Persons over the 
Employment Rates for Non-Work-Limited Persons, in the SLID one-, two-,  
three- and four-period samples, percent 
   13
Figure 1.4 provides us with first insight on wage trends over the 1990s. It 
shows the average real hourly wages for workers with work limitations as defined by 
one-, two-, three-, and four-period measures for 1993-2001. As expected, wages for 
workers with disabilities in one-period sample are higher than the corresponding wage 
rates in two-period sample. In addition, one- and two- period series exhibit very 
similar trends over time. The data show a drop in hourly wages in 1995 and in 1997 
and a recovery by 2001, to just about their 1993 levels. While the overall economy 
was well into a recovery from the recession of the early 1990s, all evidence indicates 
that the beneficial effects of the economy growth were considerably delayed for 
persons with disabilities. It is difficult to analyze the wage series for three- and four-
period samples. These series are more volatile, probably reflecting the small sample 
sizes. 
While it is useful to look at the employment and wages of people with 
disabilities, we want to focus on their relative outcomes, i.e. employment and wages 
relative to those without disabilities, to make sure that the trend for individuals with 
disabilities is not simply mirroring economic developments in the entire labour force. 
Such effects are accounted for when we look at relative employment (i.e. the ratio of 
employment rates for men with disabilities over the employment rates for men without 
disabilities) and wage differential, in Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.5, respectively. In so 
doing, we see that the employment levels and trends are very similar to those in Figure 
1.2. The employment of people with disabilities increased considerably relative to the 
employment of those without disabilities over the second half of the 1990s.    14
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Figure 1.4: Wage Rates among Employed Working Age Population with Work 
Limitation in the SLID one-, two-, three-, and four-period samples 
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Figure 1.5: Wage Differential between Employed Working Age Work-Limited 
Persons and Non-Limited Persons, in the SLID one-, two-, three-,  
and four-period samples, percent 
   16
The wage differential has grown noticeably both for our one-period and two-
period samples in the second half of the 1990s. The wage gap has increased by 65.86 
percent (4.74 percentage points) in the one-period sample, and by 49.06 percent (4.87 
percentage points) in the two- period sample over 1993-2001. It appears that trends in 
wage differential for one-period and two-period series are closely related. 
Theoretically, we could use a regression analysis to confirm our impressions by 
formally testing for difference in the level and trends of disability prevalence, wage 
and employment rates between one- and multiple-period definitions of disability. 
Unfortunately, the value of such analysis is questionable in the light of the few 
observations available, e.g., there are only eight (nine) data points for the two-period 
(one-period) samples.  
At this point, we complete the analysis of the multi-period samples. The 
remainder of this section describes the results obtained for the one-period sample.
8 
Table 1.1 reports the means for the variables used in the analysis by disability 
status across the time period 1993-2001
9. The disabled individuals’ employment rate 
was just 52.7 percent (44.7%/84.8%) of that of non-disabled. Workers with disabilities 
earned on average $15.31 per hour, while workers without disabilities received 
$17.01. In other words, hourly wages of disabled workers total about 90.0 percent of 
the average hourly wage for their non-disabled counterparts.  
                                                 
8 We perform a simple test to make sure that a change in composition of population with disabilities is 
not driving the changes in employment and wages. We limit our sample to people experiencing 
disability and regress average year-to-year changes in outcome (employment or wage rate) on average 
changes in gender, age, and education: 
01 2 3 outcome pMale pYoung pMoreHS αα α α ε ∆= + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ,  
where  pMale  is a proportion of males in sample in year t, pYoung  is a share of people aged 40 and 
younger, and pMoreHS  is a proportion of those with education more than high school. None of the 
coefficients in either equation are statistically significant. Thus, we conclude that wage or employment 
changes we observe are not the result of changing composition of the population with disabilities.  
9 Detailed descriptive statistics by each year is available from author upon request.   17
 
 
Table 1.1 Sample Means for Selected Variables
10 
Variable  Persons with 
Disabilities 
Persons 
without 
Disabilities 
A. Working-Age Population (Aged 20-59)    
Positive wage reported?  0.447 0.848 
Male?  0.465 0.469 
Married (or common law)?  0.603 0.719 
Immigrant?  0.089 0.097 
Visible Minorities? (non-white)  0.033 0.046 
Age in years  43.84 38.75 
Age: 20-30?  0.112 0.224 
Age: 30-40?  0.218 0.311 
Age: 40-50?  0.317 0.283 
Age: 50+?  0.354 0.183 
Reside in    
     Atlantic provinces?  0.247 0.212 
     Quebec?  0.164 0.205 
     Ontario?  0.310 0.284 
     Prairies?  0.203 0.212 
     British Columbia?  0.077 0.085 
     Urban areas?  0.750 0.752 
Education 
     Less than High-School?  0.351 0.178 
     High School diploma?  0.258 0.294 
     Post-secondary diploma?  0.270 0.325 
     University degree  0.071 0.160 
Aboriginal?  0.046 0.027 
English mother tongue?  0.655 0.642 
Student?  0.037 0.057 
Years of work experience (full-time full-year equivalent)  14.08 14.20 
                                                 
10 Please refer to appendix for definitions of variables used.   18
Table 1.1 (Continued) 
 
 
B. Employed Working-Age Population (Aged 20-59) 
Persons 
with 
Disabilities 
Persons 
without 
Disabilities 
 
Composite Hourly Wage  15.31 17.01 
Job part-time?  0.181 0.119 
Employed full year  0.694 0.789 
All hour paid  1556 1809 
Hours paid per week  34.15 36.98 
Weeks worked per year  45.37 48.66 
Union member or covered by collective agreement?  0.368 0.365 
Employed in Public Sector?  0.232 0.247 
Managerial responsibilities 
        Influenced Budget/Stuffing or Pay/Promotion or decided work 
        for others or supervised others or job perceived managerial?  0.292  0.327 
        Influenced Budget/Stuffing?  0.133 0.164 
        Influenced Pay/Promotion?  0.087 0.116 
        Decided work for others?  0.196 0.232 
        Supervised others?  0.244 0.281 
        Job perceived managerial?  0.147 0.185 
Occupation 
         White collar occupation?  0.396 0.477 
         Service occupation?  0.275 0.222 
         Blue collar occupation?  0.314 0.284 
Industry 
         (ind1) Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing; Mining, Oil and Gas?  0.051 0.050 
         (ind2) Utilities, Construction?  0.058 0.065 
         (ind3) Manufacturing?  0.157 0.156 
         (ind4) Trade; Transportation and Warehousing?  0.192 0.187 
         (ind5) Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Leasing;  
         Professional, Scientific and Technical Services;  
         Management, Administrative and Other Support?  0.099  0.112 
         (ind6) Educational Services; Health Care and 
         Social Assistance?  0.199 0.194 
         (ind7) Information, Culture and Recreation;  
         Accommodation and Food Services; Other Services  0.145 0.129 
         (ind8) Public Administration  0.071 0.075 
No employees at all locations:  
          less than 20  0.251 0.237 
          20-99  0.157 0.164 
          100-499  0.129 0.142 
          500+  0.405  0.417 
Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2001   19
Not only do individuals with disabilities earn less when they work, but they 
also are less likely to work than non-disabled individuals; and if they do work, they 
work fewer hours and are more likely to work part-time, and be employed part-year. 
There are other important differences in average characteristics between persons with 
and without disabilities that are especially worthy to note. Disabled persons are 
typically older, reflecting the fact that some disabilities exhibit onset at older ages. 
Also individuals with disabilities, on average, are more likely to be single, and acquire 
lower education than individuals without disabilities.  
SLID contains information on job-related responsibilities such as whether 
worker occupies supervisory or managerial position, whether he or she decides work 
for others, influences on pay and promotion, and budgeting and staffing. It becomes 
evident from Table 1.1 that people with and without disabilities experience unequal 
outcomes with respect to their job-related responsibilities. Compared to the jobs non-
disabled individuals hold, employees with disabilities are less likely to occupy 
positions that require supervisory responsibilities (24.4% versus 28.1%), less likely to 
have any influence on pay and promotion (8.7% versus 11.6%), and less likely to be 
involved in deciding budget or staffing (13.3% versus 16.4%). 
Table 1.2 examines more closely the average hourly wage for workers with 
and without disabilities and its determinants. Persons with disabilities receive lower 
wages than persons without disabilities in every sub-category considered. Disabled 
men earned 89.8 percent of the non-disabled men’s level, with the corresponding 
figure for women at 90.2 percent. Even though the disadvantage of disabled men 
relative to non-disabled men is almost the same as that of disabled women relative to 
non-disabled women, both groups of men earn more, on average, then even non-
disabled women.    20
Table 1.2 Average Hourly Wages by Disability Status 
 
Variable 
Workers 
with 
Disabilities 
(1) 
Workers 
without 
Disabilities 
(2) 
Ratio 
(1)/(2) Variable 
Workers 
with 
Disabilities 
(1) 
Workers 
without 
Disabilities 
(2) 
Ratio 
(1)/(2)
Total population  15.31  17.01  0.900 Experience: 
<1 yr  10.20 11.26  0.906
Males 17.00  18.94  0.898 Exper.:  1-5  yrs  11.65  12.97  0.898
Females 13.62  15.10  0.902 Exper.:  5-10  yrs  13.07  15.42  0.847
Married  16.23  17.89  0.908 Exper.: 10-19 yrs 15.60  17.98  0.868
Single 13.53  14.98  0.903 Exper.:  19+  yrs  17.06  18.94  0.901
Immigrants 16.09  17.96  0.896 Union  member?  19.17  20.02  0.958
Non-immigrants 15.25  16.97 0.899 Non-union?  13.09  15.35 0.852
Visible minority  14.71  16.18  0.910 Public Sector?  19.67  21.07  0.933
Urban 15.55  17.52  0.888 Private  sector?  14.01  15.74  0.890
Rural 14.56  15.61  0.933 Influenced 
Budget/Stuffing? 19.44 22.09  0.880
Age: 20-29  11.23  12.96  0.866 Influenced 
Pay/Promotion?  19.49 22.28  0.875
Age: 30-39  14.93  17.32  0.862 Decided work 
for others?  18.25 20.62  0.885
Age: 40-49  16.33  18.91  0.863 Supervised 
others?  17.94 20.19  0.889
Age: 50+  16.95  19.09  0.888 Job perceived 
managerial?  18.85 21.49  0.877
Atlantic 
provinces  13.29 14.60  0.910 White  collar  occ  17.93  19.62  0.914
Quebec 15.39  17.15  0.897 Service  occ  11.10  12.17  0.912
Ontario  16.68  18.63  0.895 Blue collar occ  15.61  16.50  0.946
Prairies 14.47  16.47  0.879 Ind1  15.92  17.41  0.915
British Columbia  17.41  18.97  0.918 Ind2  17.98  18.83  0.955
Less than high 
school  12.61 13.49  0.935 Ind3  16.49  17.67  0.933
High school  14.06  15.10  0.931 Ind4  12.90  14.22  0.907
Some college  16.06  17.07  0.941 Ind5  14.39  17.24  0.835
University 
degree  22.43 23.54  0.953 Ind6  17.60  19.48  0.903
Aboriginal 13.98  14.93  0.936 Ind7  11.07  12.86  0.861
Student 16.15  17.45  0.925 Ind8  19.39  21.12  0.918
Job part-time?  12.54  14.16  0.886 No employees: 
less than 20  12.01 13.23  0.908
Full-time job  15.94  17.45  0.913 20-99  14.43  15.97  0.903
Employed full 
year  16.74 18.10  0.925 100-499  16.25  18.08  0.899
Employed not 
full year  12.11 13.15  0.921 500+  17.73  19.48  0.910
Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2001   21
The ratio of hourly wages for disabled to non-disabled workers is highest 
(meaning wage differential is lowest) for workers covered by union or collective 
agreement (95.8%), for those employed in the utilities and construction industry 
(95.5%), and for those who holds university degree (95.3%). The ratio of hourly 
wages is lowest (pay differential is highest) for employees of finance, insurance, and 
real estate industry (83.5%), for workers with 5-10 years of full time-equivalent job 
experience (84.7%), and for those workers not affiliated with the union (85.2%).  
Persons with disabilities working part-time are paid on average 88.6 percent of 
hourly wages of non-disabled individuals working part-time. Also, though large firms 
pay more than small firms, there is almost no difference in wage gap between non-
disabled and disabled workers by firm size.  
The type of responsibilities required by individual’s job might also contribute 
to the wage differential between workers with and without disabilities. As noted 
earlier, on average, non-disabled workers are more likely to hold positions with 
supervisory or managerial responsibilities. In addition, non-disabled workers in such 
positions enjoy an hourly wage rate about 12 percent higher than disabled workers.  
Tables 1.3A-1.3C explore trends in differences in hourly wage rate for workers 
with and without disabilities more closely. For simplicity, only data for 1993, 1995, 
1997, 1999 and 2001 are presented. For men with disabilities aged 20-34 wage, the 
differential has grown by 7 percentage points by 2001 compared to 1993 and 
comprised 16.3 percent, while for women with disabilities in the same age group it has 
declined almost by 2 percentage points.  
   22
Table 1.3 Trends in Wages for Selected Sub-groups, by Disability Status 
A.     
 Total  Population  Men  Women 
Year 
Persons  
with 
Disabilities 
(dollars) 
(1) 
Persons 
without 
Disabilities
(dollars) 
 (2) 
Ratio of 
wage  
rates 
(percent)
(1)/(2)
Persons with
Disabilities
(dollars) 
 (3) 
Persons 
without 
Disabilities
(dollars) 
 (4) 
Ratio of 
wage  
rates 
(percent)
(3)/(4)
Persons  
with 
Disabilities
(dollars)  
 (5) 
Persons 
without 
Disabilities
(dollars) 
 (6) 
Ratio of 
wage 
rates 
(percent)
(5)/(6)
1993  15.56 16.77  92.8  17.33 18.64  93.0  13.36 14.81  90.2 
1995  15.16 16.61  91.3  16.56 18.39  90.0  13.45 14.75  91.2 
1997  14.98 16.70  89.7  16.56 18.58  89.1  13.29 14.73  90.2 
1999  15.39 17.32  88.9  17.12 19.29  88.8  13.87 15.27  90.8 
2001  15.57 17.68  88.1  17.30 19.69  87.9  13.98 15.62  89.5 
               
B.              
 Total  Population  Men  Women 
Year 
Persons  
with 
Disabilities 
(dollars) 
(1) 
Persons 
without 
Disabilities
(dollars) 
 (2) 
Ratio of 
wage  
rates 
(percent)
(1)/(2)
Persons with
Disabilities
(dollars) 
 (3) 
Persons 
without 
Disabilities
(dollars) 
 (4) 
Ratio of 
wage  
rates 
(percent)
(3)/(4)
Persons  
with 
Disabilities
(dollars)  
 (5) 
Persons 
without 
Disabilities
(dollars) 
 (6) 
Ratio of 
wage 
rates 
(percent)
(5)/(6)
Age 20-34              
1993  12.70 14.40  88.2  13.83 15.27  90.6  11.16 13.44  83.0 
1995  12.64 14.09  89.7  13.16 15.02  87.6  12.02 13.10  91.8 
1997  12.19 13.97  87.3  13.14 15.06  87.3  11.27 12.82  87.9 
1999  13.12 14.68  89.4  14.03 15.88  88.4  12.32 13.42  91.8 
2001  12.58 15.05  83.6  13.58 16.25  83.6  11.69 13.77  84.9 
               
Age 35-49              
1993  16.17 18.47  87.5  18.63 21.07  88.4  13.63 15.9 85.7 
1995  15.87 18.31  86.7  17.46 20.68  84.4  14.05 15.95  88.1 
1997  15.76 18.32  86.0  17.58 20.56  85.5  13.94 16.05  86.9 
1999  15.97 18.65  85.6  17.85 20.93  85.3  14.48 16.34  88.6 
2001  16.34 18.99  86.0  18.15 21.38  84.9  14.77 16.61  88.9 
               
Age 50+              
1993  17.54 18.49  94.9  18.84 21.35  88.2  15.39 15.32  100.5 
1995  17.04 18.69  91.2  18.99 21.15  89.8  14.17 15.79  89.7 
1997  16.57 18.67  88.8  18.08 21.48  84.2  14.52 15.52  93.6 
1999  16.49 19.28  85.5  18.65 22.06  84.5  14.17 16.23  87.3 
2001  16.91 19.77  85.5  19.04 22.60  84.2  14.69 16.79  87.5   23
Table 1.3 (continued) 
C. 
 Total  Population  Men  Women 
Year 
Persons  
with 
Disabilities 
(dollars) 
(1) 
Persons 
without 
Disabilities 
(dollars) 
 (2) 
Ratio of 
wage 
rates 
(percent)
(1)/(2)
Persons 
with 
Disabilities
(dollars) 
 (3) 
Persons 
without 
Disabilities 
(dollars) 
 (4) 
Ratio of 
wage  
rates 
(percent)
(3)/(4) 
Persons  
with 
Disabilities
(dollars)  
 (5) 
Persons 
without 
Disabilities 
(dollars)  
 (6) 
Ratio of 
wage 
rates 
(percent)
(5)/(6) 
Education: Less than High School             
1993  13.32 13.53  98.4  15.11  15.35  98.4  10.54 10.92  96.5 
1995  12.86 13.57  94.8  14.72  15.34  96.0 9.45  10.75  87.9 
1997  12.72 13.35  95.3  14.37  15.23  94.4  10.31 10.44  98.8 
1999  11.80 13.61  86.7  13.72  15.57  88.1 9.66  10.47  92.3 
2001  12.30 13.44  91.5  14.28  15.45  92.4 9.60  10.30  93.2 
Education: High School Only            
1993  14.58 14.96  97.5  17.16  16.81  102  11.39 13.01  87.5 
1995  13.19 14.68  89.9  14.66  16.56  88.5  11.08 12.73  87.0 
1997  13.74 14.85  92.5  15.50  16.85  92.0  12.04 12.74  94.5 
1999  14.54 15.45  94.1  16.54  17.58  94.1  12.55 13.19  95.1 
2001  14.20 15.49  91.7  16.76  17.57  95.4  11.83 13.24  89.4 
Education: More than High School           
1993  17.81 19.12  93.1  19.47  21.42  90.9  16.02 17.02  94.1 
1995  17.17 18.77  91.5  18.75  20.87  89.8  15.73 16.86  93.3 
1997  17.19 18.77  91.6  18.97  20.99  90.4  15.49 16.74  92.5 
1999  17.89 19.53  91.6  19.93  21.84  91.3  16.48 17.43  94.5 
2001  17.91 19.99  89.6  19.57  22.38  87.4  16.64 17.82  93.4 
D.                 
 Total  Population  Men  Women 
Year 
Persons  
with 
Disabilities 
(dollars) 
(1) 
Persons 
without 
Disabilities 
(dollars) 
 (2) 
Ratio of 
wage 
rates 
(percent)
(1)/(2)
Persons  
with 
Disabilities
(dollars) 
 (3) 
Persons 
without 
Disabilities 
(dollars) 
 (4) 
Ratio of 
wage  
rates 
(percent)
(3)/(4) 
Persons  
with 
Disabilities
(dollars)  
 (5) 
Persons 
without 
Disabilities 
(dollars)  
 (6) 
Ratio of 
wage 
rates 
(percent)
(5)/(6) 
Full-year employed              
1993  16.91 17.94  94.3  18.27  19.98  91.4  15.01 15.9 94.4 
1995  16.56 17.74  93.3  17.7 19.62  90.2  15.17 15.79  96.1 
1997  16.51 17.76  93.0  18.28  19.72  92.7  14.55 15.72  92.6 
1999  16.82 18.35  91.7  18.51  20.33  91.0  15.33 16.26  94.3 
2001  16.64 18.62  89.4  18.21  20.62  88.3 15.2 16.54  91.9 
Part year employed              
1993  12.61 13.23  95.3  14.89  14.92  99.8  10.34 11.2 92.3 
1995  12.41 12.86  96.5  14.33  14.36  99.8  10.04 11.25  89.2 
1997  11.53 12.85  89.7  12.45  14.49  85.9  10.63 11.09  95.9 
1999  12.14 13.14  92.4  13.94  14.92  93.4  10.56 11.36  93.0 
2001  12.85 13.78  93.3  14.99  15.73  95.3  10.85 11.84  91.6 
Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2001.   24
The wage gap between non-disabled and disabled men with low educational 
attainments has widened significantly over the time period considered, men with 
disabilities who have education less than high school received on average 98.4 percent 
of hourly wages of similar men without disabilities in 1993 and were paid only 92.4 
percent of non-disabled men’s wage in 2001. Women in similar group did slightly 
better, the wage differential between women without and with disabilities with 
education less than high school has grown 3.3 percentage points. Thus, as results in 
Table 1.3A-1.3C indicate, there is no evidence that the relative position of the disabled 
has improved in terms of earned wages over the nine years considered. 
1.3 Econometric Methods 
What accounts for such observed differences in pay for workers with and 
without disabilities? How much of the difference can be explained by observed wage-
determining factors and how much can be attributed to different pricing of those 
factors in the labour market and/or our ability to control for productivity differences 
between non-disabled and disabled workers? To answer these questions we start with 
the multivariate technique known as Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition of wage 
differentials. It aims to decompose the observed average log-wage differential between 
workers without and with disabilities into the portion attributable to differences in the 
average values of explanatory variables and the portion attributable to differences in 
coefficients (or ”pricing”). The Oaxaca-Blinder procedure is useful for looking at the 
mean wage gap, but we might be interested in what is happening at other parts of the 
distribution. For example an average wage differential of 10% is consistent not only 
with a situation where all workers with disabilities are underpaid by 10% but also with 
one in which half of the disabled workers are underpaid by 20% and the other half 
receive the same wage as non-disabled workers. Furthermore, we might be interested   25
in knowing if the same factors account for the differential at different parts of the 
distribution. Therefore, later we extend our analysis by examining the entire 
distribution of the wage gap. We use a technique suggested by Juhn, Murphy and 
Pierce (1993) with modification to account for selection into the labour market. The 
main feature of the John-Murphy-Pierce approach is that allows the decomposition of 
the wage gap at different points of the distribution. 
1.3.1 Estimating wages 
We follow the traditional labour force participation model in assuming that an 
individual deciding whether or not to enter the labour market compares the employer’s 
wage offer and his or her reservation wage. Low employment rates could be due in 
part to high reservation wages associated with certain types of disability as a 
consequence of disability income transfers and the extra demands on time and energy 
required to participate in the labour force. Low employment rates might also be due to 
low market wage rates offered to the disabled as a consequence of lower levels of 
productivity and/or accommodation costs required from employer. 
Let us start with cross-sectional log-wage equations to be estimated for the 
years 1993-2001 separately for disabled and non-disabled. The hourly offer wage of 
individual i is determined as 
0 ln     (j d,nd)
j jj j
iii WX βε =+ =         ( 1 )  
where d and nd stand for persons with and without disabilities respectively,  0
i W is the 
hourly wage offered by employer,  i X is a vector of variables believed to determine 
hourly pay, β  the associated rates of return, and  i ε  is an error term distributed 
normally with zero mean.    26
The reservation wage may be written as  
ln     (j d,nd)
Rj j j j
ii i WZ αν =+ =       ( 2 )  
where  i Z  is a vector including wage-determining characteristics along with factors 
affecting the individual’s time value, such as the level of exogenous income and the 
presence of young children.  
Individual works if the offer wage exceeds his or her reservation wage, i.e.,  
0 1   ,        
0,    
(individual i works)  if  and
otherwise.
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Therefore, the employment probability of individual i is as follows: 
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where 
2
u σ  is the variance of the difference in the error terms for the offer and 
reservation wage equations, i.e.  () [ ] () [ ] σε ν
11
jj j j 22 u ii i =v a ru =v a r - .  () Φ⋅ is the cumulative 
standard normal distribution function
11,  j γ  is a combined vector of parameters  j β  and 
j α , and 
j
i Y is the associate combined vector of 
j
i X  and 
j
i Z . 
The labour force participation decision is modeled then via a probit 
specification: 
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11 The difference in error terms, 
jj j
ii i u= ε -ν  is distributed normally with zero mean and variance 
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At this point we also explore the question of sample-selection bias arising from 
the exclusion of non-workers from the sample, given that the disabled in particular are 
unlikely to be a random sub-set of the population. The probability of being employed 
is correlated with an unobserved capacity to earn; the error term in the wage equation 
will be correlated with wages. The distribution of observed wages will differ from the 
distribution of offered wages, which also include the potential wages of those who are 
not employed and parameter estimates will be biased. The implication of this non-
random selection is the wage comparisons between non-disabled and disabled 
workers, where one only observed wages for those who work, will likely misrepresent 
the true magnitude of the components of the wage differential. Therefore, we should 
examine wage offers rather than observed wages since we are interested in the 
opportunities available to people with disabilities versus people without disabilities. 
Thus, the wage equations are further refined by using Heckman’s two-stage
12 
correction procedure for sample selection bias. A reduced-form probit equation (5) of 
the probability of being employed (or having any observed wage, i.e. of Wi being 
greater than zero) is estimated and used to derive the inverse Mills ratio, which is 
introduced as an additional regressor into the wage equation on the second stage of 
estimation.  
Consequently, the sample selection corrected wage equations are 
                                                 
12  There are two reasons why in our opinion two-stage estimation is preferable to the direct ML 
estimation of the Heckman model. First, ML relies on joint normality of the errors in the selection and 
level equations. If none of the equations is misspecified, simultaneous estimation yields more efficient 
estimates. On the other hand, misspecification of one equation may contaminate the other, resulting in 
inconsistent estimates. In contrast, the two-step estimator only relies on conditional moments. Although 
derived under assumption of joint normality, such assumptions may hold for a wider class of 
distributions, at least approximately. Second, using OLS in the second stage has the advantage that the 
average of the residual is zero, which does not hold for the ML Heckman estimator.   28
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1.3.2 Identification 
Formally, our selection model is identified even if X=Z.  The identification 
comes from the non-linearity of the inverse Mills ratio. However, in the finite sample, 
the X=Z case might result in substantial collinearity between the predicted inverse 
Mills ratio term and the remaining covariates in the wage equation, which leads to 
large standard errors. Therefore, additional identification is obtained via the exclusion 
restrictions (variables that belong in the participation equation but not in the wage 
equation) by including a variable for the number of children in the household in the 
employment equation if the respondent is the head of household or spouse of the head 
of household (zero otherwise). We justify use of variable for number of children as an 
exclusion restriction by reasoning that, conditional on age, education, and other 
observables, there is no strong reason that they should directly affect the wage, while 
they should affect employment by raising the opportunity cost of working (as well as 
the direct cost if childcare must be purchased). In addition to this, we also incorporate 
a dummy indicating the presence of another wage income earner in the household in 
the participation equation. The presence of another person with earnings in household 
does not affect the wage determination, per se. However, the decision to participate in 
the labour market is likely to be affected. Finally, in the participation equation for the 
disabled, we include dummy variables for the duration of the health conditions. We 
reason that the duration of the health condition is a proxy for severity of the condition. 
Those with more severe conditions incur higher costs of participation in employment.   29
However, once the decision to participate has been made, the duration of the health 
condition should not play a major role in wage determination.  
1.3.3 Estimating the wage gap and its components:  
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
In estimating the magnitude of the components of the wage differential 
between workers with and without disabilities we follow earlier study by Baldwin and 
Johnson (1994), based on a technique described by Reimers (1983). The gap in wage 
offers between non-disabled and disabled employees can be decomposed as: 
() ()
() () [ ] () [ ]()
ˆˆ ln ln
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ     
nd d nd nd d d
nd d nd d nd d nd d
WW
XX D I D X I D X D
δλ δ λ
ββ β β
−− − =
=− + −+ − − −
   (7) 
where I is the identity matrix and D a matrix of weights.  
The first term on the left hand side, (ln ln
nd d WW − ) can be interpreted as 
percentage differences in observed wages between non-disabled and disabled workers; 
the second term () ˆˆ nd nd d d δλ δ λ −  reflects the role that differences in selection into the 
labour market (across disability status) play in observing wage differentials, and it 
measures the magnitude of the wage differential that would have been underestimated 
had selection not have been taken into account. In other words, it is the change in log 
wage due to selection bias. Finally,  () ˆˆ ln ln
nd d nd nd d d WW δλ δ λ −− − then represents the 
difference in mean wage offers between employees without and with disabilities.  
The first term on the right hand side of (7) is called “the endowment term” or 
“the explained part” because it indicates the part of the wage gap, which can be 
attributed to measured differences in wage-determining characteristics (endowments). 
It measures the part of the wage difference that arises because disabled workers are   30
under-represented in high-paying, skilled occupations or have less education on 
average than workers without health limitations.  
The second term represents the part, which cannot be explained by the 
variables included in the wage model, it reflects the differences across groups of 
workers in how their characteristics are valued by the employer. This second term is 
sometimes referred to as “the discrimination term”, “coefficient effect”, or 
“unexplained portion”. We have to be cautious when interpreting this part of the wage 
differential. It is standard practice in empirical literature to call it “discrimination”. 
However, it is an upper bound of discrimination, especially for discrimination against 
people with disabilities. When considering pay differentials, for example, for men and 
women, or for blacks and whites, the implicit assumption is that there are no inherent 
productivity-related differences between these groups. In contrast, for persons with 
disabilities there may remain a residual amount of productivity-based differential, 
even in the absence of any discrimination. In addition, we are dependent on our ability 
to control for unobserved productivity differences in our model. The unexplained part 
contains the effects of all those variables that are not part of the X-matrix; and 
economic theory suggests many ways in which unobserved variables may be 
differently distributed across persons with and without disabilities and might thereby 
contribute to the wage differential as well. Therefore, it would be reasonable to view 
() [ ]() ˆˆ nd d nd d XID X D ββ −− −  as the upper bound of discrimination only.  
D is a weighting matrix, its values depend on which group is the frame of 
reference. If D=0 then it is implied that it is workers with disabilities who are paid 
according to their characteristics, while non-disabled workers receive excessively 
generous compensation. If D=1 then the presumption is that non-disabled employees 
are paid according to their characteristics, and it is disabled workers who are receiving   31
lower compensation than their characteristics would suggest. It is an arbitrary 
normalization, which group to select as the reference group. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 
(1991) suggest that the magnitudes of wage gap components would ordinarily be 
close, but not necessarily equal depending on which normalization one selects. In this 
case, however, there exists a reason to prefer one normalization to the other. If one 
group is significantly larger than the other, using the coefficients from the larger group 
to multiply by the smaller group’s mean in the decomposition (i.e. group one is the 
larger group) would result in an estimation of the difference with a smaller standard 
error.  
In the above decomposition, since workers with disabilities represent a small 
part of the labour force, we have chosen to present the computations using the 
coefficient vector for workers without disabilities as a reference structure with which 
we evaluate the contribution of the differences in characteristics (i.e., D=1)
13. 
Therefore, the wage differential is decomposed assuming that the wage structure (and 
hence productivity) for both disabled and non-disabled is given by the estimated 
coefficients for non-disabled:  
() () () ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ln ln
nd d nd nd d d nd nd d d nd d
kk k k k k
kk
WW X X X δλ δ λ β β β −− −= − + − ∑∑    (7’) 
The advantage of this procedure is that it enables a clear interpretation: using 
the non-disabled structure as reference and computing the effect of different 
characteristics yields an answer to the question “how much would remain of the gross 
                                                 
13 However, the results when using workers with disabilities as the base, taking the mean of coefficients 
for non-disabled and disabled workers, taking rations given by shares of the non-disabled and disabled 
in the working population and figures obtained from pooled regression are available from author upon 
request, together with detailed wage decompositions for each year.   32
differential in wages if disabled workers were treated as their non-disabled 
counterparts with similar characteristics?” 
1.3.4 Estimating the wage gap and its components:  
Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce decomposition 
Since the regression models in the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions are based 
on the ordinary least squares method, the decomposition results are a statement about 
the effects on the wages of the “average” non-disabled employee compared to the 
“average” disabled employee. These “average” results may not be reflective of the 
outcomes for workers at other wage percentiles (e.g., 10
th percentile, 75
th percentile) 
and, therefore, may be less valuable for understanding the wage determination for 
those earning at other points of the distribution. Therefore, our next task is to illustrate 
the role played by the wage distribution in determining the magnitude of the wage gap 
and its components. We follow Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) but modify their 
technique allowing for selection in the model. The main feature of the John-Murphy-
Pierce approach is that it allows decomposition of the wage gap at different points of 
the distribution.  
We start from a wage equation corrected for sample selection as in (6). Offer 
wage can be written in the form  δλ β ˆ ln
jj j jj
ii i
j
i Xu W =+ − , where 
j
i u  capture unobserved 
factors and have distribution function 
j F . If  ()
j
i
j j j
ii FuX θ =   denotes the rank 
(percentile) of individual i in the cumulative residual distribution 
j F , then we can 
write:  () ()
1 jj j
ii uF θ
− = , where  () 1 F− ⋅  is the inverse of the cumulative distribution 
function. Note that by using the actual distribution of residuals, we do not impose 
normality on the residual distribution.   33
Next, assume that a reference residual distribution is given by the residual 
distribution for sample of non-disabled individuals. We can then determine 
hypothetical outcomes with varying characteristics between the groups but fixed 
coefficients and a fixed residual distribution as 
() ()
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, nd nd nd nd nd nd
ii
dd n d n d d d
ii
WX F u X
WX F u X
β
β
−
−
=+
=+
 
Furthermore, the hypothetical outcomes with varying characteristics and 
varying prices but a fixed residual distribution are given as 
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Finally, the outcomes with varying characteristics, varying coefficients and a 
varying residual distribution can be determined as 
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These last outcomes are obviously nothing else than the originally observed 
values of wage offered, that is: 
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Now let S(i)  stand for a summary statistic of the distribution of the variable in 
parenthesis. For instance, S( nd W ) may be the mean, median or the inter-quartile range 
of the distribution of  nd W . Then the differential  ()( )
nd d SW SW −  can then be 
decomposed as 
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That is, the total difference (T) can be attributed to differences in observable 
characteristics (Q), differences in observable prices (P), and differences in 
unobservable characteristics and prices (U). 
1.3.5 Estimating Employment Effects of Imposing the Same Wage 
Structure for Persons with and without Disabilities 
The last question we are going to explore in this paper is if characteristics of 
persons with disabilities are priced differently from characteristics of persons without 
disabilities, how does this affect the employment probabilities of this population? 
Baldwin and Johnson’s approach (1994) later improved by Kidd et al. (2000) enables 
one to examine the sensitivity of the employment decision to the presence of different 
wage structures for disabled and non-disabled workers. Therefore, it allows us to 
quantify the upper bound of employment loss due to less favorable pricing of 
characteristics of persons with disabilities in each year.  
Let’s assume that we are able to exhaustively measure the variables that relate 
to productivity differences between non-disabled and disabled workers, and that there 
is none of the residual amount of productivity-based differential left.  Then the second 
term of Oaxaca Blinder decomposition turns to zero. In addition, in such a case, wages 
for disabled workers will be higher, wages for non-disabled workers will be lower, and 
the wage equation relating wages to characteristics would have different coefficients, 
where the coefficient on any one variable would likely be between  d β and  nd β . 
An apparent candidate for measuring the overall employment effects of 
eliminating the unexplained component in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is the 
difference ()
* jj
ii PP −  averaged over all persons with and without disabilities (j=d, nd), 
where  * j
i P  is the probability of employment in an “ideal world” where wages for   35
disabled and non-disabled are set to be equal, and  j
i P is the employment probability we 
observe. 
The Baldwin and Johnson’s (1992) procedure, later refined by Kidd et al. 
(2003), consists of three steps.  
First, the estimated coefficients from the participation probit model (5) are 
used to predict the probability of employment for each individual i and disability 
status j=d, nd, and then averaging provides  j P , the average predicted probability of 
employment for persons with and without disabilities: 
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where  () Φ⋅ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function.  
The second step is to estimate * j
i P , the average probability of employment in 
the world with the same wage structure for persons with and without disabilities. 
Pursuing the Baldwin and Johnson (1992) approach, this can be written as: 
*
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where 
* j
i W is the wage offered when there is no difference in pricing of characteristics 
between disabled and non-disabled.  
In order to calculate 
* j P  we need to identify parameter  j
u σ . Reduced probit (5) 
allows us to find ()
jj
u γσ but not  j
u σ . Baldwin and Johnson (1992) suggest imposing 
an additional restriction in their model by assuming that hours worked are proportional 
to the gap between offer and reservation wage. However, the easiest way to identify 
j
u σ  is to assume that the offer wage equation (1) includes a variable that is excluded 
from the reservation wage equation (2), call this variable X0. Then from (6) we obtain   36
an estimate  0 ˆ β , and from reduced probit model (5) we get an estimate of () σ 0 u β  and 
division of these estimates allow us to identify σu . However, the question of which 
variable is most suitable to fulfill the role of the exclusion restriction still remains. 
Heckman (1976), Baldwin and Johnson (1992, 1996), and Kidd et al. (2000, 2003) 
have assumed that it is the labour market experience (or education) that affects the 
offered wage but not the individual’s reservation wage. Taking into account the 
narrow choice of variables capable to pose as exclusion restriction is, i.e. experience, 
education, or region of residence, we follow earlier studies and assume that the 
equation for offer wage depends on the level of experience while the individual’s 
reservation wage does not. Hence, after identifying  j
u σ  separately for persons with and 
without disabilities, we can obtain  * j P  from (9). 
Then, the employment effect of eliminating the second term in Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition
14 is estimated as the difference in employment probabilities scaled by 
the population size, i.e. the estimated number of jobs not taken by persons with 
disabilities as a result of the less favourable pricing of their characteristics, is 
()
*        ( , ) j jj j
ii EP P N j d n d ∆= − =        ( 1 0 )  
Finally, turning to estimating an uncompensated wage elasticity of labour 
supply (in terms of participation decision), we calculate the participation elasticity as 
the ratio of percentage change in employment to percentage change in the wage. 
                                                 
14 The calculation of employment effects uses Cotton-style weights, i.e. D is set to be equal to the 
proportion of persons without disability in sample.  If instead we use D=1, then the hypothetical 
employment probability for non-disabled is equal to the estimated probability and the wage elasticity is 
therefore zero for this group. We hypothesize, however, that the employment participation decision is 
neither perfectly elastic nor perfectly inelastic.   37
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Employment participation 
The employment participation probit estimates are presented in Table 1.4. A 
first stage selection equation includes gender dummy variable, dummies for age (30-
39 is the omitted category), visible minority status, immigration status, education 
categories, urban/rural residence, regional dummies (Ontario is the omitted category), 
marital status, presence of children under 18 in a household, presence of another 
earner in a household, regional unemployment rate, years of work experience and 
squared years of work experience, variable indicating amount of non-labour income 
for the individual, and dummy variables for duration of health-limiting condition for 
those who answered positively to disability question. In all cases, Likelihood Ratio 
tests unambiguously reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients in each regression 
are jointly insignificant. 
Turning to the coefficient estimates, most findings are in accordance with 
expectations. The results show that more educated individuals are significantly more 
likely to be employed than those with lower education; a finding that applies both for 
the disabled as well as the non-disabled. However, the marginal effect of education is 
stronger for the disabled, indicating the particular importance of obtaining higher 
levels of education among this group.
15 There are, in addition, strong age effects, 
conforming to the usual pattern. The presence of children has a negative effect on 
participation for non-disabled individuals, and generally positive effect on 
participation of disabled. The presence of another household member with labour 
                                                 
15 A full set of marginal effects is available from the authors upon request.    38
earnings has a positive effect on employment participation for both individuals with 
and without disabilities. For the disabled, having a long-lasting health problem reduces 
the likelihood of employment. There is no persistent pattern of regional effects 
compared to the omitted region (Ontario). On the whole, therefore, particular personal 
and other characteristics appear to have similar qualitative effects on the probability of 
employment for both the non-disabled and disabled, although there are some notable 
exceptions (for instance non-disabled males are more likely to be employed than non-
disabled females in all years in our analysis; for people with disabilities the marginal 
effect of gender on employment becomes statistically insignificant in the late 1990s). 
However, while qualitatively similar, formal tests of parameter equality among the 
different sub-groups unambiguously reject the null of homogeneity in each case. 
The p-value from a test of the joint null hypothesis that the coefficients on all 
of the exclusion restrictions equal zero rejects this null with a p-value of 0.000. Thus, 
weak instruments are not a problem here. 
1.4.2 Wages 
The results for selectivity corrected wage regressions for persons with and 
without disabilities are shown in Table 1.5. In the wage equation, we include, in 
addition to the common variables mentioned above, the individual’s job 
characteristics, such as, whether he or she is employed part-time, full-year, whether he 
or she is covered by collective bargaining, whether working in public sector, whether 
the individual has managerial responsibilities on the job, and dummy variables which 
refer to the worker’s industry, occupation, and employing firm’s size.  
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Table 1.4 Employment Participation Probit Estimates, one-period sample, selected years 
 
 Disabled  Non-Disabled 
Variable 1993  1995  1997  1999  2001  1993  1995  1997  1999  2001 
Condition duration:  
(reference group: < 1 yr) 
       1-4 years  -1.159***  -0.581***  -0.712***  -0.535***  -0.300***           
 (7.70)  (4.01)  (7.27)  (6.52)  (3.46)           
       5-9 years  -1.077***  -0.633***  -0.780***  -0.900***  -0.456***           
 (6.55)  (3.85)  (7.61)  (10.18)  (4.96)           
       10-19 years    -1.048***  -0.664***  -0.832***  -0.864***  -0.606***           
 (6.18)  (3.90)  (7.74)  (9.13)  (6.51)           
       20 years or more    -0.780***  -0.281  -0.405***  -0.567***  -0.280***           
 (4.58)  (1.57)  (3.63)  (5.79)  (2.84)           
male 0.213**  0.200*  0.158**  -0.030  0.027 0.600***  0.559***  0.536***  0.420***  0.458*** 
 (2.14)  (1.88)  (2.52)  (0.47)  (0.44)  (14.81) (12.80)  (18.29)  (14.80)  (13.60) 
married -0.035  -0.004  -0.093  -0.156**  -0.048 -0.102**  -0.096*  -0.202***  -0.276***  -0.301*** 
 (0.29)  (0.03)  (1.26)  (2.01)  (0.65)  (2.12) (1.90)  (5.81)  (7.66)  (7.33) 
immigrant -0.019  -0.042  0.046  -0.062  -0.164 -0.093  -0.200**  -0.020  -0.041 -0.114** 
 (0.11)  (0.21)  (0.39)  (0.51)  (1.33)  (1.31) (2.57)  (0.40)  (0.82)  (1.99) 
Visible minority  0.180  -0.023  -0.084  0.187 0.345**  -0.107  0.125  -0.045  -0.144**  -0.016 
 (0.61)  (0.06)  (0.43)  (1.09)  (2.02)  (1.07) (1.10)  (0.66)  (2.25)  (0.21) 
urban -0.017  -0.036  0.063  0.194***  0.002 0.001  0.057 0.047  0.037 0.013 
 (0.16)  (0.32)  (0.93)  (2.78)  (0.04)  (0.04) (1.37)  (1.64)  (1.27)  (0.38) 
Age:  
(reference group:30-39) 
       20-29  0.368** 0.313*  0.545***  0.436***  0.475***  0.288*** 0.358***  0.375***  0.075*  0.168*** 
 (2.20)  (1.70)  (5.09)  (3.65)  (3.77)  (5.49) (6.09)  (9.36)  (1.76)  (3.28) 
       40-49  -0.371***  -0.608***  -0.365***  -0.263*** -0.497***  -0.242***  -0.346***  -0.272***  -0.118***  -0.147*** 
 (2.74)  (4.01)  (4.41)  (3.09)  (5.75)  (4.90) (6.50)  (7.64)  (3.36)  (3.52) 
       50+  -1.049***  -1.123***  -0.946***  -0.807*** -0.994***  -0.840***  -1.065***  -1.037***  -0.783***  -0.868*** 
 (6.47)  (6.12)  (9.20)  (7.94)  (9.78)  (13.30) (15.42)  (22.70)  (17.61)  (16.82) 
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Table 1.4 (continued) 
 Disabled  Non-Disabled 
Variable 1993  1995  1997  1999  2001  1993  1995  1997  1999  2001 
Region of residence 
(reference group: Ontario) 
       Atlantic provinces  -0.280  0.104 -0.241*  -0.144 -0.202  0.082 0.011 0.061  0.014 -0.033 
 (1.51)  (0.47)  (1.87)  (1.15)  (1.42)  (1.12) (0.13) (1.06)  (0.25) (0.44) 
       Quebec  -0.223  0.082  -0.137  -0.405*** -0.127  -0.208***  -0.212***  -0.099**  -0.218***  -0.136** 
 (1.19)  (0.35)  (1.15)  (3.19)  (0.96)  (3.02) (2.59) (1.97)  (4.24) (2.10) 
         Prairies  0.301**  0.093  0.224** 0.067  0.100  0.127** -0.020 0.213***  0.086**  0.094** 
 (2.21)  (0.60)  (2.12)  (0.77)  (1.05)  (2.33) (0.32) (4.48)  (2.22) (1.98) 
         British Columbia  0.096  0.155 0.274**  0.108 0.053  0.067 -0.011 0.044  0.044  -0.143** 
 (0.50)  (0.84)  (2.39)  (0.87)  (0.43)  (0.95) (0.15) (0.87)  (0.85) (2.56) 
Years of schooling  0.233***  0.445***  0.263***  0.160*** 0.109** 0.263***  0.297*** 0.241***  0.217*** 0.195*** 
 (3.36)  (5.43)  (6.09)  (3.77)  (2.56)  (8.73) (9.27) (11.92)  (10.74)  (8.29) 
Experience 0.377**  0.452**  0.499***  -0.147  0.202** 0.799***  1.003***  1.006*** -0.010  0.356*** 
 (2.27)  (2.46)  (4.71)  (1.44)  (1.99)  (12.50) (14.39) (21.90)  (0.23)  (6.86) 
Experience squared  -0.002  -0.024  -0.041  0.089*** 0.030  -0.123***  -0.155*** -0.170***  0.035***  -0.038***
 (0.05)  (0.53)  (1.55)  (3.24)  (1.12)  (7.25) (8.35) (14.07)  (3.06) (2.74) 
Number of children in HH  0.044  0.103*  0.127***  0.067* 0.079**  -0.087***  -0.101***  -0.110*** -0.088***  -0.077***
 (0.81)  (1.71)  (3.58)  (1.87)  (2.17)  (4.76) (5.06) (8.15)  (6.58) (4.92) 
Provincial unemployment rate  0.013  -0.072  -0.001 -0.009  0.028 -0.006 -0.035**  -0.017*  -0.005  0.007 
 (0.46)  (1.55)  (0.04)  (0.41)  (1.00)  (0.55) (2.42) (1.70)  (0.51) (0.48) 
Non-labour income, in thousands  -0.064***  -0.026**  -0.001 0.001  -0.036***  -0.014***  -0.012*** -0.009***  -0.006*** -0.017***
 (4.12)  (2.36)  (0.38)  (0.07)  (2.97)  (3.36) (3.70) (3.75)  (2.70) (6.09) 
Other earners in HH  0.551***  0.283**  0.328*** 0.380***  0.275***  0.131*** 0.231*** 0.324***  0.308*** 0.369*** 
 (5.17)  (2.45)  (4.84)  (5.32)  (3.97)  (2.88) (4.90) (10.12)  (9.39) (9.48) 
Constant -0.456  -1.394***  -1.077***  -0.742***  -1.159*** -0.701*** -0.770*** -0.670***  -0.777*** -1.084***
   (1.13)  (2.60)  (3.65)  (3.32)  (4.58) (4.53) (4.35) (5.46)  (7.82) (8.05) 
Observations 1209  1031  2767  3214  3029  11643  10496  23785  25676  20682 
Test of Exclusion Restrictions,  2 χ  32.38 50.53  173.16  133.03  114.28  90.03 31.69 116.12  169.32  68.74 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2001 
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Table 1.5 Wage Equation Estimates, one-period sample, selected years 
 Disabled  Non-Disabled 
Variable  1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 
male 0.198***  0.097***  0.172*** 0.175*** 0.235*** 0.223*** 0.203*** 0.206*** 0.219*** 0.217***
  (5.77) (2.67) (7.22) (8.83) (11.57)  (24.20) (22.39) (34.20) (41.78) (36.07) 
married 0.021  0.032  0.067*** 0.058*** 0.071*** 0.064*** 0.077*** 0.060*** 0.048*** 0.066***
  (0.63) (0.89) (2.99) (3.23) (3.76) (7.74) (9.40) (10.91)  (9.42) (11.34) 
Immigrant  0.087 0.007 -0.021  -0.013  0.001 -0.001  -0.015  0.004 0.003 0.003 
  (1.53) (0.10) (0.51) (0.37) (0.04) (0.09) (0.98) (0.46) (0.32) (0.31) 
Visible minority 
(Non-white)  -0.161*  -0.048 -0.041 -0.041 0.028 -0.084***-0.051**  -0.070***  -0.066***-0.037***
  (1.75) (0.41) (0.59) (0.88) (0.55) (3.89) (2.37) (5.22) (5.61) (2.68) 
Urban  0.020 -0.010  0.042*  0.037*  0.029 0.046*** 0.040*** 0.031*** 0.021*** 0.024***
  (0.56) (0.26) (1.69) (1.83) (1.35) (5.42) (4.76) (5.35) (3.82) (3.92) 
Age:  
(reference group: 
30-39) 
       20-29  -0.085 -0.050 -0.088**  -0.079**  -0.093***-0.034***-0.020 -0.047***  -0.089***-0.077***
  (1.63) (0.87) (2.39) (2.57) (2.78) (2.82) (1.57) (5.26) (11.86)  (8.64) 
       40-49  -0.009  0.005  -0.041  0.019  -0.027 -0.014 -0.029***-0.013*  -0.017***-0.033***
  (0.23) (0.10) (1.41) (0.81) (1.09) (1.38) (2.71) (1.93) (2.69) (4.57) 
       50+  -0.060  -0.038  -0.007  -0.044  -0.022 -0.057***-0.068***-0.063***  -0.035***-0.056***
  (1.06) (0.55) (0.17) (1.41) (0.67) (3.43) (3.79) (5.34) (3.71) (5.12) 
Region  
(reference group: 
 Ontario) 
       Atlantic  
       provinces  -0.141*** -0.222*** -0.189***-0.177***-0.183***-0.142***-0.173***-0.199*** -0.192***-0.198***
  (3.26) (4.82) (6.05) (7.44) (7.52) (13.44) (16.37) (28.24) (29.09) (26.83) 
       Quebec  -0.032  -0.079  0.040  -0.065* -0.004  -0.060***-0.073***-0.074***  -0.076***-0.088***
  (0.53) (1.16) (1.00) (1.92) (0.13) (4.44) (5.36) (8.16) (9.07) (9.20) 
         Prairies  -0.098**  -0.112*** -0.120***-0.091***-0.075***-0.094***-0.096***-0.091*** -0.093***-0.074***
  (2.54) (2.78) (4.39) (4.11) (3.09) (9.27) (9.41) (13.31)  (14.88)  (10.37) 
         British  
         Columbia  0.081  0.066  0.108*** 0.092*** 0.063* 0.060*** 0.078*** 0.070*** 0.054*** 0.035***
  (1.47) (1.18) (2.95) (2.93) (1.81) (4.34) (5.89) (7.72) (6.28) (3.50) 
Years of  
schooling 0.113***  0.112***  0.108*** 0.130*** 0.117*** 0.184*** 0.174*** 0.157*** 0.156*** 0.172***
  (4.48) (3.72) (6.27) (9.52) (8.40) (26.19) (24.61) (35.72) (40.52) (39.32) 
Part-time  -0.118***  -0.058 0.006  -0.086***-0.036 -0.008 -0.033***-0.014*  -0.050***-0.059***
  (2.73) (1.31) (0.24) (3.60) (1.36) (0.72) (3.03) (1.86) (6.56) (6.68) 
Full-year 0.095***  0.051  0.101*** 0.099*** 0.073*** 0.111*** 0.100*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.085***
  (2.77) (1.43) (4.28) (5.01) (3.39) (12.87) (11.39) (18.72) (18.95) (12.60) 
Experience  0.039 0.102 0.116*** 0.017 0.118*** 0.226*** 0.276*** 0.213*** 0.133*** 0.164***
  (0.74) (1.61) (2.82) (0.55) (3.50) (12.88) (14.64) (16.81) (14.36) (14.33) 
Experience 
squared  0.007 -0.002  -0.016  0.010 -0.016**  -0.032***-0.041***-0.029*** -0.016***-0.021***
  (0.57) (0.11) (1.57) (1.25) (1.97) (7.84) (9.62) (9.96) (6.55) (7.35) 
Union 0.112***  0.200***  0.197*** 0.203*** 0.142*** 0.143*** 0.146*** 0.132*** 0.135*** 0.112***
  (2.89) (5.03) (7.31) (9.43) (6.34) (16.40) (16.49) (22.03) (24.12) (17.36)  
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Table 1.5 (continued) 
 Disabled  Non-Disabled 
Variable  1993  1995 1997 1999 2001 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 
Public  sector  0.145***  0.102**  0.061  0.114*** 0.112*** 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.086*** 0.089*** 0.076*** 
  (2.84)  (2.05) (1.64) (3.75) (3.65) (5.99) (5.94) (9.45) (10.55)  (8.14) 
Managerial 
responsibilities 0.161***  0.024  0.085*** 0.147*** 0.102*** 0.112*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.134*** 0.128*** 
  (4.76)  (0.68)  (3.55)  (7.45)  (5.30)  (14.23) (13.89) (20.76) (26.59) (23.38) 
Occupation  
(reference group:  
blue collar) 
       White collar  0.038  -0.002  0.136***  0.092***  0.126***  0.068***  0.064***  0.092***  0.131***  0.128*** 
  (0.86)  (0.04) (4.47) (3.53) (4.52) (6.29) (5.87) (12.65)  (19.55)  (16.10) 
        Service  -0.119***  -0.181***  -0.128*** -0.106*** -0.118*** -0.130*** -0.121*** -0.133***  -0.111*** -0.123***
  (2.67)  (3.52)  (3.98)  (3.90)  (4.01)  (11.17) (10.29) (16.65) (14.80) (14.02) 
Industry 
(reference group:  
ind3 – 
- manufacturing) 
          Ind1  0.103  -0.049  0.040  -0.000  0.085*  0.050***  0.095***  0.091***  0.031***  0.050*** 
  (1.53)  (0.61) (0.81) (0.00) (1.95) (3.06) (5.67) (7.88) (2.74) (3.64) 
          Ind2  0.134*  0.073  0.115**  0.133***  0.078*  0.103***  0.107***  0.109***  0.078***  0.083*** 
  (1.92)  (0.89) (2.17) (3.35) (1.78) (6.50) (6.63) (9.85) (7.74) (7.04) 
          Ind4  -0.097**  -0.124**  -0.125*** -0.105*** -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.097*** -0.094***  -0.108*** -0.121***
  (1.98)  (2.38) (3.72) (3.60) (3.53) (9.21) (7.87) (11.87)  (14.27)  (13.50) 
          Ind5  -0.034  0.042  -0.092**  -0.062*  -0.029  -0.002  0.013  -0.004  0.003  0.005 
  (0.54)  (0.60) (2.14) (1.71) (0.78) (0.15) (0.86) (0.46) (0.31) (0.47) 
          Ind6  0.087  0.003  -0.002  -0.012  0.018  0.027*  0.038**  0.010  -0.029*** -0.013 
  (1.44)  (0.05) (0.04) (0.35) (0.47) (1.70) (2.43) (1.00) (2.92) (1.16) 
          Ind7  -0.123**  -0.122*  -0.164*** -0.178*** -0.122*** -0.147*** -0.121*** -0.130***  -0.142*** -0.138***
  (2.16)  (1.86)  (4.22)  (5.38)  (3.38)  (10.35) (8.70)  (14.29) (16.52) (13.56) 
          Ind8  -0.070  -0.078  -0.078  -0.066  0.019  0.013  0.019  -0.009  -0.032**  -0.010 
  (0.94)  (0.98) (1.39) (1.39) (0.40) (0.68) (0.96) (0.64) (2.51) (0.73) 
Firm size 
(reference group: 
Less than 20  
employees)  
       20-99  0.156***  0.112**  0.111***  0.038  0.065**  0.072***  0.065***  0.069***  0.028***  0.067*** 
  (3.45)  (2.30) (3.52) (1.48) (2.37) (6.75) (5.96) (9.49) (4.15) (8.43) 
       100-499  0.056  0.083  0.139***  0.016  0.100***  0.098***  0.085***  0.113***  0.068***  0.126*** 
  (1.09)  (1.49) (4.03) (0.57) (3.32) (8.43) (7.35) (14.30)  (9.43) (14.74) 
       500+  0.204***  0.164***  0.185***  0.077***  0.139***  0.153***  0.145***  0.163***  0.105***  0.165*** 
  (4.97)  (3.68)  (6.43)  (3.54)  (5.98)  (16.39) (15.32) (25.29) (18.26) (23.81) 
Constant  1.855***  2.033*** 1.763*** 1.920*** 1.827*** 1.577*** 1.579*** 1.674*** 1.849*** 1.751*** 
    (16.24)  (12.83) (19.46) (30.60) (27.28) (44.89) (44.28) (69.82) (103.60)  (83.14) 
Mill’s:lambda 0.129***  0.016 0.039 0.029 0.012 0.217***  0.206*** 0.148*** 0.055*** 0.080*** 
    (3.20)  (0.27) (1.13) (1.24) (0.43) (7.71) (7.22) (7.29) (4.34) (4.77) 
Adjusted  
R-squared   0.526   0.541   0.534   0.543   0.507   0.536   0.561   0.545   0.543   0.539 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2001  
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Inclusion of job characteristics, occupations, and sectors as control variables in 
these types of models is a subject of considerable debate since it might create some 
problems. In almost all studies (including ours), inclusion of these variables adds 
considerably to the explanatory power of the model, generating a much-reduced 
adjusted pay gap. A glance at Table 1.5 reveals that some of these variables are among 
the most important control variables. The reason for this is not only because 
occupational variables correlate with wage differentials, but also occupational 
categories may also correlate with a host of unobserved variables that affect the wage 
level. This is illustrated in the study by Le Grand (1994, 1995) where eight variables 
characterizing working conditions were used instead of occupations and when 
decomposition was carried out with occupation as an additional control variable it was 
found to have very little explanatory power. In other words, the working conditions 
variables (such as job monotony, autonomy, etc.) are likely to be unobserved 
productivity-related variables in other models, but picked up by the occupation control 
variable. Also, as Oaxaca’s (1973) study suggests that the part-time work variable had 
relatively strong explanatory power, but, again, this may have been strongly associated 
with occupational categories. More generally, in his (1973) study, Oaxaca 
recommends to estimate two separate decompositions; the first decomposition 
involving personal characteristics only and the second involving personal and job 
characteristics. At best, therefore, the two estimates may be thought of as setting lower 
and upper bounds, respectively, to the extent of magnitude of components in wage 
differential.  
The estimates in Table 1.5 show substantial agreement in the pattern of 
regressor significance and size of coefficients both for persons with and without 
disabilities. The age profile of wages for both persons with and without disabilities  
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tends to have the familiar concave shape, there are well-established regional effects 
that differ by disability status, the highest-paid workers reside in British Columbia, 
and more education has the usual positive effect on wages. The experience variable 
has a positive and usually significant effect, which is stronger for non-disabled. The 
jobs covered by collective bargaining and jobs in public sector pay more than non-
union jobs or jobs in private sector. Part-time jobs pay less than full-time; full year 
employment and jobs with larger firms are more likely to offer higher wages; wages 
are higher for married than for single individuals, irrespective of whether they are 
disabled, effects that are also well-established in the literature. Turning to other 
variables in these regressions, the industry dummies have a fairly consistent effect 
across the groups, with higher earnings in utilities and construction (ind 2) as 
compared to manufacturing. Those employed in trade, transportation and warehousing 
(ind 4) or in accommodation, food and other services (ind 7) have lower wages than 
those employed in manufacturing.  
In general, it seems to be the case also that wages are determined in a 
qualitatively similar fashion for disabled and non-disabled persons, although formal 
tests reject null hypothesis of parameter equality in all cases. 
Finally, we confirm that the correction for sample selection was necessary. The 
inverse of the Mill's ratio was statistically significant and positive in the wage 
equation for non-disabled workers in all years 1993-2001, and for disabled workers in 
1993 and 1996. A positive value of the inverse of Mill’s ratio indicates that the error 
terms in the participation and wage equations are positively correlated. In terms of the 
wage equation context, those individuals whose unobservable characteristics make 
them more likely to participate also make them likely to earn higher wages when they 
work. If, for example, the unobservable represented motivation; presumably more  
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motivated people are both more likely to work and earn differentially higher wages 
when they do.  
1.4.3 Wage Decompositions: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
Results for Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition using selection-corrected wage 
equations for one-period as well as two-period samples are reported in Table 1.6. 
The actual difference in the means of the log-wages for workers without and 
with disabilities averages 10.7 percent ($1.69) over 1993-2001. The selectivity 
corrected wage differential somewhat differs and comprises 9.80 percent ($1.57). 
Beginning in 1996, generally, there is an obvious increase in both the observed and 
selectivity-corrected wage differentials between workers without and with disabilities.  
As Table 1.6 indicates, the substantial part of the wage differential cannot be 
explained by differences in measured wage-determining characteristics. For our one-
period sample, on average, slightly more than a half (53 percent) of the differential in 
the mean log-wages can be explained by superior productivity characteristics for non-
disabled. Thus, all estimators suggest that a large part of the wage differential remains 
unexplained by differences in the characteristics that we are able to measure. Over the 
entire time period, the coefficient effect (portion unexplained by differences in 
characteristics) averages 47 percent of the corrected wage differential. The results for 
two-period sample that contains individuals with longer-lasting and more severe work 
limitations suggest that on average, both observed and selectivity-corrected wage 
differentials are larger than in one-period sample. In addition, a smaller part (46.7 
percent) of the total gap in offered wages is attributable to differences in 
characteristics. In general, although the estimates in Table 1.6 for one-and two-period 
measure of disability differ in levels, they follow the same pattern.  
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Table 1.6 Observed and Selectivity-corrected Wage Differentials 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
Observed 
Wage 
Differential  
(1) 
 
 
Observed 
Wage 
Differential, 
dollars 
(2) 
Wage 
Differential 
Corrected for 
Selectivity into 
the Labour 
Market 
(3) 
Wage 
Differential 
Corrected for 
Selectivity into 
the Labour 
Market, 
dollars 
(4) 
Percent of 
Corrected Wage 
Differential 
Explained by 
Characteristics 
(5) 
Coefficient 
Effect as 
Percent of 
Corrected 
Wage 
Differential 
(6) 
 
 
 
 
Selection 
Effect 
(7) 
A. One-period Sample
1993  0.068 1.09 0.092  1.43  51.4% 48.6%  -0.024 
1994  0.105 1.74 0.066  1.20  71.8% 28.2%  0.039 
1995  0.081 1.38 0.053  1.01  16.9% 83.1%  0.028 
1996  0.086 1.23 0.087  1.24  59.3% 40.7%  -0.001 
1997  0.116 1.73 0.115  1.71  43.8% 56.2%  0.001 
1998  0.107 1.57 0.094  1.38  55.4% 44.6%  0.013 
1999  0.125 1.98 0.129  2.02  57.3% 42.7%  -0.004 
2000  0.147 2.40 0.125  2.09  61.6% 38.4%  0.021 
2001  0.127 2.13 0.121  2.04  59.9% 40.1%  0.006 
Mean  0.107 1.69 0.098  1.57  53.0% 47.0%  0.009 
             
Year  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
B. Two-period Sample 
1994  0.105 1.78 0.173  2.64  39.9  60.1  -0.067 
1995  0.111 1.96 0.056  1.20  21.5  78.5  0.055 
1996  0.056 0.99 0.062  1.13  37.2  62.8  -0.006 
1997  0.142 2.07 0.156  2.26  49.2  50.8  -0.014 
1998  0.163 2.42 0.164  2.41  41.0  59.0  -0.002 
1999  0.137 2.04 0.121  1.80  56.5  43.5  0.016 
2000  0.181 2.87 0.161  2.59  50.4  49.6  0.019 
2001  0.171 2.73 0.134  2.19  77.9  22.1  0.037 
Mean  0.133  2.11  0.129  2.03 46.7 53.3  0.005 
Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2001 
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The regressors explain about 52 percent of the variation in wages of disabled 
workers and about 54 percent of the variation in wages of non-disabled workers in 
each year. As we explained earlier, it would not be reasonable to explain the entire 
coefficient effect as an indication of discrimination. However, given the magnitude of 
the coefficient effect, the number of observable characteristics the regression includes, 
and relative success in explaining wage variation, the coefficient effect cannot be 
completely rejected as the result of unmeasured characteristics of either disabled or 
non-disabled. Therefore, this might be taken as an upper bound for the extent of 
discrimination against people with disabilities in Canada. 
1.4.4 Wage Decompositions: Juhn, Murphy and Pierce decomposition 
Turning to Tables 1.7 and 1.8 and Figures 1.6-1.9 with results of the JMP 
decomposition at various points of wage distributions, we can see that that the wage 
differential varies significantly throughout the distribution. As the wage distributions 
of persons with and without disabilities are not congruent typically, the percentile 
wage gaps also reflect the extent to which wage distributions for disabled and non-
disabled differ. At the low end of the distribution (from 1
st to 10
th percentile), the wage 
gap is low (about 6-7 percent). The largest wage differentials are observed in the 
“middle” of the wage distribution. In general, for both one- and two-period samples, 
the inverse U-shape of the wage gap is quite pronounced (see Figures 1.6 and 1.7). 
Starting with some 7% in the lowest decile, the gap raises to slightly more than 10% 
(14%) for the “middle” of the wage distribution in one-period (two-period) sample, 
then decreases somewhat for the highest earners where it amounts to 9% (12%).  
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  Total Differential 
  Explained by Characteristics 
  Effect of Unobservables 
Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2001 
Figure 1.6: Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce Decomposition: Selectivity-Corrected Wage 
Differentials, One-period Sample, Selected Years 
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Figure 1.7: Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce Decomposition: Selectivity-Corrected Wage 
Differentials, Two-period Sample, Selected Years 
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Figure 1.8: Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce Decomposition: Percent of Selectivity-Corrected 
Wage Differential Explained by Characteristics, One-period Sample, Selected Years 
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Figure 1.9: Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce Decomposition: Percent of Selectivity-Corrected 
Wage Differential Explained by Characteristics, Two-period Sample, Selected Years 
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As illustrated in Figures 1.8 and 1.9 and Tables 1.7 and 1.8, the explanatory 
power of the measured wage-related characteristics varies a lot over the wage 
distribution both for one-and two-period definitions of disability. Generally, the 
fraction of the wage gap explained by different measured characteristics of persons 
with and without disabilities decreases over the wage distribution. This result is more 
pronounced in the one-period sample. At the low tail of wage distribution the major 
part of the wage differential can be explained by differences in observable 
characteristics. At the high tail of distribution, the big part of the wage gap is due to 
the differences either in unobservable characteristics or in wage structure between 
disabled and non-disabled. While explaining as much as about 84% at the lower end of 
the wage distribution, it accounts for less than 5% of the gap between high-wage non-
disabled persons and their disabled counterparts. The effect of differences in returns to 
characteristics has the reverse pattern. Different returns to characteristics seem to 
affect mostly people with disabilities at the higher end of the wage scale. 
Furthermore, since we are no longer confined to the sample means, the effect 
of unobservables can also be illustrated. Unobservables take up some of the wage gap 
for low and high income receivers but generally their effect is close to zero for the 
rest. Also the pattern of unobservables shows more volatility for two-period sample 
due to, probably, the smaller sample size for two-period sample. As a consequence, 
although the graphs for two-period sample reveal patterns similar to one-period 
sample, the endowment effect takes up a smaller fraction of the pay gap. 
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Table 1.7 Wage Differential Corrected for Selection. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 
Decomposition (One-period Sample) 
Lower Tail of Distribution (from 1
st to 24
th percentile) 
   1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Mean
p5  Total wage differential, percent  0.076 0.032 -0.046 0.096 0.086 0.044 0.119 0.073 0.070 0.061
 Explained  by  X’s  0.065 0.037 -0.036 0.059 0.044 0.064 0.078 0.059 0.050 0.047
 Explained  by  Coefficients  0.006 0.002 0.002 0.024 0.042 -0.029 0.034 0.018 0.003 0.011
  Percent of Wage Differential Explained by X’s 85.00 116.4 79.73 61.76 50.96 146.2 65.73 81.40 71.20 84.27
              
p10Total wage differential, percent  0.063 0.043 -0.009 0.073 0.095 0.053 0.110 0.110 0.086 0.069
 Explained  by  X’s  0.071 0.029 0.012 0.057 0.046 0.061 0.057 0.090 0.056 0.053
 Explained  by  Coefficients  -0.009 -0.003 -0.014 -0.002 0.044 -0.017 0.047 0.023 0.022 0.010
   Percent of Wage Differential Explained by X’s 112.3 67.48 -140.31 78.44 48.69 115.24 52.15  81.56  64.62 53.35
Middle of Distribution (25
th-74
th percentile) 
   1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Mean
p25Total wage differential, percent  0.145 0.050 0.026 0.068 0.125 0.133 0.157 0.142 0.143 0.110
 Explained  by  X’s  0.125 0.030 -0.001 0.032 0.067 0.079 0.111 0.097 0.099 0.071
 Explained  by  Coefficients  0.016 0.007 0.028 0.022 0.056 0.047  0.047 0.054 0.036 0.035
  Percent of Wage Differential Explained by X’s 86.63 60.43 -3.85 47.05 53.54 59.50 70.69 68.15 69.49 56.85
              
p50Total wage differential, percent  0.116 0.098 0.086 0.114 0.133 0.103 0.144 0.126 0.130 0.117
 Explained  by  X’s  0.045 0.097 0.038 0.074 0.080 0.071 0.079 0.077 0.075 0.071
 Explained  by  Coefficients  0.066 0.001 0.034 0.038 0.059 0.028  0.065 0.049 0.051 0.043
  Percent of Wage Differential Explained by X’s 39.02 99.13 44.28 64.77 59.71 69.51 54.94 61.66 58.10 61.23
              
p75Total wage differential, percent  0.082 0.097 0.112 0.084 0.102 0.072 0.113 0.126 0.117 0.100
 Explained  by  X’s  0.013 0.087 0.041 0.050 0.039 0.016 0.060 0.088 0.061 0.051
 Explained  by  Coefficients  0.078 0.009 0.060 0.038 0.062 0.065  0.053 0.028 0.052 0.050
   Percent of Wage Differential Explained by X’s 16.04 89.56 36.35 59.65 38.67 22.68 53.33 70.43 51.91 48.73
Higher Tail of Distribution (76
th -100
th percentile) 
   1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Mean
p90Total wage differential, percent  0.130 0.065 0.096 0.055 0.070 0.073 0.093 0.102 0.114 0.089
 Explained  by  X’s  0.023 0.013 -0.065 0.005 -0.007 -0.003 0.027 0.018 0.038 0.005
 Explained  by  Coefficients  0.108 0.048 0.144 0.058 0.085 0.076  0.066 0.073 0.076 0.081
  Percent of Wage Differential Explained by X’s 17.72 19.35 -68.13 8.84 -9.69 -4.58 29.01 17.38 33.47 4.82 
              
p95Total wage differential, percent  0.059 0.081 0.051 0.065 0.104 0.062 0.121 0.119 0.110 0.086
 Explained  by  X’s  -0.060 -0.038 -0.119 0.011 -0.009 0.000 0.051 0.011 0.015 -0.015
 Explained  by  Coefficients  0.114 0.107 0.155 0.078 0.120 0.092  0.063 0.094 0.101 0.103
   Percent of Wage Differential Explained by X’s-100.7 -47.73-231.79 16.31 -8.90 -0.42 42.33 9.01 13.49 -34.26
Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2001  
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Table 1.8 Wage Differential Corrected for Selection. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 
Decomposition (two-period sample) 
Lower Tail of Distribution (1
st – 24
th percentile) 
   1994 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001  Mean 
p5  Total wage differential, percent   0.116 -0.111 0.119 0.121 0.070 0.080  0.078  0.068 
 Explained  by  X’s  0.080  -0.069 0.087 0.091 0.030 0.064  0.057  0.048 
 Explained  by  Coefficients  -0.004 -0.021 0.035 -0.001 0.045 0.024 -0.004  0.011 
  Percent of Wage Differential Explained by X’s 68.64  62.22  73.08  74.60 35.94 80.84  72.79  66.87 
              
p10  Total wage differential, percent  0.141 -0.057 0.151 0.118 0.083 0.122  0.091  0.093 
 Explained  by  X’s  0.052  -0.050 0.094 0.048 0.050 0.091  0.079  0.052 
 Explained  by  Coefficients  0.089  -0.007 0.039 0.065 0.038 0.034 -0.010  0.035 
   Percent of Wage Differential Explained by X’s 37.09  87.20  62.73  40.99 54.75 74.92  86.38  63.44 
Middle of Distribution (25
th-74
th percentile) 
   1994 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001  Mean 
p25  Total wage differential, percent  0.191 0.019 0.186 0.201 0.171 0.173  0.146  0.138 
 Explained  by  X’s  0.066  0.002 0.100 0.074 0.050 0.111  0.137  0.087 
 Explained  by  Coefficients  0.123 0.004 0.082 0.113 0.119 0.067 -0.006  4.441 
  Percent of Wage Differential Explained by X’s 34.71  9.80  53.53  36.68 30.70 64.21  93.83  48.79 
              
p50  Total wage differential, percent  0.158 0.091 0.149 0.176 0.120 0.167  0.132  0.142 
 Explained  by  X’s  0.073  0.033 0.095 0.107 0.100 0.085  0.105  0.085 
 Explained  by  Coefficients  0.084 0.051 0.057 0.076 0.005 0.078  0.027  0.054 
  Percent of Wage Differential Explained by X’s 46.54  35.76  63.69  60.73 83.70 51.11  79.62  60.16 
              
p75  Total wage differential, percent  0.182 0.098 0.133 0.132 0.100 0.145  0.122  0.130 
 Explained  by  X’s  0.065  0.045 0.071 0.066 0.040 0.106  0.119  0.073 
 Explained  by  Coefficients  0.097 0.032 0.060 0.069 0.059 0.036  0.008  0.051 
   Percent of Wage Differential Explained by X’s 35.60  45.50  53.33  49.71 38.88 73.22  97.12  56.19 
Higher Tail of Distribution (76
th -100
th percentile) 
   1994 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001  Mean 
p90  Total wage differential, percent  0.155 0.171 0.093 0.129 0.118 0.103  0.078  0.121 
 Explained  by  X’s  0.021  -0.050 0.004 -0.007 0.010 -0.010  0.044  0.002 
 Explained  by  Coefficients  0.108 0.186 0.108 0.139 0.097 0.100  0.048  0.112 
  Percent of Wage Differential Explained by X’s 13.31 -29.16 4.31  -5.48 12.58 -9.76  56.21  6.00 
              
p95  Total wage differential, percent  0.137 0.160 0.122 0.126 0.060 0.091  0.088  0.112 
 Explained  by  X’s  0.006  -0.070 -0.008 -0.032 0.010 -0.042  0.032  -0.015 
 Explained  by  Coefficients  0.051 0.194 0.138 0.168 0.062 0.128  0.066  0.115 
   Percent of Wage Differential Explained by X’s 4.44 -43.67 -6.22 -25.61 13.24 -46.02  36.03  -9.69 
Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2001  
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Thus, another important result of this study is derived from JMP 
decomposition over the wage distribution. Remarkable differences are revealed in 
wage differential as well as in magnitude of the components of that wage differential 
at different points of distribution. At the low tail of wage distribution, the major part of 
wage differential can be explained by differences in observable characteristics. At the 
high tail of distribution, the big part of the wage gap is due to the differences either in 
unobservable characteristics or in wage structure between disabled and non-disabled. 
These results of the JMP decomposition highlight what we think is one of the most 
interesting findings of this paper, that is if the wage discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities exists it is concentrated in the very high end of the wage distribution. 
Therefore, the most economically vulnerable disabled labour force participants (those 
with low labour incomes) are unlikely to be subject to wage discrimination, as the 
wage gap is almost entirely explained by differences in wage-determining 
characteristics used in the model.  
A further recommendation derived from our analysis would therefore be to pay 
careful attention to differences over the wage distribution when drawing policy 
conclusions.  
1.4.5 Employment Effects of Imposing the Same Wage Structure for 
Disabled and Non-Disabled 
Table 1.9 shows the estimated upper bound of employment effects in Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition when the differences in pricing of observable wage-
determining characteristics are eliminated. Here we assume that we were able to 
perfectly capture all differences in characteristics of people with and without 
disabilities and that the wage-determining characteristics for persons with and without  
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disabilities are priced equally. On average, the employment probability of person with 
disabilities is 0.462 (0.314) in one- period (two-period) sample. Assuming that in an 
ideal world persons with disabilities would be paid based on an average of disabled 
and non-disabled wage structure the predicted employment probability would increase 
to 0.513 (0.362). Thus, on average 5.2 (4.8) percent more of persons with disabilities 
would work in each year from 1993 to 2001 as result of wage increase. It is probable 
that some of these people would forego seeking the disability benefits from private or 
social insurance plans in order to work at higher wage rate. 
The participation elasticity characterizes the sensitivity of the employment 
participation decision to a change in the wage rate. We expect it to be positive both for 
persons with one-period and two-periods work limitations. A priori, however, the 
relative magnitude of participation decision elasticities is unclear. We can expect that 
the elasticity of employment for persons with two-period disabilities would be higher 
than that for persons with one-period disabilities given that the average wage is lower 
for persons with longer-lasting disabilities. From the other hand, due to more severe 
health limitations one could expect lower responsiveness of the population 
experiencing disability in multiple periods to the wage rate change. As the results for 
elasticities in Table 1.9 suggest, for every year in the analysis, except for 2001, the 
decision to participate in employment for the one-period disabled is more responsive 
to change in the wage than for the two-period disabled. On average, the elasticities are 
1.27 and 0.79 for persons with disabilities in one- and two-period sample, 
respectively. The magnitude of these estimates suggests the relatively inelastic labour 
supply curve for persons with more severe disabilities and relatively elastic labour 
supply for disabled group that includes individuals with temporary work limitations. 
Therefore, if a legislation leading to a wage convergence between persons with and  
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without disabilities were enforced, it will have some positive impact on the 
employment rate of persons with disabilities causing fewer of them to draw income 
from public disability programs.  
 
Table 1.9 Employment Effects of Imposing the Equal Wage Structure for 
Persons with and without Disabilities 
 
A. One-period Sample 
Year  Weighted 
population 
Estimated 
Probability 
of 
Employment 
Estimated 
Probability of 
Employment if 
the wage structure 
for disabled and 
non-disabled is 
the same 
Difference 
in 
Probabilities 
of 
employment 
Additional 
Jobs Would 
be Taken 
Participation 
Elasticities 
1993 1,034,303  0.476  0.534  0.059  60,529  1.272 
1994 1,008,091  0.434  0.485  0.051  51,261  2.542 
1995 1,025,611  0.410  0.476  0.067  68,388  1.482 
1996 1,336,023  0.439  0.508  0.069  91,877  1.910 
1997 1,323,741  0.428  0.488  0.060  78,834  0.916 
1998 1,297,058  0.431  0.490  0.059  76,743  1.376 
1999 1,344,007  0.486  0.518  0.032  43,287  0.575 
2000 1,468,130  0.517  0.570  0.053  77,554  1.078 
2001 1,536,141  0.534  0.548  0.014  21,430  0.279 
Mean 1,263,678  0.462  0.513  0.052  63,323  1.270 
 
B. Two-period Sample 
Year  Weighted 
population 
Estimated 
Probability 
of 
Employment 
Estimated 
Probability of 
Employment if 
the wage structure 
for disabled and 
non-disabled is 
the same 
Difference 
in 
Probabilities 
of 
employment 
Additional 
Jobs Would 
be Taken 
Participation 
Elasticities 
1994 589,753  0.313  0.367  0.054  31,997  0.517 
1995 649,570  0.291  0.358  0.067  43,624  1.492 
1996 735,049  0.282  0.323  0.041  30,098  1.024 
1997 820,528  0.311  0.348  0.037  30,538  0.465 
1998 855,922  0.302  0.374  0.071  61,062  0.728 
1999 795,602  0.287  0.305  0.017  13,685  0.319 
2000 735,282  0.344  0.407  0.063  46,464  0.780 
2001 796,015  0.386  0.416  0.030  24,164  0.979 
Mean 747,215  0.314  0.362  0.048  35,204  0.788 
Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2001  
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1.5 Conclusions 
For the first time using Canadian data from the Survey of Labour and Income 
Dynamics from 1993 to 2001, this paper confirms the presence of substantial wage 
differences between non-disabled and disabled individuals. The analysis in this paper 
indicates that the wage differential between disabled and non-disabled workers has 
risen considerably over 1993-2001. Using Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition technique 
we show that almost half of that differential remains unexplained by differences in 
productivity-related characteristics. In addition, we also illustrated importance of wage 
distribution in defining the mean wage differentials and showed that different factors 
are in play at different points of distribution. We find that the wage gap is low for low 
earners, and that differences in measured human capital and other personal and job-
related characteristics are explaining the majority of the wage differential at the lower 
end of the wage distribution. Hence low skilled/low wage disabled workers are less 
seriously impacted by wage discrimination than their higher skilled/higher wage 
counterparts. Therefore, a further recommendation derived from our analysis would be 
to pay careful attention to differences over the wage distribution when drawing policy 
conclusions. 
We also show that under the strong assumption of being able to perfectly 
control for differences in all characteristics between people with and without 
disabilities, and forcing the returns to observable characteristics to be equal for 
persons with and without disabilities, the second part of decomposed wage differential 
can be entirely eliminated. We estimate the upper bound of potential employment 
gains. For persons with one-period measure of disability it averages about 5.2 percent 
in each year. It is probable that some of these people would forego seeking the  
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disability benefits from private or social insurance plans in order to work at a higher 
wage rate.  
Given the possibility of omitted variables in the wage equations, especially the 
severity and the extent of health limitations, the unexplained component is likely to 
reflect the role of un-captured differences in tastes and productivity. Several authors 
have stressed the importance of using multiple measures of disabilities since people 
with disabilities are not a homogeneous group and diverse with respect to their health 
condition. In particular, Salkever and Domino (1997) have noted significant 
differences in employer attitude towards “employability” for different disability 
groups. Therefore, it would be of interest to extend current research via the 
employment of additional sources of data containing detailed information about the 
nature of disability and controlling for it, while estimating the wage differentials 
between persons with and without disabilities, and to see how the components of the 
wage differential would change. Further examination of the endowment and 
coefficient effects could also allow us to see the contribution to these components 
made by specific individual or job characteristics, on average, and over the wage 
distribution. Also, we have estimated the upper bound of employment gains in a 
hypothetical case of the same wage structure for persons with and without disabilities, 
however, other effects of such as increase in hours worked yet to be estimated. In 
addition, there are a number of ways to extend Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition to 
study, for example, the role of employment sectors (e.g., employment in public versus 
private sector, covered by union versus non-unionized employment) in determining 
the wage differentials between persons with and without disabilities.  
 60
 Appendix I: Additional Tables for Chapter 1 
 
 
Appendix Table I.1 Definitions of Selected Variables 
Variable  Definition 
Employment  A person is considered to be employed if he or she reports positive wage 
Married (or common law) 
The concept of marital status applies to the conjugal arrangements of a 
person. It includes persons who are living together as husband and wife, 
regardless of whether they are legally married or in a common-law 
relationship. The statement living together implies that both persons in the 
relationship live in the same household. In the majority of cases this is true, 
but also included are couples who are temporarily separated for work-
related reasons or couples temporarily separated because one is 
institutionalized for a short term. Persons living in a conjugal relationship 
are identified as spouses. Spouses may be legally married spouses or 
common-law partners 
Immigrant  Flag to indicate whether a person is an immigrant.  
Visible Minorities 
Visible Minority refers to whether or not a person, under criteria 
established by the Employment Equity Act, is non-Caucasian in race or 
non-white in colour. Under the Act, an Aboriginal person is not considered 
to be a Visible Minority 
Aboriginal 
Aboriginal refers to a person who can trace his or her ancestry to 
Aboriginal linguistic family whose traditional lands fell in total or in part 
in the geographic area that is now Canada. Aboriginal ancestry also refers 
to a person who has been accorded Aboriginal rights by legislation, for 
example, by marriage to an Aboriginal person. 
Age in years  Person's age as of December 31 of the reference year. 
Region of residence  The following geographical regions are defined:Atlantic provinces, 
Quebec, Ontario, Prairies, British Columbia 
Education 
 
Educational attainment refers to the highest level of schooling a person has 
attained in terms of grades of elementary or secondary school completed 
and certificates or diplomas obtained. It also refers to post secondary 
institutions attended and certificates, degrees or diplomas granted. Number 
of years of education completed refers to the number of academic years a 
person completed in a formal program provided by elementary and 
secondary schools, universities, colleges or other formal post-secondary 
institutions. 
Student 
Flag to indicate if person was attending school, college, CEGEP (a general 
and vocational college established under the Quebec General and 
Vocational Colleges Act.) or university in the reference year.  
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Appendix Table I.1 (continued). 
Variable  Definition 
Years of work experience (full-time 
full-year equivalent) 
Work history begins with the respondent’s first full-time 
paid job. Previous work, such as part-time or summer jobs 
while in school, is not included because respondents might 
have difficulty recalling such information. Consequently, 
SLID does not measure the part-time experience of the 15% 
of men and 23% of women who never worked full time. The 
survey asks respondents how many years they worked at 
least 6 months (recorded as full years) or not at all. The 
remaining years are recorded as part years worked. For years 
during which they worked 6 months or more, respondents 
are asked whether they worked full time, part time, or both, 
at different times during the year. Full time is defined as 30 
hours or more a week. To arrive at full-year full-time 
equivalents (FYFTE), each year of work history is valued as 
follows: 
Full year, full time (6 months or more, 30 hours per week or 
more) = 1 FYFTE 
Full year, part time (6 months or more, under 30 hours per 
week) = 0.5 FYFTE 
Full year, some full time/some part time = 0.5 FYFTE 
Part year (less than 6 months), whether full or part time = 
0.25 FYFTE 
For example, someone who worked 6 years full time for at 
least 6 months each year, plus 5 years full time but less than 
6 months each year, plus 4 years part time for at least 6 
months each year, would have 9.25 years’ experience : (6x1) 
+ (5x0.25) + (4x0.5). 
Composite Hourly Wage 
The wage at the end of the job, or year end, was used for 
persons with one job. For those with more than one job, 
a composite hourly wage, i.e. the average hourly wage rate 
(weighted by number of hours worked in each job) of all the 
jobs held during the year was used. Hourly wage was 
calculated for paid workers, including salaried as well as 
hourly-rated employees. 
Job part-time  A person who, in a given month, worked less than 130 hours. 
Employed full year  A person who was employed all year. 
All hours paid 
Total hours paid at all jobs during the reference year. This is 
the summation, of total hours scheduled for a job minus 
scheduled hours during any unpaid absences for that same 
job, for all jobs. 
Weeks worked per year  Indicates number of weeks employed during reference year 
Union member or covered by 
collective agreement? 
Flag to indicate whether person was a member of a union or 
covered by a collective agreement in this job during the 
reference year. 
Employed in Public Sector  Flag to indicate whether the employer is in the public sector 
Occupation  Grouping: White collar occupation, Service occupation, Blue 
collar occupation  
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Appendix Table I.1 (continued). 
Variable  Definition 
Industry  
(ind1) Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing; Mining, Oil and Gas? 
(ind2) Utilities, Construction? 
(ind3) Manufacturing? 
(ind4) Trade; Transportation and Warehousing? 
(ind5) Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Leasing; 
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services; 
Management, Administrative and Other Support? 
(ind6) Educational Services; Health Care and Social 
Assistance? 
(ind7) Information, Culture and Recreation; Accommodation 
and Food Services; Other Services 
(ind8) Public Administration 
Number of employees at all locations:  Grouping: less than 20; 20-99; 100-499; 500+ 
Work limitation 
SLID contains a disability-specific section which examines 
the role of disability in work activities. For employment 
equity purposes, any person who indicated that they suffered 
from a long-term physical condition, mental condition or 
health problem and were limited in kind or amount of work 
they could do (could have done) during the reference year or 
perceived their potential disadvantage in the labour market 
due to their condition are classified as having work 
limitations, i.e. a positive response to one or more of the 
following questions in the SLID is required to identify a 
respondent as a person with disabilities: 
•  Because of a long-term physical condition, mental 
condition or health problem, is [respondent] limited 
in the kind and amount of activity he/she can do at 
work? – (asked if working in reference year) 
•  Does [respondent] have a long-term physical or 
mental condition that limits the kind or amount of 
activity he/she would be able to do at a job or 
business? - (asked if not working in reference year) 
•  Does [respondent]’s condition make it difficult for 
him/her to change jobs or to get a better job?  
•  Does [respondent]’s condition completely prevent 
him/her from working at a job or business or from 
looking for work? – (asked of respondents not in 
the labour force) 
Condition duration 
Duration of a health limiting condition grouping: less than 1 
year; 1-4 years; 5-9 years; 10-19 years; more than 20 years. 
This refers to any condition not only to work limitation. 
Difficult to change job  Flag to indicate if a persons' condition made it difficult for 
him/her to change jobs or to get a better job. 
Condition completely prevents work 
Flag to indicate if a persons' condition completely prevents 
him/her from working at a job or business or from looking 
for work  
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Appendix Table I.2 Disability Prevalence Rates among Working Age Population in 
the SLID one-, two-, three-, four-, five, and six-period samples, 1993-2001 
 
  One Period  Two Periods Three Periods Four Periods Five Periods  Six Periods 
Year 
Mean, 
% 
Sample 
Size 
Mean, 
% 
Sample 
Size 
Mean, 
% 
Sample 
Size 
Mean, 
% 
Sample 
Size 
Mean, 
% 
Sample 
Size 
Mean, 
% 
Sample 
Size 
1993  8.50  19,908            
1994 7.73 20,540 5.34 17,413                
1995 7.69 20,130 5.25 17,961 4.32 15,661            
1996  10.14  41,348 5.76 18,018 4.48 16,474 3.82 14,509        
1997 9.49 41,714 6.53 36,786 4.78 16,538 3.84 15,281 3.38 13,540     
1998 9.31 41,732 6.47 37,571 5.14 34,007 4.07 15,497 3.40 14,391 3.00 12,807
1999 9.80 41,021 5.70 18,757 4.70 17,241 4.25 15,628        
2000  10.97  38,682 5.97 33,774 4.35 16,135 3.84 15,021 3.56 13,768     
2001  11.25  40,683 6.56 33,999 4.66 30,448 3.64 14,834 3.24 13,888 3.02 12,798
Mean  9.43 33,973 5.95 26,785 4.63 20,929 3.91 15,128 3.39 13,897 3.01 12,803
Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2001  
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Appendix Table I.3 Employment Rates among Working Age Population with Work 
Limitation in the SLID one-, two-, three-, four-, five, and six-period samples, 1993-
2001 
  One Period  Two Periods  Three Periods Four Periods Five Periods  Six Periods
year 
Mean, 
% 
Sample 
Size 
Mean, 
% 
Sample 
Size 
Mean, 
% 
Sample 
Size 
Mean, 
% 
Sample 
Size 
Mean, 
% 
Sample 
Size 
Mean, 
% 
Sample 
Size 
1993 46.55 1,423                     
1994 41.34 1,369  30.99  862                 
1995 39.97 1,374  28.25  852  27.36 623             
1996 41.34 3,358  28.15  906  21.18 638  22.19 489         
1997 38.27 3,322  29.98  2,124  23.54 693  19.87 524  20.33  421     
1998 41.42 3,258  28.10  2,149  24.04 1,598 23.18 562  21.36  437  20.30 352 
1999 48.49 3,361  27.94  952  20.73 725  19.74 595         
2000 50.44 3,472  35.35  1,869  23.41 626  20.40 505  19.61  429     
2001 54.45 3,592  39.18  2,061  31.51 1,317 23.66 489  20.75  398  20.92 342 
Mean 44.70 2,725 30.99 1,472 24.54 889  21.51 527  20.51  421  20.61 347 
Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2001  
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Appendix Table I.4 Wage Rates among Employed Working Age Population with 
Work Limitation in the SLID one-, two-, three-, four-, five, and six-period samples, 
1993-2001 
  One Period  Two Periods  Three Periods Four Periods  Five Periods  Six Periods 
year 
Mean 
 % 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
 % 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
% 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
% 
Sample 
Size 
Mean
% 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
 % 
Sample 
Size 
1993  15.56  686                
1994  15.29  598   15.18  270                  
1995  15.16  589   14.62  239   14.92 153              
1996  15.32  1,538   15.36  267   15.23 148   15.75  111          
1997  14.98  1,491   14.51  683   15.56 169   15.28  114   16.46 89      
1998  15.23  1,478   14.44  668   14.11 423   14.35  128   14.67 95   16.10  69  
1999  15.39  1,734   14.90  276   13.32 159   13.12  124          
2000  15.31  2,002   14.76  662   14.61 157   13.50  105   13.86 87      
2001  15.57  2,254   14.96  831   14.90 412   14.87  119   14.80 83   14.77  71  
Mean  15.31  1,374   14.84  487   14.66 232   14.48  117   14.95 89   15.43  70  
Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2001  
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Appendix Table I.5 Ratio of Employment Rates for Work-Limited Persons Over the 
Employment Rates for Non-Work-Limited Persons, in the SLID one-, two-, three-, 
four-, five, and six-period samples, percent 
 
year  One Period  Two Periods  Three Periods Four  Periods Five  Periods Six  Periods 
1993 56.80           
1994 50.16  37.14         
1995 48.22  33.54  32.46       
1996 48.61  32.42  24.43  25.65     
1997 44.45  34.44  26.82  22.66  23.27   
1998 47.99  32.22  27.49  26.06  24.07  23.02 
1999 57.23  32.45  23.97  22.77     
2000 58.15  40.20  26.55  23.08  22.22   
2001 62.42  44.00  35.37  26.52  23.27  23.53 
Mean 52.67  35.80  28.16  24.46  23.21  23.27 
Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2001  
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Appendix Table I.6 Wage Differential between Employed Working Age  
Work-Limited Persons and Non-Work-Limited Persons, in the SLID one-,  
two-, three-, four-, five, and six-period samples, percent 
 
year 
One 
Period 
Two 
Periods 
Three 
Periods 
Four 
Periods 
Five 
Periods 
Six 
Periods 
1993 7.20           
1994 9.26  9.92         
1995 8.77  11.84  11.03       
1996 7.77  7.70  9.69  7.48     
1997 10.29  12.73  7.09  9.89  6.42   
1998 9.62  14.08  17.02  15.95  17.64  10.27 
1999 11.17  12.19  22.62  24.72     
2000 13.48  15.26  17.50  24.54  26.23   
2001 11.94  14.78  15.91  17.70  22.29  23.29 
Mean 9.94  12.31  14.41  16.71  18.15  16.78 
Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2001  
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CHAPTER 2 
HOW DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITIONS 
AND OTHER POLICY VARIABLES AFFECT THE TIMING OF SOCIAL 
SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE APPLICATION: 
RESULTS FROM THE SURVEY OF INCOME AND PROGRAM 
PARTICIPATION 
2.1 Introduction 
While the road to Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) benefit status 
begins with a health condition, the transition onto the DI rolls is influenced by the 
personal and economic characteristics of individuals and the government policies and 
labor market conditions they face. This paper brings a dynamic perspective to the 
debate over the labor market consequences of disability discrimination laws by 
determining their importance within a hazard model that measures the speed at which 
workers apply for DI benefits after their health condition begins to limit their ability to 
work. 
  Most recent research on the employment behavior of working-age people with 
disabilities has focused on the role the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 played 
on their employment. (See: DeLeire 2000, 2003; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001; Kruse 
and Schur, 2003; and Houtenville and Burkhauser, 2004)  Most recently, researchers 
in this literature have recognized that most states had some sort of disability 
discrimination prohibitions prior to 1990 and have attempted to integrate that 
information into their analyses of the impact of labor protection laws on the 
employment of working-age people with disabilities. (See, Beegle and Stock, 2003; 
Hotchkiss, 2004; and especially, Jolls and Prescott, 2005).   But all this research relies  
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on difference-in-difference analyses using cross sectional data, primarily from the 
Current Population Survey, to, in various ways, exploit differences in the employment 
of working-age people with disabilities relative to those without disabilities, before 
and after the implementation of the ADA, as a measure of the importance of 
implementation of this antidiscrimination law.  Furthermore, they had to rely on 
comparisons of the stock of workers employed or not employed in a given year. Thus, 
they were forced to abstract from the costs associated with transitions into and out of 
the labor force and how they change with duration in those states.    
  A parallel literature has attempted to explain the importance of public policies 
on the employment decision of working-age people with disabilities by focusing on 
their decision to leave the labor force and apply for DI benefits following the onset of 
a disability.  This literature has focused on DI policy variables, most especially state 
variations in DI acceptance rates over time to identify their models and to capture the 
influence of such differences on behavior. (See: Burkhauser, Butler, and Kim, 1995; 
Burkhauser, Butler, Kim and Weathers, 1999; Burkhauser, Butler and Weathers, 2002; 
and Burkhauser, Butler and Gumas, 2004).  This research has primarily relied on data 
from the Health and Retirement Study to estimate the speed of exit from employment 
or to application for DI benefits. While these data are rich in detail they are based on 
retrospective information of a cohort of older persons, and their models do not attempt 
to measure the importance of antidiscrimination laws on labor market outcomes.  
  This paper attempts to link these two strands of research on 
employment behavior of working-age people with disabilities by using the Jolls and 
Prescott (2005) data series on state implementation of antidiscrimination laws prior to 
the enactment of the ADA to focus on how such laws impact the speed at which 
workers apply for DI benefits following the onset of a disability.  Using retrospective  
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data from the 1990 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, this 
paper exploits state-level variation in legislation prohibiting disability discrimination 
prior to the passage of the ADA in 1990 to test the timing of DI application on a 
sample of persons who were working at the time they experienced the onset of their 
work limitation. 
2.2 Review of the Literature 
This paper is based on two distinct strands of the economics literature that 
focuses on the employment behavior of working-age people with disabilities and how 
public policies influence that behavior. 
2.2.1 Past Studies of the Importance of DI on Employment Behavior  
Burkhauser and Daly (1996), using data from the Health and Retirement Study, 
show that the majority of older working-age people with disabilities experience their 
work limitation as adults and most were employed at the time. Furthermore they found 
that a substantial time elapsed between the onset of a health condition, its first impact 
on work performance, job exit, and application for disability benefits. This suggests 
that the timing of a policy intervention in the process to disability benefit receipt may 
play as important a role in prolonging employment as the intervention itself. 
  This insight is particularly important in modelling the impact of public policies 
on the employment of working-age people with disabilities since the vast majority of 
funds targeted on this population come from the Social Security Disability Insurance 
(DI) program.  DI is the largest federal transfer program intended to ameliorate the 
consequences of work-related health impairments on the earning capacity and 
economic well-being of people with disabilities. And, like all transfer programs used  
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to replace lost earnings, DI can have the unintended consequences of altering the labor 
force participation behavior of people with disabilities by discouraging work.  
  The dramatic rise in the number of people claiming disability benefits since the 
early 1980s has been well documented and a substantial literature has emerged 
examining explanations of this phenomenon (see Bound and Burkhauser, 1999 and 
Stapleton and Burkhauser, 2003 for review of the literature). 
DI provides benefits based on previous Social Security covered employment. It 
is designed to provide cash benefits to individuals who have impairments that prevent 
“any substantial gainful activity.” A large economics-based literature links changes in 
the size of the DI population to changes in program eligibility criteria and their 
enforcement and to the generosity of program benefits relative to market wages (see 
Bound and Burkhauser 1999 for a review of this literature). Because not being “able to 
work at all” is essentially a precondition for receiving benefits, some argue that 
changes in program rules might have induced a greater proportion of those with work 
limitations to leave the labor force in the 1990s and declare themselves unable to work 
at all so they could receive benefits. That is, some people with disabilities might 
rationally choose DI over work or continuing to look for work if unemployed, given 
their expected wages and the costs, both monetary and non-monetary, of working.  
Goodman and Waidmann (2003) review the evidence that the expansion of the 
DI program during the late 1980s and early 1990s played a central role in the rise in 
the fraction of men who had work limitations and reported being unable to work at all. 
They primarily focus on two papers, Autor and Duggan (2003) and Bound and 
Waidmann (2002), which use data from the CPS and a work-limitation measure of 
disability, to argue that changes in DI eligibility and benefits are primarily responsible  
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for the decline in the employment of working-aged people with disabilities. They 
show, using data from the CPS and NHIS, a close correlation between increased 
enrollment in the DI program and decreased employment during the past 30 years. The 
authors then argue that program expansions, which began in 1984, reduced the 
employment rate of working-aged people with disabilities in the early 1990s in two 
ways. First, many workers made eligible by the easing of eligibility standards in the 
mid-1980s began applying for DI benefits when the economy began deteriorating 
between 1990 and 1992. Second, the wage indexing method used in the formula for 
determining benefit levels had the unintended consequence of increasing the value of 
the benefit, relative to wages, for low-wage workers. They argue that it was the change 
in DI eligibility rules and benefit growth for low-wage workers during the period, 
rather than a change in the underlying severity of impairment or chronic conditions 
that led to the sharp decline in the employment rates of those who reported work 
limitations in the CPS data. Empirically, they show that increases in the DI rolls 
account for the entire rise in the fraction of the population who both report that they 
have a work limitation and are not employed.  
DI is financed by the Social Security payroll taxes. In December 2000, DI paid 
5,042,334 disabled workers an average monthly benefit of $786 (U.S. Social Security 
Administration, 2001). Here we provide a brief overview of DI program rules. A much 
fuller description can be found in the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social 
Security Bulletin. 
Application to DI is merely the beginning of a multiple step eligibility process 
and a protracted appeals process which can be long and whose final outcome is 
uncertain. Thus while a probability of acceptance is not required in retirement models, 
models of DI application must include it because applicants may be either rejected or  
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accepted. The probability that an application for DI is approved has varied 
dramatically over time and state (see Burkhauser, Butler, and Weathers, 2002). In our 
model, we use the rates of approval by state and year, which varied from 25 percent to 
75 percent between 1974 and 1990. 
Applicants who are initially rejected for benefits can file appeals at various 
levels. However, appeals are not a random sample and therefore we choose not to 
model them in this paper as the estimation would become much more complicated. 
The main focus of this paper is modeling the timing of first application for DI. For the 
same reason, we also abstract from returns to work either after being accepted or 
rejected benefits. Bound and Burkhauser (1999) report that accepted individuals rarely 
return to permanent work. Bound (1989) shows that return to work is not likely for the 
rejected group since the relative rewards for returning to work are small. 
This paper models the time to application for DI following the onset of a work 
limitation. The hazard rate is defined as the probability of applying for DI benefits 
once a work limiting condition begins to bother the worker. This probability is time-
dependent. It is conditional on not having applied earlier. An interval hazard that 
controls for unobserved heterogeneity is used to estimate the transition to DI 
application. The unobserved heterogeneity, due to omitted variables or differences in 
the distribution functions across individuals, is integrated out of the likelihood 
function by assuming a gamma mixture form. This model is a variation of the models 
developed in Burkhauser, Butler, Kim, and Weathers (1999) and Burkhauser, Butler, 
and Weathers (2002). 
Burkhauser, Butler, Kim, and Weathers (1999) model the DI application 
decision using a continuous time hazard model. They use 1978 Survey of Disability  
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and Work (SDW) and 1992 Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data to analyze the 
consequences of a move to universal employer accommodation as well as the effect of 
benefit level changes and find that both affect the speed to application.  
Burkhauser, Butler, and Weathers (2002) model the timing of DI application 
once a work limiting health condition begins to bother the worker. They use a hazard 
model and control for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity and estimate their 
model using data from the first wave of HRS. They find that policy variables, such as 
state allowance rates, benefit levels, and employer accommodation, significantly 
influence the speed to application.  
The major innovation of this paper is to include the importance of 
antidiscrimination laws on the speed at which workers apply for DI following the 
onset of a work limitation and to do so with the SIPP data that is a random sample of 
the entire population not simply a cohort of older workers. 
2.2.2 Past Studies of the Importance of the ADA on Employment Behavior 
The ADA requires employers, among other things, to make “reasonable 
accommodations” for workers with work limiting health conditions unless this would 
cause “undue hardship” to the operation of business. An innovative feature of this 
legislation is its emphasis on changing the workplace environment.  
Title I of the ADA requires employers to make “reasonable accommodations” 
to workers with disabilities unless this would cause undue hardship on the operation of 
business. On July 26, 1992, all employers of 25 or more workers were subject to its 
rules. On July 26, 1994, the standards of antidiscrimination were extended to all 
employers of 15 or more workers. The primary goal of Title I of the ADA is to ensure  
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equal access to employment for people with disabilities. Underlying this goal is a 
belief that the removal of disability-related barriers to employment will allow greater 
numbers of individuals with disabilities to choose work over disability benefit receipt, 
which will, in turn, increase their economic well-being. 
One would expect that the declining unemployment rates during the growth 
years of the 1990s business cycle would have caused employers to look beyond their 
traditional workforce to the millions of working- aged people with disabilities. Yet, 
various studies using Current Population Survey data show that the employment rates 
of working-age men and women declined relative to their counterparts without 
disabilities over this period. (See Stapleton and Burkhauser, 2003 for a review of the 
controversy over the use of Current Population Survey data to measure the relative 
employment of working-age people with disabilities over this period.)  This decline in 
the relative employment of working-age people with disabilities has resulted in a 
major debate over the role that the ADA played in this decline.  
ADA advocates expected the ADA to increase the employment of people with 
disabilities by requiring firms to make reasonable accommodations for “qualified” 
employees and by banning discrimination against people with disabilities in hiring, 
firing and pay. Its proponents claimed the ADA would induce companies to make 
adjustments necessary to employ workers with disabilities, and would reduce unlawful 
discrimination. Critics argued that the unintended consequence of the increased 
“firing” costs of accommodation via the increased cost of demonstrating a non-
discriminatory motive to protect against the threat of litigation, as well as the 
increased cost of accommodation required by its “reasonable” accommodation 
requirements would lead to a reduction in hiring and hence an overall decline in the 
employment of the very people the ADA was meant to protect. (See Jolls and Prescott,  
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2005 for a more detailed discussion of the potential costs of compliance and 
noncompliance of the ADA.) 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) and DeLeire (2000) looked at the effects of 
employer accommodation enforcement after the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 (ADA) and they argue that the ADA had the unintended consequence of 
reducing the employment of people with disabilities. They argue that even though the 
ADA may have increased the duration on the job for those who are already employed, 
this effect was offset by the decline in the employment of working-age men and 
women with disabilities.  Importantly for this paper, they were unable to disentangle 
these two offsetting outcomes. 
DeLeire (2000) makes the case that the ADA is responsible for the decline in 
the employment of working-aged people with disabilities. DeLeire first lays out the 
conditions under which protective labor laws could induce employers, on net, to 
employ more or fewer protected workers, and the methods used to measure the net 
effect of such protective laws. He explains that models in the economics literature 
used to test the relative importance of the ADA are the same as those that were used to 
show that the 1964 Civil Rights Act improved the employment rates of African 
Americans in the 1960s and beyond. In the case of the ADA, however, the results 
using these models show the opposite outcome. He concludes that, after controlling 
for all other factors, the employment of working-aged people with disabilities fell after 
the ADA went into effect. DeLeire argues that the difference in the employment 
outcome of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the ADA is likely the result of the burden 
that accommodation costs place on employers, and urges that policies to lighten that 
load be considered to reverse this outcome.  
 80
Kruse and Schur (2003) agree with the basic theoretical model described by 
DeLeire, but argue that both the DeLeire (2000) and the Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) 
papers are flawed because they fail to control for all other factors in their empirical 
models. Similar to Kaye (2002), Kruse and Schur focus on the dramatic changes that 
have occurred in the severity of impairments and chronic conditions in the overall 
population with disabilities. They report that their own work (Kruse and Schur 2003) 
using SIPP data replicates the DeLeire (2000) finding of a fall in the employment of 
the overall working-aged population with work limitations, but they go on to show 
that the employment rate of the work-limited population who report being able to 
work at all rises following passage of the ADA. They show that the results are quite 
sensitive to alternative definitions of the population with disabilities. In effect, Kruse 
and Schur, although acknowledging the criticisms of others, line up with Kaye (2003) 
in their conclusions that those who self-report being unable to work at all should not 
be included in policy analysis of the ADA. Thus, they conclude that increases in the 
severity of impairments in the working-aged population with disabilities reduced the 
overall employment rate, and that the ADA, or possibly other changes in the social 
environment, had a positive effect on the employment of working-aged people with 
disabilities.  
Blanck, Schwochau, and Song (2003) approach the economics-based 
discussion in DeLeire and Kruse and Schur from the broader perspective of the law. 
They criticize the theoretical model used to analyze protective legislation such as the 
1964 Civil Rights Act and the ADA as too narrow in its assumptions about 
competitive labor and product markets. They provide a review of the theoretical 
literature that explicitly accounts for market failures via imperfect information and 
difference in the productivity of workers with and without disabilities. They argue that  
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simple competitive models fail to take into account additional possible reasons why 
firms that are not constrained by perfectly competitive markets would be willing to 
employ additional workers following the passage of protective legislation. Like both 
DeLeire and Kruse and Schur, they conclude that theoretical models are ambiguous in 
their predictions of the impact of the ADA on employment. Ultimately, the only way 
to assess the impact is through empirical research. Blanck, Schwochau, and Song go 
on to provide a more detailed institutional argument for the use of the kind of 
subpopulations discussed by both Kaye and Kruse and Schur to study the 
consequences of the ADA on the employment of its specific protected class. They 
argue that because the ADA was intended to focus on only a small subset of the 
population with chronic conditions or work limitations, empirical analysis of its 
consequences should focus solely on the outcomes in its intended protected class. 
They conclude that such research has not yet been done, and that it is premature to 
implicate the ADA as the main cause of the decline in the employment rate for people 
with disabilities. 
2.3 Pre-ADA State Law Regimes
16   
Before the passage of the ADA, there were no federal laws protecting the 
employment and wages of workers with disabilities in the private sector. (The 
predecessor of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, did incorporate the idea that 
the ability of persons with disabilities to get jobs or access to training is limited by the 
prejudices of others rather the direct effects of injuries or illnesses alone (Johnson, 
1997) and did impose antidiscrimination standards on public employers.) However, by 
                                                 
16 We base our data on the presence or absence of traditional antidiscrimination prohibitions and 
reasonable accommodations requirements across states in the pre-ADA period on information provided 
in Jolls and Prescott (2005).  
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the time the ADA was enacted, almost all states had passed some form of legislation 
prohibiting discrimination against workers with disabilities (Jolls and Prescott, 2005; 
Hotchkiss, 2003), but the coverage and effectiveness of these state laws varied. The 
states enacted their legislations at different times, used different definitions and 
regulations, and varied by coverage.  
Appendix Table II.1 taken from Jolls and Prescott
17 (2005) groups the states 
into three distinct groups with respect to the nature of their anti-discrimination laws 
prior to the enactment of the ADA. The largest group of states enacted some form of 
traditional antidiscrimination laws that prohibited discrimination on the basis of 
disability in hiring, firing, and terms and conditions of employment, but did not 
contain “a reasonable accommodation” standard. A second group of states enacted 
anti-discrimination laws that not only contained the traditional prohibitions against 
discrimination on the basis of disability in hiring, firing, and terms and conditions of 
employment but like the ADA contained reasonable accommodation requirements. 
Finally, a third group of states—Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi—all located in 
the South, had no such laws prior to the enactment of the ADA.
18  
Comparing groups of states that did and did not have pre-existing state-level 
disability laws prior to passage of the ADA, Jolls and Prescott (2005) show that the 
relative employment of working-age people with disabilities declined more relative to 
their counterparts without disabilities in states where the ADA imposed a new 
                                                 
17 Jolls and Prescott (2005) made a tremendous effort researching and summarizing legal data on state 
disability discrimination regimes prior to the ADA. They rely on the actual text of statutes and judicial 
decisions and have traced statutory provisions through all of their pre-ADA amendments and code 
sections. They have also read all of the pre-ADA reported case law, which provides judicial 
interpretations of states’ statutory provisions, and researched unreported case law available in the 
Westlaw legal database.  
18 All of the “no protection” states did prohibit disability discrimination by public employers as required 
by the employment provisions of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, but they did not prohibit such 
discrimination by private employers.   
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mandate of reasonable accommodation relative to the states where state laws already 
included this requirement along with traditional discrimination prohibitions. They also 
show, however, that differences ended a few years after passage. 
This paper takes advantage of the detailed legal research of Jolls and Prescott 
(2005) by using their data on state-level pre-ADA antidiscrimination regimes. We use 
state-level variation in pre-ADA regimes governing treatment of workers with 
disabilities by private employers to test the importance of antidiscrimination 
regulations on the speed of application for DI. Our findings suggest that the reasonable 
accommodations standard as well as traditional discrimination prohibitions played a 
significant role in reducing the speed of application for DI following the onset of a 
work-limiting condition.  
2.4 Data Description 
This section briefly describes the data sets and defines the variables used in the 
paper. 
2.4.1 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
The paper uses data from the 1990 SIPP panel.
19 In general, each of the SIPP 
panels includes longitudinal information on households, families, and individuals over 
a minimum 32-month period (Later SIPP panels provide information for longer 
                                                 
19 Unlike the 1990 SIPP Panel, there are crucial differences between what is claimed to be in the data in 
the data dictionaries for the 1991, 1992, and 1993 Panels and what was actually done, which prevents 
us from using these Panels in our analysis. Although the data dictionaries for these years state that the 
question used to define the SSDI beneficiaries is as follows: “Have … ever applied for Social Security 
Disability Benefits for him/herself?” the item 28A (corresponding to the entry TM9022 in the data 
dictionary) in questionnaires for 1991, 1992, and 1993 panels say, “In the last 12 month, has … applied 
for Social Security Disability or SSI Benefits for him/herself?” Hence, only the 1990 Panel of SIPP 
actually asks retrospective questions on SSDI application history.  See the data appendix for a detailed 
discussion of data issues and other problems with these later panels.  
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periods; for example, the 1992 and 1993 SIPP panels include longitudinal information 
over a 40 and 36 month period, respectively). Each panel contains detailed monthly 
demographic, program, employment, and health characteristics for a nationally 
representative sample of the non-institutionalized resident population of the United 
States. During each SIPP interview “wave,” interviewers ask “core” questions to 
adults age 15 and older. The core questions include demographic, program 
participation, and employment information pertaining to the previous four-month 
period. The number of interviews in each SIPP panel varies, but each panel had at 
least eight waves of interviews. In addition to the core questions asked during each 
interview, the SIPP also includes “topical module” information on special subjects, 
such as past program participation, work history, disability history, and health. We 
draw the data on application for SSDI benefits and health from the “Recipiency 
History,” “Work Disability History,” and the “Functional Limitations and Disability” 
modules that are available in each SIPP panel.  
Our sample consists of working-age (aged 21-62) people with disabilities who 
were working when a health condition first began to bother them. While the SIPP data 
set is large, the onset of a disability before age 62 is a relatively rare event. Hence, 
even with eight waves of data it is difficult to make use of the longitudinal nature of 
the data to contemporaneously look at work behavior following the onset of a 
disability. Fortunately, the SIPP included a retrospective module that contains several 
questions regarding the timing and adaptation to a work limiting condition. That 
section of the data is used as the foundation for our analysis. Individuals were asked 
when their condition first began to bother them, and this date is defined as start of their 
work limitation. They were also asked if and when they applied for DI benefits. For 
those who applied, their spell of not applying for DI following the onset of their  
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disability ends at the year of application. We excluded individuals with a missing 
onset or DI application date. We focus on those workers whose onset occurred after 
1974 and before 1990 who were between the ages of 21 and 62 at the time of onset. 
2.4.2 State Level Variables 
In order to capture the impact of the variation across states and over time in the 
administration of the DI program, we use an additional source of state level data 
provided by The Lewin Group. The Lewin Group created a Public Use File, which 
includes state level data on DI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs as 
well as state level descriptive variables for the years 1974 through 1993. The data 
contain initial DI allowance rates for each state computed as the number of people 
awarded DI benefits at the initial state level screening process divided by the total 
number of initial applications in that state. These data are used to form the 
probabilities of acceptance. While DI is a federal program with uniform eligibility 
rules across states, all administration decisions regarding initial eligibility are done at 
the state level. Appendix Table II.2 shows the mean allowance rate for each state 
between 1974 and 1990. The Lewin Group also provided data on the state 
unemployment rates for the 1974 through 1993 time period.
20  They collected these 
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics 
Division.  
                                                 
20 Rupp and Stapleton (1996) examined the importance of controlling for the state employment rate on 
the estimated impact of the administrative climate on SSDI application by replicating Parsons (1991). 
Parsons (1991) did not include the state unemployment rate in his specification. Rupp and Stapleton 
(1996) replicated the Parsons (1991) study and include and additional specification with the state 
unemployment rate. Inclusion of state unemployment rate, along with age effects, cut the estimated 
elasticity of SSDI application with respect to the state SSDI denial rate by one-half.  
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We also use the data on total state population and Gross State Product (GSP) 
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, 1998). The BEA data are used 
to compute the GSP per capita for each state for years 1974-1990. All dollar figures 
are in real 2000 dollars.  
Relevant data from Lewin Group Public Use File as well as data on GSP per 
capita are merged to the SIPP data using the state of residence identifiers for all SIPP 
respondents. 
2.4.3 Descriptive Statistics for State Data 
Appendix Table II.2 shows the means for the allowance rates, unemployment 
rates, and Gross State Product (GSP) per capita. The table shows quite a bit of 
variation across states.  Across states the mean allowance rate has highs of 49 percent 
in Delaware and 46 percent in New Jersey and Rhode Island, and lows of 24 percent in 
Louisiana and New Mexico. The mean unemployment rate is highest (10 percent) in 
Louisiana and West Virginia.  New Hampshire, Maine, Nebraska, and South Dakota 
have the lowest mean unemployment rate, about 4 percent, during this time period.  
The overall mean unemployment rate is 6.9 percent. The total numbers are not 
population weighted and therefore may not reflect the national average over this 
period. Data show striking differences both in allowance and unemployment rates by 
state.  
  Information on the date of adoption of pre-ADA state disability laws is taken 
from Jolls and Prescott (2005). Jolls and Prescott classify states as full-protection 
(where pre-ADA law imposed both traditional antidiscrimination and reasonable 
accommodation standards on private employers), limited protection (where pre-ADA 
law imposed traditional discrimination prohibition but no reasonable accommodation  
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standard), and no-protection states (where state law imposed no restrictions on 
treatment of workers with disabilities by private employer). As shown in Appendix 
Table II.1, the states within the first two groups greatly varied by date of adoption of 
their legislations. Some states, such as Colorado and Washington, had 
antidiscrimination law with reasonable accommodation requirement in place as early 
as 1977 and 1978, respectively, while others enacted such legislation just before the 
passage of the ADA in 1990. Delaware and Idaho adopted antidiscrimination laws 
with reasonable accommodation requirements in 1988. The majority of states had, 
however, imposed traditional discrimination prohibitions by the end of the 1970s. 
Only Alabama, Arkansas and Mississippi had no disability discrimination prohibitions 
prior to the passage of the ADA in 1990.  It is important to note for purposes of our 
analysis that while only these three states did not provide any type of disability 
antidiscrimination protection prior to the passage of the ADA, the majority of workers 
in our sample (53 percent) did not live in a state that provided disability discrimination 
protection at the time of their disability, because they experienced the onset of their 
disability before their state enacted such legislation. In our sample 22 percent of 
workers were living in states that required accommodation by their employers at the 
time they experienced a work limiting health condition and 25 were living in such 
states before they decided to apply for DI.  
2.4.4 Variables Affecting Timing of Disability Insurance Application 
The explanatory variables for the hazard function, ( ) t h , are defined in Table 
2.1. While application for DI benefits is a function of health, it also is influenced by 
program rules and benefits. These include eligibility criteria and the generosity of 
benefits relative to work, the comparative generosity and availability of other means-
tested welfare and social insurance programs, macro economic conditions (national,  
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state, and local), and applicants’ education and job skills. Therefore, our set of 
explanatory variables includes socio-economic and health status variables used in 
previous studies, as well as a variable unique to this data set: whether or not state pre-
ADA legislation requiring the employer to accommodate them existed after the onset 
of their disability. 
Policy Variables. We are interested in several policy variables. A relatively 
high probability of acceptance onto the DI rolls is expected to increase the marginal 
value of the post-application period and speed the time to application. We assume that 
the probability of a successful award by a worker is a function of the allowance rate 
for DI applicants in the worker’s state of residence. Workers who live in states with 
relatively porous screening processes have a higher probability of initial acceptance, 
and thus a higher marginal value in their post-application period which will induce 
them to apply sooner than other workers. Because Social Security Administration 
guidelines for eligibility include medical as well as vocational criteria we also assume 
that those workers with health conditions that are more serious are more likely to be 
accepted, as are those whose vocational characteristics are weaker—poor education, 
older, manual laborers, etc.—and thus both are likely to apply more quickly.  
 Accommodation  Requirement  and Discrimination Prohibition. Because state 
discrimination prohibitions are likely to increase job accommodation, we are 
particularly interested in the role such prohibitions played prior to the passage of the 
ADA and its impact on timing of DI application. Accommodation by employers can 
increase the length of time during which an employee stays on a job and does not 
apply for DI (Burkhauser et al., 1999; Burkhauser et al., 2002). We introduce two 
dummy variables into our model to control for the existence and type of state pre-
ADA law governing treatment of workers with disabilities in the workplace.   
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Table 2.1 Mean Values for the SIPP Sample of People with Disabilities  
 
Variable  Means  Standard 
ii States with Reasonable Accommodation 
Requirement  0.245 0.430 
States with Antidiscrimination Prohibition  0.666  0.473 
State Allowance Rate  0.358  0.068 
Mean State Unemployment Rate  0.069  0.022 
Mean GSP per capita (thousands, 2000 dollars)   27.853  5.049 
Age of onset   40.40  9.981 
Female 0.452  0.498 
Nonwhite 0.140  0.347 
Education:  Less than HS  0.319  0.466 
Education:  More than HS  0.359  0.480 
North-east   0.161  0.368 
South 0.378  0.485 
West 0.220  0.414 
Disability is a result of on the job accident  0.244  0.429 
Disability is a result of the accident other than on 
the job accident  0.139 0.346 
Musculoskeletal 0.451  0.498 
Cardiovascular 0.161  0.370 
Comorbidity: 2 Conditions  0.188  0.391 
Comorbidity: 3 Conditions  0.119  0.324 
Time 1-3  0.281  0.450 
Time 3-6  0.256  0.436 
Time 6-9  0.143  0.350 
Time 9+  0.113  0.316 
Spell Length   4.586  3.461 
 
a Includes heart attack, arteriosclerosis, and other heart troubles. 
b Includes chronic stiffness in arm, hand, foot, leg or back; other deformities of the back or 
spine; muscular atrophy; or lupus. 
 
  Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 1990 SIPP Panel and the Public Use Data File on 
SSDI and SSI Applicants and Beneficiaries provided by the Lewin Group. 
We treat state-level variables (allowance rate, unemployment rate, GSP per 
capita, and type of pre-ADA antidiscrimination law) as time-varying, as they change 
with time. In Table 2.2 we show the means of time-varying covariates in our model for  
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each period from the onset of a disability until the last observed period. 
 Other  socio-economic  variables.  Age at onset of a disability, race, and 
education are also included in our empirical model. Higher education, younger age, 
and non-black race are generally found to increase work effort and, therefore, to 
decrease the risk of DI application. 
 Health  measures.  Finally, we attempt to account for variations in health within 
our sample in two ways. First, we account for co-morbidity. We expect that a worker 
with multiple health conditions is more likely to apply for DI than a worker with only 
one health condition. Second, we see if different conditions influence duration. We 
choose the two most common physical conditions in the DI population, 
musculoskeletal and cardiovascular conditions. Because musculoskeletal conditions 
tend to be chronic in nature and cardiovascular more acute, we expect those with such 
conditions to have significantly different rates of decline from those with other 
conditions.  
2.5 Empirical Estimations 
Disability is a process that begins with the onset of a health condition. 
Eventually the condition begins to limit the ability to work and can possibly lead to 
application for DI benefits. Table 2.3 examines the duration between the onset of a 
work limiting health condition and application for DI benefits for our sample of 
workers who are employed at the time of onset, disaggregated by the type of disability 
discrimination protection they have at onset. It provides life tables that separately 
describe the distribution of spell lengths from onset to application for workers who 
lived in states with no disability discrimination protection, states with traditional civil 
rights based discrimination protection, and states with traditional antidiscrimination, as  
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well as ADA-like reasonable accommodation protection at the time of onset. Some 
workers who were at risk at the beginning of an interval dropped out before its end. 
The implicit assumption is that attrition from the risk set occurred randomly during the 
interval; hence the non-survivors were exposed on average for one-half the interval.  
Figure 2.1 is based on Table 2.3 values.  It graphs the distribution of spell 
length to DI application for workers with each of the three types of antidiscrimination 
protections. About 75 percent of the sample applied for DI benefits by the end of our 
data. The survival rates are highest for workers with disabilities in states where a 
reasonable accommodation standard is imposed along with traditional discrimination 
prohibition and lowest in states where no law governing treatment of disabled workers 
existed at time of a worker’s application for DI. This is what we would expect since 
the reasonable accommodation standard was meant to increase the rate at which 
workers were accommodated on the job. We would expect this difference to be 
greatest in our population of workers since we would expect employers to be most 
sensitive to accommodating workers who are already on the job when their work 
limitation occurs, since this is the group who is most easily able to take advantage of 
ADA-type laws to sue for damages.   
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Table 2.2 Mean Values for Time-Varying Variables 
 
 N 
Living in 
States with 
No Protection
Living in States 
With Traditional 
Antidiscrimination 
Prohibition 
Living in States 
with Reasonable 
Accommodation 
Requirement 
State 
Allowance 
Rate 
State 
Unemployment 
Rate 
GSP per 
capita (In 
2000 dollars, 
$1,000) 
At time of onset  1,307  0.114  0.666  0.220  0.365  0.069  27.676 
After 1 Year  1,095  0.109  0.660  0.231  0.361  0.069  27.757 
After 2 Years  965  0.104  0.668  0.229  0.357  0.069  27.653 
After 3 Years  876  0.097  0.672  0.231  0.353  0.070  27.618 
After 4 Years  803  0.091  0.671  0.238  0.348  0.071  27.653 
After 5 Years  658  0.079  0.657  0.263  0.347  0.071  27.665 
After 6 Years  543  0.075  0.648  0.277  0.351  0.072  27.788 
After 7 Years  466  0.075  0.647  0.278  0.353  0.072  27.883 
After 8 Years  393  0.065  0.645  0.290  0.351  0.070  28.110 
After 9 Years  335  0.052  0.624  0.324  0.356  0.066  28.554 
After 10 Years  266  0.050  0.648  0.302  0.359  0.064  28.660 
After 11 Years  224  0.047  0.661  0.291  0.372  0.062  29.060 
After 12 Years  176  0.035  0.671  0.294  0.369  0.061  29.095 
After 13 Years  143  0.048  0.683  0.270  0.367  0.058  29.732 
After 14 Years  104  0.047  0.721  0.233  0.370  0.057  29.863 
After 15 Years  72  0.105  0.737  0.158  0.369  0.059  29.419 
Total    0.093 0.662  0.245 0.358  0.069  27.853 
  Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 1990 SIPP Panel and the Public Use Data File on SSDI and SSI Applicants and Beneficiaries provided by 
the Lewin Group.  
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Table 2.3 Life Table Estimates of the Timing of DI Application  
by Type of State Disability Discrimination Protection  
   States without Protection   
States with Traditional 
Discrimination Prohibition   
States with Reasonable 
Accommodation Requirement 
    Number of Persons  Probabilities    Number of Persons  Probabilities 
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(1)      (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)   (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)   (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
1    19  22  149 0.127 0.873   112  106  871 0.129 0.871   31  28  287 0.108  0.892 
2    11  16  108 0.089 0.784   54  77  759 0.072 0.799   22  27  228 0.086  0.806 
3    9  9  81 0.087 0.697   44  41  705 0.067 0.732   9  20  179 0.041  0.765 
4    7  8  63 0.078 0.619   32  50  663 0.054 0.678   9  15  150 0.045  0.72 
5    3  11  48 0.038 0.581   16  57  629 0.030 0.648   7  6  126  0.04  0.68 
6    3  4  34 0.052 0.529   14  36  511 0.032 0.616   2  12  113 0.012  0.668 
7    1  4  27 0.019 0.510   14  27  417 0.037 0.579   9  8  99 0.061  0.607 
8    2  4  22 0.047 0.463   10  23  362 0.031 0.548   3  8  82 0.022  0.585 
9    0  5  16 0.000 0.463   5  20  306 0.017 0.531   4  -2  71 0.033  0.552 
10    0  3  11 0.000 0.463   9  21  255 0.036 0.495   2  19  69 0.016  0.536 
11    1  1  8 0.058 0.405   5  14  210 0.024 0.471   1  10  48 0.011  0.525 
12    2  1  6 0.135 0.270   7  20  181 0.039 0.432   4  8  37 0.057  0.468 
13    0  0  3 0.000 0.270   5  9  148 0.038 0.394   4  4  25 0.075  0.393 
14    1  0  3 0.090 0.180   2  10  123 0.018 0.376   0  7  17  0  0.393 
15    0  0  2 0.000 0.180   5  12  92 0.061 0.315   1  6  10 0.039  0.354 
16    1  1  2 0.090 0.090   1  13  67 0.023 0.292   2  1  3 0.236  0.118 
Total     60  89              335  536              110  177          
 
a  Survival means probability of not applying for DI by period t. 
 
b Applying represents the conditional probability of applying at period t given survival to period t. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the 1990 SIPP Panel.  
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Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the 1990 SIPP Panel 
 
Figure 2.1: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates of the Timing of Application for Social 
Security Disability Insurance Benefits 
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For each of our three groups of workers in Table 2.3 we provide five columns 
of information. The first column shows the number of periods since the onset of a 
work limiting health condition. Columns (2)-(5) show the number of workers who 
apply within the period; who are censored within the period, total number at risk; their 
hazard rate, and their probability of surviving to the beginning of the period. In all 
three groups, the hazard rate is greatest in the first period and declines continuously 
thereafter. The vast majority of workers in each group do not apply for DI in the first 
few years following onset. The median worker with no antidiscrimination protection 
applies for DI benefits 8 years following onset. The median worker with traditional 
disability discrimination protection applies for benefits 10 years after onset. The 
median worker with both traditional protection and reasonable accommodation 
protection applies 12 years after application.  These life tables establish that there is 
substantial variation in spell lengths from onset to application and that workers with 
disabilities who were living in states with pre-ADA traditional discrimination 
prohibition either enforced by reasonable accommodation standard or without it, have 
higher survival probabilities in each period. 
Table 2.3 assumes that no heterogeneity exists across individuals. More 
important, it assumes that the sample composition does not change over time. These 
are strong assumptions. Part of the large reduction in the risk of disability insurance 
application is caused by changes in the composition of survivors. To specify better the 
risk of disability insurance application over time, we use a hazard model that adjusts 
for sample heterogeneity and allows us to separate the effect of initial characteristics 
from time effects. An additional limitation of our data set is that it is not a true panel. 
There are, as discussed below, problems of recall error as well as the difficulty of 
capturing the exact time of exit.  
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2.5.1 Developing an Empirical Hazard Model 
Because we are interested in measuring the time it takes before the onset of a 
work limiting health condition leads to DI application, we use a dynamic model of DI 
application. Our choice is a discrete-state, continuous-time hazard model.
21 Our model 
looks explicitly at a person’s risk of application each year. Using this model we 
capture the distribution in the timing of an event as well as its occurrence over a 
specific interval. Most important, we are able to correctly handle censoring problems 
caused by people with work limitations who still do not apply for DI when the survey 
ends. Ordinary regression specifications are not well adapted to offsetting censoring 
problems.  
We focus on the speed of application for DI by workers who experience a 
work limiting health condition and assume that it is an absorbing state. This abstracts 
potential issues related to return to work or to applying for retirement or other 
programs (such as SSI), as well as to saving and labor supply choices.  
More formally we model the hazard rate as the probability of application to DI 
following onset of a work limiting health condition. Suppose the cumulative 
probability that a person applies for disability insurance by time (t) is given by: 
() ( ) . exp 1
0
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
− − = ∫
t
du u h t G         ( 1 )  
                                                 
21 The hazard model is based on Burkhauser et al. (2002). Hazard models are explicitly reduced form 
models of the time until an event occurs, here application for SSDI. Of course arguments can be made 
with respect to the value of reduced form models, such as hazard models, which are less difficult to 
estimate, primarily because they are available in standard computer packages and which, however, can 
be criticized for being unable to capture the consequences of a changing structure. However, these 
reduced form models offer such convenience in practice that they should also be considered. The only 
way to know how reduced form models compete with structural models in their ability to predict the 
behavioral consequences of policy changes is to estimate both reduced form and structural models of 
real and complex problems. This is another issue we are going to explore in subsequent papers, by 
comparing the predictive power of our reduced form hazard models to structural models.  
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Associated with this distribution function is the density function g(t), and the 
instantaneous hazard rate is the conditional probability of disability insurance 
application at (t), given that the person has not applied before (t). It 
is () () () [] t G t g t h − = 1 . 
To make the distribution function G(t) a function of individual attributes, we 
specify the hazard rate in the form: 
() [] [ ] . ) ( exp exp υ ⋅ ⋅ ′ = t f a X t h         ( 2 )  
The first term accounts for observable variation across individuals and is 
modeled as an exponential function. The second term shows the time profile to DI 
application once individual differences are held constant. Rather than specify a 
particular functional form and to allow flexibility in how we capture time dependence, 
we include a step function of time, with steps at the 25
th, 50
th, 75
th, and 90
th percentiles 
of time. The third term captures unobserved individual heterogeneity. For instance, 
unobserved heterogeneity may exist because of omitted variables or differences in the 
distribution functions across individuals. People who are less motivated or less healthy 
for reasons that are not observable will apply for DI more quickly, but we are not able 
to control completely for attitudes in our sample. Hence, we may confuse negative 
time dependence with the fact that in the next period, the remaining sample is 
dominated by more motivated people who are less likely to exit. To control for such 
differences, unobserved factors are integrated out of the likelihood function. See 
Lancaster (1990) for more discussion of these points. Here we report our findings 
using a gamma-mixture distribution to control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
For those who apply for DI following onset, the year of application is known. 
The probability of this event occurring between  i t  and ( ) i i s t +  is  () ( ) i i i i i t G s t G − + .  
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We know the year of onset for all our respondents, so left censoring is not a 
problem.  However, many workers in our sample have not applied for benefits by 
1989, and they are right censored.  In this case we only know that the true duration of 
the spell exceeds the observed final value, and hence, the duration is the length of time 
until the end of the survey. Our hazard model explicitly accounts for right censored 
observations. For individuals who still do not apply for disability insurance at the time 
the survey ends, the probability of not applying is  ( ) u t G j j + − 1.   
Combining complete and incomplete spell components yields the (M) disabled 
workers who have applied for SSDI and those (N) who have not applied following 
onset:  () ( ) [] () [] ∏ ∏
= =
+ − − + =
N
j
j j
M
i
i i i i i u t G t G s t G L
1 1
1.  
2.5.2 Results 
Table 2.4 shows the results of our interval hazard model with unmeasured 
heterogeneity
22. To show the robustness of the model to inclusion of various variables 
we run two specifications. Specification 1 is most closely related to Table 2.3 and 
simply looks at the marginal effect of the antidiscrimination protection in the state for 
our sample of workers and the state DI acceptance rate. Note that, unlike Table 2.1, we 
allow both these variables to be time varying. The coefficients for reasonable 
accommodation and acceptance rates are significant at the 1 percent level. The 
coefficient for traditional antidiscrimination protection is significant at the 5 percent 
level. When we control for all our other variables in specification 2 the size of the 
coefficients on all three variables declines as does the level at which they are 
                                                 
22 Our estimation procedure also accounts for within-state dependence and calculates the standard errors 
of estimates using the bootstrap method. For more information on bootstrap procedures see: Effron 
(1979), Efron (1982), Rao and Wu (1988), Shao and Tu (1995), Shao (1996), Tukey (1958), Veall 
(1998), and Vinod (1993). 
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significantly different from zero. Reasonable accommodation is now significant only 
at the 5 percent level and traditional antidiscrimination is significant only at the 10 
percent level. Acceptance rates, however, are still significant at the 1 percent level. We 
chose Model 2 as our final specification. The hazard model produces mostly 
significant and economically meaningful parameter estimates. Since the coefficients 
do not provide a measure of the magnitude of the particular variable’s impact on the 
hazard, the marginal impact of all significant variables in Table 2.4 on spell duration 
are estimated and examined in Table 2.5. 
Additional education and being younger at onset increases the utility of 
earnings relative to DI, discouraging application, while being older or less educated 
leads to shorter duration to DI application. Relative to whites, members of other races 
tend to have higher DI application hazards. There is evidence that presence of more 
than one work-limiting condition significantly increases speed of application to DI. 
Although some health conditions lead to longer time to application than others, we do 
not find that cardiovascular conditions, such as heart attack, arteriosclerosis, and other 
heart troubles lead to longer duration to DI application.  
The policy variables in Table 2.4 affect the application hazard in the expected 
direction. Holding other variables in the model constant, an increase in the state 
allowance rate significantly increases the hazard of DI application. We also find that 
the risk of a person applying for DI after a health condition begins to limit his ability 
to work is significantly reduced when a state law prohibits discrimination of a worker 
with disability; the hazard of DI application is also reduced when, in addition, the state 
imposes a reasonable accommodation requirement.   
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Table 2.4 Hazard Models of the Timing of DI Application 
a 
Variable  Coefficient  (standard errors in parentheses) 
  Model 1 Model 2
States with Reasonable Accommodation Requirement  -0.479  *  -0.351  ** 
 (0.170)    (0.177)   
States with Antidiscrimination Prohibition  -0.301  **  -0.293  *** 
 (0.148)    (0.156)   
State Allowance Rate 3.264  *  2.898  * 
 (0.663)    (0.799)   
Mean State Unemployment Rate      -1.527   
     (2.538)   
Mean GSP per capita      0.012   
     (0.010)   
Age of onset      0.043  * 
     (0.005)   
Female     -0.075   
     (0.095)   
Nonwhite     0.233  *** 
     (0.124)   
Education:  Less than HS      0.020   
     (0.107)   
Education:  More than HS      -0.320  ** 
     (0.121)   
Northeast     0.157   
     (0.147)   
South     0.191   
     (0.134)   
West     0.092   
     (0.153)   
Disability is a result of on the job accident      0.140   
     (0.122)   
Disability is a result of the accident other than on the       -0.069   
job accident      (0.166)   
Musculoskeletal     -0.164   
     (0.108)   
Cardiovascular     -0.129   
     (0.129)   
Comorbidity: 2 Conditions      0.238  ** 
     (0.114)   
Comorbidity: 3 Conditions      0.536  * 
     (0.120)   
Time 1-3      -0.326  ** 
     (0.114)   
Time 3-6      -0.601  * 
     (0.132)   
Time 6-9      -0.655  * 
     (0.167)   
Time 9+      -0.303  *** 
     (0.164)   
Constant -3.338  *  -4.981  * 
   (0.273)     (0.623)    
* Significant at the .001 level; ** Significant at the .05 level, *** Significant at the .10 level.  
a These calculations are based on the gamma-mixture unmeasured heterogeneity model. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the 1990 SIPP Panel.  
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This finding is consistent with the emphasis on accommodation in the federal 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. But the fact that, in our sample, 25 percent 
of people with disabilities (see Table 2.2) were living in states requiring 
accommodation by their employer at the time they made a decision to apply for SSDI 
benefits, modifies the view that such accommodation was rare prior to the passage of 
the ADA and supports Jolls and Prescott (2005) effort to control for prior state 
protection in evaluating the net effect of the ADA on employment outcomes. 
2.5.3 Measuring the Relative Importance of  
Employer Accommodation Law 
Using the parameters in the hazard equation in Table 2.4, we can calculate 
expected duration for a person with mean characteristics. We can then measure the 
impact of a change in an independent variable on duration. Our calculation of 
marginal impacts assumes that the unmeasured heterogeneity or disturbance in the 
hazard function is zero. In this nonlinear model, this is equivalent to assuming it is the 
median value of the hazard in the calculation. 
Table 2.5 shows the marginal impact of the variables found to be significant in 
Table 2.4. At the mean value of all explanatory variables, the calculated expected 
duration of time to DI application after onset is 12.9 years, and existence of state 
antidiscrimination statutes alone or with reasonable accommodation standards 
imposed significantly increases a person’s expected time to application. The presence 
of traditional discrimination prohibition increases time to DI application by more than 
4 years. Further strengthening this prohibition by imposing an accommodation 
requirement is estimated to add almost 6 more years until application. Recall, 
however, that the average worker’s age is 40.40. Hence, most workers in states with  
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traditional discrimination prohibitions as well as in states with accommodation 
requirements are still likely to apply for DI and leave the job well before normal 
retirement age.  
 
  Table 2.5 Marginal Impact of Some Variables on Length of Time to DI 
Application 
a 
 
Explanatory Variables  Mean 
Marginal Impact in  
Years 
(T-value in parentheses)
 
States with Reasonable Accommodation 
Requirement 
b 0.245  5.992
***
   (1.782)  
States with Antidiscrimination Prohibition 
b 0.662  4.354 ***
   (1.931)  
State Allowance Rate 
c (10% increase) 0.358 -1.820 * 
   (-5.845)  
Age of onset   40.40  -0.672 * 
   (-6.693)  
Nonwhite 
b 0.140  -3.341 ** 
   (-2.010)  
Education:  More than HS 
b 0.359  5.239 ** 
   (2.456)  
Comorbidity: 2 Conditions 
b 0.188  -3.436 ** 
   (-2.197)  
Comorbidity: 3 Conditions 
b 0.119  -6.872 * 
   (-5.045)  
    
* Significant at the .001 level; ** Significant at the .05 level, *** Significant at the .10 level. 
a Mean expected duration is 12.9 years. 
b The marginal impact is an estimate of a change from zero to one. 
c  Based on a 10 percent change in state allowance rate 
Age at onset is measured as the addition of one more year. 
 
  Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 1990 SIPP Panel and the Public Use Data File on 
SSDI and SSI Applicants and Beneficiaries provided by the Lewin Group. 
 
 
Another important factor in Table 2.5 that significantly delays expected time to 
DI application is education. Workers with more than a high school education delay 
expected time to application by 5.24 years.   
 103
Other variables in Table 2.5 have adverse effects on the expected time to 
application. Being a member of a race other than white shortens expected time to DI 
application by 3.34 years. Presence of two work-limiting conditions decreases 
expected duration by 3.44 years, presence of three health conditions cuts expected 
time to application by 6.87 years. A one-year increase in age at onset modestly 
decreases expected duration by 0.67 years. Finally, a 10 percent increase in state 
allowance rate accelerates time to application by 1.82 years. 
Table 2.6 shows more clearly how the risk of DI application is influenced by 
the state antidiscrimination law and mandated accommodation standard for the 
average worker. It shows the estimated distribution of time to application in three 
groups of states based on the simulation of the average worker following the onset of a 
health condition that limits work. In states with no protection, half of all persons with 
disabilities exit within five years.
23  In contrast, it takes seven years for fifty percent of 
persons with disabilities who were living in states with traditional antidiscrimination 
laws but without mandated accommodation requirements and eight years for those 
who were living in states requiring accommodation. In states with either traditional 
discrimination prohibitions or in those with such protection plus a reasonable 
accommodation requirement, a third of persons with disabilities will delay DI 
application for 10 years or more after onset of their health limitation, while only 17 
percent of those living in states without such protections have such long expected 
durations to application. This finding suggests that while legislation requiring 
accommodation is not a work panacea, it does have the potential to increase time to DI 
application and, therefore, increase substantially the duration of employment for 
                                                 
23 Note that while this is considerably shorter than the 8 years finding from our life table reported in 
Table 2.3, it still shows a considerable period between onset and application even in states with no 
antidiscrimination protection.  
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workers who experience the onset of a disability while employed. 
 
Table 2.6 Distribution of Expected Hazard of DI Application for the  
Average Worker by Type of State Disability Discrimination Protection  
 
 
States with No 
Protection 
States with 
Traditional 
Antidiscrimination 
Prohibition 
States with 
Reasonable 
Accommodation 
Requirement 
Years before 
application 
following onset 
of disability 
Hazard 
Rate 
Cumulative 
Hazard 
Hazard 
Rate 
Cumulative 
Hazard 
Hazard 
Rate 
Cumulative 
Hazard 
1 0.158  0.158  0.123  0.123  0.109  0.109 
2 0.109  0.266  0.086  0.209  0.073  0.182 
3 0.104  0.370  0.082  0.291  0.074  0.256 
4 0.075  0.445  0.060  0.351  0.054  0.310 
5 0.069  0.514  0.058 0.409 0.052 0.363 
6 0.060  0.574  0.057  0.465  0.049  0.412 
7 0.057  0.631  0.054  0.520  0.050 0.462 
8 0.060  0.691  0.055  0.574  0.051  0.513 
9 0.061  0.752  0.053  0.627  0.052  0.565 
10 0.078  0.830  0.075  0.702  0.073  0.638 
Greater than 10  0.170   0.298    0.362    
In states with no protection, half of all persons with disabilities exit within five years. In contrast, it 
takes eight years for fifty percent of persons with disabilities who were living in states requiring 
accommodation, and seven years for those living in states with traditional antidiscrimination but 
without mandated accommodation requirement. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 1990 SIPP Panel and the Public Use Data File on SSDI and 
SSI Applicants and Beneficiaries provided by the Lewin Group. 
 
We also report the estimated probabilities of applying for DI for the average 
worker within 1, 5, 10, and 15 years of the onset of a disability in Table 2.7. The first 
row of Table 2.6 shows the estimated mean outcomes for each column. Each 
succeeding row shows the change in estimated mean outcome based on a particular 
change in the explanatory variable. 
As can be seen in row one, on average 37.4 percent of workers with disabilities  
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are expected to apply within the first five years and 81.2 percent are expected to apply 
within the first 15 years. 
The impact of universal employer accommodation legislation is shown in the 
next row. Universal accommodation law would reduce applications by 11.9 
percentage points within 5 years, 20.3 percentage points within 10 years, and 32.0 
percentage points within 15 years. The effect of traditional discrimination prohibition 
is similar: it reduces applications by 11.8 percentage points within 5 years, 20.2 
percentage points within 10 years, and 32.3 percentage points within 15 years. 
Table 2.7 Estimated Probabilities of DI Application for the Average Worker  
within 5, 10, and 15 years of Onset of a Disability 
 
 Probability  of  Application 
Variable 
Within 
1 
year 
Within 
 5 years
Within 
 10 years
Within 
 15  
years 
Expected Value  0.125 0.374 0.603 0.812 
States with Reasonable Accommodation 
Requirement
 b  -0.040 -0.119 -0.203 -0.320 
States with Antidiscrimination Prohibition 
b  -0.039 -0.118 -0.202 -0.323 
State Allowance Rate 
c (10% increase)  0.014 0.042 0.073 0.129 
Age of onset 
d  0.005 0.017 0.029 0.046 
Nonwhite 
b  0.031 0.095 0.163 0.264 
Education:  More than HS 
b  -0.037 -0.114 -0.191 -0.312 
Comorbidity: 2 Conditions 
b  0.032 0.097 0.164 0.256 
Comorbidity: 3 Conditions 
b  0.081 0.245 0.422 0.705 
      
b The marginal impact is an estimate of a change from zero to one. 
c  Based on a 10 percent change in state allowance rate 
d Age at onset is measured as the addition of one more year. 
 
  Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 1990 SIPP Panel and the Public Use Data File on SSDI and 
SSI Applicants and Beneficiaries provided by the Lewin Group. 
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A 10 percent increase in the state allowance rate would increase mean 
allowance rates from 36 percent to about 40 percent. This increase represents a one 
standard deviation movement in the distribution and is well within the range of the 
data. Such an increase would increase applications by 4.2 percent within the first five 
years. Within 10 years, the marginal effect is a 7.3 percentage point increase, and it is 
12.9 percentage points within 15 years.  
An alternative way to judge the importance of traditional antidiscrimination 
laws as well as accommodation requirement is to compare their importance to the 
policy parameter most often measured in disability studies — the expected 
replacement rate (Burkhauser, Butler, and Kim, 1994). Burkhauser et al. (1994) 
measure the effect of a change in the expected replacement rate from zero to one for a 
sample of DI applicants very similar to the one we are using in this paper. This 
dramatic policy counterfactual, which captures the full effect of a guaranteed total 
replacement of wages for the mean worker versus receiving no benefits, reduces 
expected duration by 3.3 years (Burkhauser et al., 1994). This value is smaller than the 
estimated effect of a discrete change in either state legislation. Furthermore, it is 
unlikely that the replacement rates will ever be allowed to fluctuate to this degree. 
Hence, a traditional discrimination prohibition and a reasonable accommodation 
standard are more powerful tools for affecting the application decision than the 
replacement rate. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This paper, building on the most recent literature focusing on the 
antidiscrimination protection of workers prior to the passage of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, shows that workers who lived in states that had either  
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traditional disability antidiscrimination protection or such protection plus the type of 
reasonable accommodation protection that was later included in the ADA were 
significantly slower in applying for DI benefits than were workers in states with no 
such protection.  
This positive employment response to antidiscrimination protection and 
especially our very strong finding that ADA-like reasonable accommodation 
requirements have an even greater impact on delaying application for DI should to 
some degree reassure those proponents of the ADA that reasonable accommodation 
laws importantly increase the protection of workers who experience the onset of a 
disability while on the job.  This is the first paper to show that reasonable 
accommodation laws delay exit from employment and application for DI benefits. 
But it is important to note that our findings are not necessarily inconsistent 
with those of Jolls and Prescott (2005) who argue that the introduction of the federal 
ADA resulted in short run declines in employment in states where the ADA provided 
workers with reasonable accommodation protection for the first time. This is so 
because they are looking at changes in the relative employment of those with and 
without disability. We, for the first time, have shown that such reasonable 
accommodation laws impact duration on the job by presumably increasing 
accommodation. But it is certainly possible, as critics of the ADA and disability 
discrimination laws in general claim, that the added costs associated with such 
requirements led employers to reduce the number of workers with disabilities that they 
hired in the years that Jolls and Prescott (2005) consider.  
But it is also possible that other factors led to a decline in the relative 
employment of working-age people with disabilities over this entire period. Our  
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results also show that workers are sensitive to their probability of being accepted onto 
the DI rolls and take it into consideration in their timing of application for DI benefits. 
Increase in workers’ expectations of being accepted onto the DI rolls over this period 
is an alternative explanation of the fall in the relative employment of working-age 
people with disabilities that has not been fully explored in the literature.   
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Appendix II: Additional Tables for Chapter 2  
 
Appendix Table II.1 Pre-ADA State Laws Prohibiting Disability Discrimination – 
“Protection without Accommodation” States 
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Appendix Table II.1 (continued). Pre-ADA State Laws Prohibiting Disability 
Discrimination – “ADA-like states” 
 
 
 
Source: Jolls and Prescott (2005)  
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Appendix Table II.2 State Level Variables over 1974-1989 
    
Current State of 
Residence 
Initial 
Allowance 
Rate 
Unemployment 
Rate 
GSP per capita 
(thousands of 
real 2000 
dollars) 
Alabama   0.308  0.092  21.717 
Alaska 0.379  0.096  77.298 
Arizona   0.375  0.064  24.771 
Arkansas   0.316  0.080  20.390 
California   0.349  0.068  32.192 
Colorado   0.389  0.065  29.160 
Connecticut   0.442  0.050  32.784 
Delaware   0.488  0.072  30.815 
Florida   0.359  0.063  23.939 
Georgia   0.333  0.061  26.160 
Hawaii 0.344  0.047  31.279 
Idaho 0.305  0.056  23.340 
Illinois   0.357  0.077  29.480 
Indiana   0.391  0.069  24.820 
Iowa   0.353  0.085  22.601 
Kansas   0.380  0.048  26.728 
Kentucky   0.313  0.083  22.618 
Louisiana   0.244  0.102  29.326 
Maine   0.434  0.041  26.266 
Maryland   0.376  0.050  29.230 
Massachusetts   0.451  0.049  31.399 
Michigan   0.367  0.088  26.826 
Minnesota   0.439  0.055  27.706 
Mississippi   0.287  0.098  18.719 
Missouri   0.371  0.061  25.933 
Montana   0.308  0.067  21.578 
Nebraska   0.385  0.042  26.202 
Nevada   0.342  0.067  31.965 
New Hampshire   0.451  0.039  27.089 
New Jersey   0.457  0.054  32.737 
New Mexico   0.248  0.075  23.503 
New York   0.401  0.063  33.052 
North Carolina   0.405  0.055  25.032 
Ohio   0.402  0.074  26.463 
Oklahoma   0.312  0.064  24.535 
Oregon   0.325  0.075  24.929 
Pennsylvania   0.375  0.067  25.501 
Rhode Island   0.464  0.056  26.921 
South Carolina   0.371  0.069  20.393 
South Dakota   0.449  0.043  22.127 
Tennessee   0.342  0.069  23.653 
Texas   0.323  0.068  29.384 
Utah   0.443  0.057  22.528 
Vermont   0.425  0.051  23.602 
Virginia   0.348  0.053  25.860 
Washington   0.354  0.082  28.006 
West Virginia   0.269  0.100  20.716 
Wisconsin   0.442  0.067  25.113 
Wyoming   0.382  0.064  39.748 
Total 0.365  0.069  27.676 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the 1990 SIPP Panel and the Public Use Data File on SSDI and 
SSI Applicants and Beneficiaries provided by the Lewin Group.  
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Appendix Table II.3 Description of Variables Used in Analysis 
Variable Description 
Spell Length Variables 
Disability  A health condition or impairment that limits the kind or amount of paid 
work that can be performed.  The health condition or impairment is 
expected to last at least 1 year. 
Disability Limit  The year the disability first began to limit the kind or amount of work 
person can do. 
Apply  Indicator equal to 1 if the person applied for SSDI benefits, 0 
otherwise. 
Censor  Indicator equal to 1 if the person had not applied for benefits, 0 
otherwise. 
Condition Limit 
Duration 
The number of years from the year the disability began to interfere until 
the year that first application for SSDI occurred.   
Length of Spell to 
Application 
 
Number of years from onset to application or censoring. 
Policy Variables 
States with 
Reasonable 
Accommodation 
Requirement 
Indicator equal to 1 if the is living in a state that requires private 
employer to accommodate a disabled worker prior to the ADA 
enactment, 0 otherwise. 
States with 
Traditional 
Antidiscrimination 
Prohibition 
Indicator equal to 1 if the is living in a state that has a traditional 
antidiscrimination prohibition but not reasonable accommodation 
requirement prior to the ADA enactment, 0 otherwise. 
States with no 
Protection 
Indicator equal to 1 if the person is living in a state that has no law 
protecting a disabled worker prior to the ADA enactment, 0 otherwise. 
State Allowance 
Rate  
The number of persons who are awarded benefits divided by the 
number of persons who apply for benefits in each state and for each 
year.   
Economic Variables 
State Unemployment 
Rate 
Unemployment rate for each state and for each year.  
Gross State Product 
per capita 
Gross State Product per capita for each state and for each year. 
Demographic and other Variables 
Education Level  Number of years of education attained. 
Age of Onset  Age when the condition first began to limit the kind or amount of work 
the person can do. 
Non-white  Indicator equal to 1 if the person’s race is classified as non-white, 0 
otherwise. 
State of Onset  We approximate the state at time of the onset of disability by the state 
where a person resides currently. We assume that people do not move 
in our sample after the health condition begins to bother them. 
Disability Caused 
by Accident at 
Work 
Indicator equal to 1 if the disability was a result of an accident that 
occurred at work, 0 otherwise. 
Disability Result of 
other Accident 
Indicator equal to 1 if the disability was a result of an accident other 
than accident at work, 0 otherwise.  
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Appendix Table II.3 (continued) 
 
Variable Description 
Health Condition Variables 
Comorbidity 1  Indicator equal to 1 if person reports 2 health conditions at the onset 
of a disability, 0 otherwise. 
Comorbidity 2  Indicator equal to 1 if person reports 3 or more health conditions at 
the onset of a disability, 0 otherwise. 
Cancer  Indicator equal to 1 if the person reported that the condition was in 1 
of the following categories, 0 otherwise. 
Cancer; leukemia; Hodgkin’s disease; melanomas; malignant tumors. 
Other Tumors,  cysts or growths; “polyps” 
Skin conditions; dermatitis; eczema; "rashes"; Paget's disease 
Musculoskeletal  Indicator equal to 1 if the person reported that the condition was in 1 
of the following categories, 0 otherwise. 
Arthritis; rheumatism; bursitis. 
Back/Neck/Spine problems; chronic stiffness, deformity or pain; disc 
problems; scoliosis; spinal bifida; “bad back” 
Stiffness, deformity, numbness or chronic pain in foot, leg, arm or 
hand; “bad knee”; hip problems; hip replacement. 
Hernias; hiatal hernia. 
Muscular dystrophy. 
Other musculoskeletal or connective tissue problems; lupus; 
osteoporosis; pinched nerve; carpal tunnel syndrome; fibrocitis. 
Paralysis  Indicator equal to 1 if the person reported that the condition was in 1 
of the following categories, 0 otherwise. 
Missing legs, feet, arms, hands, or fingers. 
Paralysis—any mention, including from Polio. 
Circulatory  Indicator equal to 1 if the person reported that the condition was in 1 
of the following categories, 0 otherwise. 
Heart problems: heart attack (coronary) or failure; arteriosclerosis; 
aneurysms; heart deformities; angina; "bad heart"; congestive heart 
disease. 
High blood pressure (hypertension). 
Stroke; cerebral hemorrhage or accident. 
Blood disorders: anemia; hemophilia; polycythemia; "bad blood"; 
toxemia. 
Other circulatory problems; phlebitis, clots, embolisms; varicose 
veins; hemorrhoids; low blood pressure. 
Respiratory  Indicator equal to 1 if the person reported that the condition was in 1 
of the following categories, 0 otherwise. 
Allergies; hay fever; sinusitis; tonsillitis. 
Asthma. 
Bronchitis; pneumonia; “acute upper respiratory problems”. 
Emphysema. 
Other respiratory problems; tuberculosis.  
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Appendix Table II.3 (continued) 
 
Variable Description 
Endocrine  Indicator equal to 1 if the person reported that the condition was in 1 
of the following categories, 0 otherwise. 
Diabetes. 
Thyroid trouble; goiter. 
Cystic fibrosis. 
Nutritional problems; weight problems; eating disorders; high 
cholesterol. 
Other endocrine/metabolic problems; pancreatitis; pituitary 
problems; Addison’s disease. 
Digestive  Indicator equal to 1 if the person reported that the condition was in 1 
of the following categories, 0 otherwise. 
Stomach and intestinal conditions: ulcers; colitis; gastritis; 
diverticulosis; appendicitis; Chron’s disease; “stomach pains” 
Liver conditions: cirrhosis; hepatitis 
Kidney conditions: kidney stones; kidney failure (including 
dialysis). 
Gallbladder conditions 
Bladder conditions ; urinary infections 
Urinary incontinence; urinary loss/leakage; problems with bladder 
control 
Other digestive system problems 
*Combined with Endocrine Health Conditions 
Nuerological  Indicator equal to 1 if the person reported that the condition was in 1 
of the following categories, 0 otherwise. 
Blindness or vision problems: glaucoma; cataracts; detached retina 
Deafness, hearing loss or other ear conditions 
Multiple sclerosis; cerebral palsy; epilepsy; Parkinson’s; ALS; 
“seizures”; neuropathy 
Speech conditions—any mention: congenital speech defects; 
stuttering. 
Mental retardation; learning disabilities; Down syndrome 
Other neurological/sensory problems; sciatica; “headaches”; 
“dizziness”; “blackouts”; “brain damage”; meningitis; “memory 
loss” 
Reproductive  Indicator equal to 1 if the person reported that the condition was in 1 
of the following categories, 0 otherwise. 
Pregnancy and childbirth problems; miscarriage; stillbirth; RH factor 
Infertility; sterilization; vasectomy; tubal ligation 
Prostate conditions 
Other problems of reproductive system; hysterectomy; ovarian 
problems; PMS; menopause 
*Only 2 Cases-This Category is in Miscellaneous  
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Appendix Table II.3 (continued) 
 
Variable Description 
Emotional  Indicator equal to 1 if the person reported that the condition was in 
1 of the following categories, 0 otherwise. 
Alcoholism 
Drug abuse, addiction 
Other severe psychological conditions: (chronic) depression; 
schizophrenia; mania; paranoia; autism; psychosis 
Other emotional and psychological problems; “mental problems”; 
“nerves”; “nervous breakdown” 
Miscellaneous  Indicator equal to 1 if the person reported that the condition was in 
1 of the following categories, 0 otherwise. 
Alzheimer’s disease; “senility” 
Dental and gum conditions—any mention 
Acute infectious diseases; flu, colds, fever, mumps, etc. 
Injuries and traumas: broken bones; pulled muscles; strains; 
tendon damage; burns, lacerations; concussion; side 
effects/conditions due to surgery. 
Sleep disorders; sleep apnea; narcolepsy 
Immune system disorders; HIV positive; AIDS; ARC 
Old age; “everything wore out” 
Lack of energy/strength; (chronic) fatigue 
Other health condition   
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Appendix III: Data Appendix  
We are interested in following the path of DI applications following the onset 
of a disability. The sample is drawn on the basis of self-reports about health 
conditions. 
We use Wave 2, Wave 3, and Wave 6 of the 1990 SIPP panel for sample 
construction. Topical Module (TM) from Wave 2 contains important information on 
Work Disability History. Waves 3 and 6 include information on Functional 
Limitations and Disability. In order to fully utilize all information we merge these 
waves together. Hence, after merging, only respondents that were interviewed in all 
waves 2, 3, and 6 stay in the sample. 
In total, 42,030 respondents were interviewed in Wave 2; 41,881 in Wave 3; 
and 39,909 in Wave 6. After merging these waves, there are 34,517 individuals in our 
sample. From Work Disability History in Wave 2 we find out the year of onset of 
disability, and from Wave 3 we define health limiting conditions. Moreover, since 
early retirement under Social Security is possible at the age 62, any individual whose 
onset was after age 61 was excluded from the analysis. We also exclude any person 
who experiences the onset of a work limitation before the year 1974, the first year we 
have information on DI state allowance rates.  
Defining Disability. SIPP respondents are asked the following question: 
“Does [insert name] have a physical, mental, or other health condition which 
limits the kind or amount of work [insert name] can do?” 
A person that replies “yes” to this question in Wave 2 is classified as disabled.  
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Respondents who answer “yes” are asked to specify the type of work-limiting 
conditions they have; these questions will be discussed below. 
Working at Onset. Using work disability history from Wave 2 we can then 
classify persons with disabilities as working or not working at the onset of disability. 
Respondents were asked in TM of Wave 2: “Was [insert name] employed at the time 
[insert name]’s work limitation began?” Persons who respond “no” to this question 
were excluded from the analysis. Persons with positive answers to this question were 
considered as employed at onset of disability.  
Appendix Table III. 1 Sample Development. 
    
Definition Total  Men  Women 
Entire SIPP sample  34,517  15,738  18,779 
Disabled with Onset of Disability 
after 1974, before 1990, and before 
the age of 61 
1,888 871  1,017 
Working at Onset  1,348  611  737 
Source: Waves 2, 3, and 6, SIPP 1990 Panel. 
Results of Initial Screening. Appendix Table III. 1 reports the development of 
our sample. The tables show the sample size that results from each step used to define 
the sample for both the entire sample and for the sample of age-eligible respondents.  
Of the entire sample of 34,517 respondents, 1,888 satisfied our definition of a 
disability.  Of the entire sample of 1,888 disabled persons, 1,348 or 71 percent of all 
disabled persons were working at the onset of their disability.  
Disabled respondents are asked a sequence of questions regarding the onset of 
their condition. The first question in the sequence is:  
TM8310/TM8312. “When did … become limited in the kind and amount of 
work … can do at a job?” Respondents are asked to report the month and year. From  
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this we derive the year of the onset of work-limiting condition (Appendix Table III. 2).  
Appendix Table III. 2. Timing of Disability 
Year of 
Onset of 
Disability 
Total 
Percent of 
total 
sample
Men
Percent 
of 
sample 
for men
Women 
Percent 
of total 
sample 
for 
women
1974 24  1.84 7 1.17 17  2.40
1975 33  2.52 9 1.50 24  3.39
1976 35  2.68 18 3.00 17  2.40
1977 28  2.14 10 1.67 18  2.55
1978 56  4.28 29 4.83 27  3.82
1979 52  3.98 17 2.83 35  4.95
1980 66  5.05 35 5.83 31  4.38
1981 43  3.29 18 3.00 25  3.54
1982 65  4.97 18 3.00 47  6.65
1983 63  4.82 33 5.50 30  4.24
1984 87  6.66 41 6.83 46  6.51
1985 119  9.10 54 9.00 65  9.19
1986 128  9.79 58 9.67 70  9.90
1987 115  8.80 57 9.50 58  8.20
1988 196  15.00 108 18.00 88  12.45
1989 197  15.07 88 14.67 109  15.42
Total 1307  600   707 
  Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the 1990 SIPP Panel. 
Year of SSDI Application.  In TM “Functional Limitations and Disability” in 
wave 3 and wave 6 the respondents were asked:  
TM9022.  “Have … ever applied for Social Security Disability Benefits for 
him/herself?”  
If the person responded “yes,” they were asked:  
TM9036.  “In what year did … first apply for Social Security disability 
benefits?”   
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We use the year as the date of application.  If the person responded “no” to 
question TM9022 they were treated as censored in the analysis.  If the person did not 
respond to question TM9022 they were assigned a missing value indicator.  If the 
person responded “yes” to question TM9022 and did not respond to question TM9036 
they were assigned a missing value indicator. 
Then we derive the spell length to SSDI application defined as year of 
application minus year of onset of a health limiting condition. 
Appendix Table III. 3. Spell Length to SSDI Application 
Spell Length  Total Men Women 
Did not apply  801 376 425 
1 162 73 89 
2 87 23 64 
3 62 33 29 
4 48 23 25 
5 26 12 14 
6 19 9 10 
7 24 11 13 
8 15 10 5 
9 9 2 7 
10 11 6 5 
11 7 4 3 
12 13 7 6 
13 9 3 6 
14 3 3 0 
15 7 2 5 
16 4 3 1 
Total applied  506 224 282 
    Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the 1990 SIPP Panel. 
Note that there are crucial mistakes in the data dictionaries for the 1991, 1992, 
and 1993 panels, which prevent us from using them in the analysis. First, Question 
TM9022 in the data dictionary says, “Have … ever applied for Social Security  
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Disability Benefits for him/herself?” Next, the data dictionary states that the universe 
is defined as “designated parent or guardian WHO HAS CHILDREN BETWEEN 
THE AGES OF 3 AND WHO LIVE IN HH AND HAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH 
CERTAIN ACTIVITIES”. However, when looking at the actual questionnaire and 
following skip patterns, it becomes clear that the actual universe was ALL adult 
disabled people.  Second, and the most important discrepancy between what appears 
in the data dictionary and what was actually asked during the interview in the 1991, 
1992, and 1993 SIPP Panels, is the question on SSDI history itself. Although the data 
dictionary states that the question used to define the SSDI beneficiaries is as follows: 
“Have … ever applied for Social Security Disability Benefits for him/herself?” the 
item 28A (corresponding to the entry TM9022 in the data dictionary) in questionnaires 
for the 1991, 1992, and 1993 panels says, “In the last 12 month, has … applied for 
Social Security Disability or SSI Benefits for him/herself?” Hence, only the 1990 
Panel of SIPP actually asks retrospective questions on SSDI application history.  
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CHAPTER 3 
AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF WINNERS AND LOSERS OVER THE 
1990S BUSINESS CYCLES IN GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN, JAPAN, AND 
THE UNITED STATES 
3.1 Introduction 
Real income growth and how it is distributed are important measures of the 
overall change in a country’s economic welfare. While there has been significant 
growth in average income in the United States over the second half of the 20
th 
Century, Bradbury (1996), Karoly (1992), Lynch (2003), Burkhauser, Crews, Daly 
and Jenkins (1996), and Burkhauser, Cutts, Daly and Jenkins (1999), using data from 
the Current Population Survey (CPS), all find that changes in income inequality, 
whether measured at the family or household level have been more varied.  The 
variance in the distribution of income, measured before taxes in this United States 
literature, narrowed continuously through the middle of the 1970s but then widened 
throughout the 1980s.  Burkhauser, Couch, Houtenville and Rovba, (2004a), using a 
household size-adjusted measure of before-tax income from the CPS, confirm that 
income inequality rose substantially over the business cycle of the 1980s (1979-1989).  
But they also show that this was not the case over the business cycle of the 1990s 
(1989-2000). While income inequality rose over the first part of the 1990s, it fell 
thereafter. By 2000, income inequality returned approximately to its 1989 level.
24 
                                                 
24 In the United States Current Population Survey, one can choose two methods to define an economic 
sharing unit.  The family (all married or blood relatives who live in a common dwelling) or the 
household (all residents living in a common dwelling).  These are the sharing units most often used by 
those estimating income inequality or poverty rates in the United States. Income within the sharing unit 
is assumed to be shared equally and some degree of returns to scale in the use of that income is assumed 
to be experienced by those who live together. Each individual in the sharing unit is then assigned a 
family or household size-adjusted income value.  Burkhauser, Crews, Daly and Jenkins (1999) show 
that changes found by researchers in the distribution of income in the 1980s are similar using either a  
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  Based on summary income inequality measures, cross-national studies using 
data from the Luxembourg Income Study show that income inequality (measured after 
taxes) in Japan was not only substantially below that of the United States at the start of 
the 1980s, but was also substantially below the level of income inequality found in 
European countries using after-tax measures of income (Atkinson, Rainwater, and 
Smeeding, 1995; Jacobs, 2000). But income inequality in Japan has increased since 
then (Atkinson et al., 1995; Fukawa, 2002; Jacobs, 2000; Smeeding, 1997; 
Tachibanaki, 1996 and Terasaki, 2002).  By the middle of the 1990s, Japanese after-
tax income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, while still substantially 
below the United States, was at the income inequality level of European countries 
(Smeeding, 1997). 
What is not known is how the shape of the after-tax income distribution in 
Japan and these other countries changed over this period. Did the middle of the 
Japanese, German, and British income distributions fall, as was the case in the United 
States in the 1980s, with most of their middle class becoming richer?  How did 
vulnerable populations—older persons—fare relative to the rest of the population? In 
this paper, we try to answer these questions by looking at the after-tax income in four 
major industrialized OECD countries and how it changed over the 1990s business 
cycles in these countries.   
We extend the existing literature on cross-national research of economic well-
being by comparing the growth and dispersion of household size-adjusted after-tax 
                                                                                                                                              
family or household sharing unit. We use the household unit as our sharing unit for the United States 
Current Population Survey. We use an expanded family sharing unit for the BHPS and GSOEP which 
in addition to all married and blood relatives also includes co-habitators.  But for ease of explication in 
this paper, we will call this sharing unit a “household”. In the Japanese Survey of Income 
Redistribution, household is defined in a manner similar to the CPS - as all persons sharing the same 
housing unit, regardless of any familial relationship  
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income through the 1990s in the United States with that of three other major 
industrialized countries—Great Britain, Germany, and Japan.  In doing so, we 
recognize that both after-tax income and income inequality vary over the business 
cycle.  
While we have calculated average after-tax income and income inequality for 
all years in our study, here we focus on similar years in the business cycle.
25  When we 
compare levels of income and inequality between the peaks of the business cycle in 
these countries, we draw four conclusions:   
1.  Average household size-adjusted after-tax income increased over the 
business cycle of the 1990s in all four countries but more so in Great 
Britain than in the United States, Germany, or Japan.  
2.  Income inequality, which had widened throughout the business cycle of 
the 1980s in the United States, fell over the business cycle of the 1990s 
both in the United States and Great Britain while rising in Germany and 
Japan. At the end of the 1990s, after-tax income inequality in Germany 
and Great Britain was approximately the same and both were 
substantially lower than income inequality in the United States and Japan. 
Increases in income inequality in Japan moved it closer to income 
inequality levels in the United States than in these two European 
countries. 
3.  Unlike the business cycle of the 1980s, the entire distribution of income 
shifted upward over the business cycle of the 1990s in the United States. 
Great Britain experienced a similar upward shift.  In Germany and Japan, 
                                                 
25 Tables with mean and median income values and income inequality measures for all years are 
available from authors upon request.  
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the shift in the income distribution looked much like the United States 
shift in the 1980s, a dramatic decline in the middle with most people 
becoming richer but a small but statistically significant share becoming 
poorer.  
4.  The pattern of income gains between the older (65 and older) and 
younger (64 and younger) populations in these countries varied, with 
younger persons gaining relative to older persons in the United States and 
Japan, but the opposite occurring in Great Britain and Germany.  Income 
inequality fell in all four countries at older ages but rose substantially at 
younger ages in Germany and Japan, while falling in the United States 
and Great Britain. 
Since we are interested in making cross-national comparisons, and because 
taxes play a much larger role in our other three countries than in the United States, we 
measure household income net of income taxes and Social Security contributions in all 
countries. The CPS did not directly question its respondents about their federal income 
tax payments. We develop an income tax estimation procedure using a TAXSIM 
model that approximates the income tax burdens for the CPS data and that can be used 
with consistently top-coded income variables in CPS for the years 1979 through 2000.  
After-tax income for Germany and Great Britain come from the Cross-National 
Equivalent File, while after-tax income for Japan comes from the Survey of Income 
Distribution. 
3.2 Data 
The data used in this paper come from the United States March Current 
Population Survey’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS), the Cross- 
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National Equivalent Files (CNEF), prepared at Cornell University (Burkhauser, 
Butrica, Daly and Lillard, 2001), and the Survey on Income Redistribution (Japan).  
We compare longer term trends in average income and income inequality in four 
major OECD countries – the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan.  We 
separate the cyclical factors that influence yearly fluctuations from longer secular 
changes by comparing peak years of the 1990s business cycle in each country.  Since 
each country’s business cycle peaks occurred over slightly different years, the 
calendar years we compare will differ slightly across countries. 
We use the March Current Population Annual Demographic Surveys (CPS) 
from 1980 through 2001 to calculate the household size-adjusted income of 
individuals living in United States households.
26  There have been two major business 
cycles over this period. While we use data from all years, we focus most of our 
comparisons on 1979, 1989, and 2000, each of which is a business cycle peak year in 
the United States.
27 By examining these peak years, we control for the state of the 
business cycle. Following others, we use the CPS household definition to define the 
sharing unit for our population and also assume that household income is equally 
shared.  
                                                 
26 We measure the size-adjusted income of all people residing in households in the CPS. But our unit of 
analysis is the person. Younger and older persons may live in the same household. In this case, they will 
receive the same household size-adjusted income value but that value will be included in the average 
for the age group of the individual. 
27 The starting and ending years of a business cycle are to some degree arbitrary. In the United States 
and Great Britain we use what are distinguishable peak years in average income to define our peak 
years of the 1980s and 1990s business cycles. For Germany, income years 1991 and 1992 are very 
similar. We chose 1991 even though its average income was slightly lower than 1992 since it was closer 
to the peak year as defined using standard macroeconomic growth data.  Because employment and 
income lag changes in economic growth, these years do not necessarily match business cycles defined 
by changes in macroeconomic growth. In Japan, the variance in average income over the 1990s was 
much less pronounced that in the other three countries. So we chose 1989 and 2001 as the starting and 
ending dates for the 1990s business cycle because these years roughly correspond to peak years 
according based on OECD methodology using a composite index of wage and salary income, 
employment, the industrial production index, manufacturing and trade sales, and quarterly gross 
domestic product. (see Artis, Bladen-Hovell and Zhang,1995).  
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  For calculation of income and income inequality measures in Great Britain and 
Germany we use the Cross-National Equivalent Files (CNEF). The CNEF includes 
data from nationally representative household panels for four countries: the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS), Canadian Survey of Labor and Income Dynamics 
(SLID), the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), and the United States Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The CNEF data include standard demographic 
information, household income and its components, and individual data on 
employment and labor earnings. Also included are cross-sectional and longitudinal 
sample weights, and macroeconomic indicators for each country. One advantage of the 
CNEF data is the provision of harmonized measures of household income before and 
after the impact of the complete government tax-and-transfer system in each country.  
We use data from the February 2004 CNEF release which includes income years 
1990-2000 for Great Britain and income years 1983-2001 for Germany. Households 
from the eastern states of Germany were included in the German data beginning with 
income year 1989.  Since most measures of income inequality are sensitive to outliers, 
we exclude observations in the top and bottom two percent of the household size-
adjusted income distribution in Germany, Great Britain, and Japan.
 28 We use the CPS 
data here rather than the PSID since we want to compare our results to Burkhauser et 
al. (2004a) and because the CPS provides much greater sample sizes.  We exclude 
SLID data because it does not cover the full 1990s business cycle.  Because the 1990s 
business cycles in Great Britain and Germany occurred over slightly different years, 
we will focus on 1990 and 2000 in Great Britain and 1991 and 2001 in Germany
29.  
Our analysis for Japan is based on cross-sectional data from the Survey on 
                                                 
28 Feng, Burkhauser and Butler (2005) show that a rule-of thumb trimming of the top 2 percent of the 
public use version of the CPS yields population samples whose levels and trends in wage earnings 
inequality are similar to those using the consistently top coded methods used here. 
29 Income values for all years are available from authors upon request.  
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Income Redistribution (SIR), conducted by the Ministry of Health and Welfare of 
Japan every three years. The Survey on Income Redistribution is also one of most 
reliable income surveys in Japan. It collects information on household income and its 
sources such as social security income including public pensions, medical care, and 
family allowances.  We use micro-data from SIRs released in 1990, and 2002 that 
collect income data for the previous year. The sample sizes range between 7,165 (in 
1984) and 8,856 (in 1990). 
3.3 Measuring Economic Well-Being  
Economists conceptualize economic well-being in terms of utility or life 
satisfaction. But they measure economic well-being either in terms of consumption or 
income. While consumption-based measures more closely approximate the theoretical 
construct of economic well-being, survey data on individuals seldom include detailed 
measures of consumption. Hence, the most commonly used alternative measure of 
economic well-being and the one we use in this study, is income. As a measure of 
economic well-being, income will be correlated with consumption, although the 
degree of correlation will be smaller among the sub-sample of the older population 
with substantial wealth. All income calculations are based on the household post-tax 
post-transfer income. That is, income from all sources (labor earnings, income from 
investments and savings, public and private pensions, and transfers) minus total 
household taxes and social insurance contributions. Our measure of post-tax post-
transfer income does not include non-money transfers such as food stamps, health 
benefits, subsidized housing, payments in kind, or fringe benefits from one's 
employment. 
To control for differences in the number of people living in a household and  
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hence the share of household income they control, it is important to take into 
consideration economies of scale associated with joint residence.  How much income 
sharing occurs among household members is a matter of some debate, as is the 
economies of scale associated with shared living within a household.  Operationally, it 
has been shown that measured levels and trends in inequality are not very sensitive to 
reasonable alternative scale economy assumptions.  However, levels of overall income 
and the relative incomes of groups within the population are sensitive to the 
assumption made about household economies of scale.  (See Burkhauser, Smeeding 
and Merz 1996; Burkhauser, Giles, Lillard and Schwarze 2003).  We assume a scale 
elasticity of 0.5.  Burkhauser, Smeeding and Merz (1996) note that this is the 
dominant one used in the cross-national literature.
30  
Sharing Unit. The CPS family definition, based on marriage or blood 
relationship, is often used as the income-sharing unit in the United States income 
distribution literature, but the CPS household definition, based on common residence, 
is closer to what is used in most cross-national studies. Atkinson, Rainwater, and 
Smeeding (1995) argue that using the blood or marital relationship definition rather 
than the less restrictive common residence definition produces a bleaker picture of the 
income distribution because it categorizes a larger number of individuals as single 
person sharing units even when they reside and share the benefits of living with others. 
The BHPS and GSOEP sharing-unit definitions fall somewhere between the CPS 
family and common residence definitions in that they include unmarried non-blood-
related cohabitants in the "family" but exclude other unmarried non-blood-related 
                                                 
30 The formula used for this calculation is
θ F Y Y u a = . Here, Ya is the adjusted household income 
used in the analysis.   Yu is the unadjusted household income.  F is household size.  θ is the adjustment 
for household size.  We assume θ = 0.5.  As discussed in Karoly and Burtless (1995, p. 382), this 
implies that a four person household needs twice as much income as a one person household to attain 
the same level of consumption.    
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residents. For convenience of discussion, we use the word "household" to describe the 
BHPS and GSOEP sharing units in our analysis, although they only approximate the 
CPS household definition. . In the SIR for Japan, household is defined in a manner 
similar to the CPS  - as all persons sharing the same housing unit, regardless of any 
familial relationship. 
Adjusting for inflation. While summary measures of the income distribution 
used here (90/10 ratio and Gini coefficients) are insensitive to the fluctuations in the 
units of the currency, as is the shape of the income distribution, comparisons of real 
changes in average income and in the movement of the income distribution over time 
are.  Here we use the Consumer Price Index-X (CPI-X) to adjust for inflation in the 
United States because it is the official measure of inflation used by the United States 
Bureau of the Census.  Boskin, Dulberger, Gordon, Grilliches, and Jorgenson (1996) 
offer the most systematic criticism of the CPI-X used in most measures of economic 
well-being in the United States and propose alternative indices for the 1980s that are 
between 1.0 and 1.5 percentage points below the CPI-X. While using alternative cost-
of-living measures affects the magnitude of our results, (e.g., a lower CPI will increase 
the real gains in economic well-being over time), they do not alter our major points. 
We use the International Monetary Fund Consumer Price Index for, Germany, Great 
Britain and Japan. All incomes are converted to 2000 monetary units.  
Defining the Older Population. Our age dichotomy is somewhat arbitrary. A 
major social policy questions in each of these countries is the degree that older (and a 
more likely to be retired population) fare relative to the younger population over the 
business cycle.  This may vary, for instance, based on how social security benefits are 
adjusted with economic growth.  We divide total sample into two groups: persons 
aged 65 and over and persons younger than age 65.  In all four countries age 65 is  
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about the age of normal retirement in their social security program.  We include 
children in our younger population. While children are also not likely to be in the 
labor force, they usually live in households with adults who are younger than age 65 
and in the labor force.  
Accounting for taxes.  Household income is defined as the sum of all income 
held by individuals residing in a single dwelling, and it is measured as post-tax, post-
transfer money income. In the U.S. literature, pre-tax, post-transfer family money 
income, including cash government transfers, is the most common yardstick used to 
measure economic status. However, we are interested in making cross-national 
comparisons, and because taxes play a much larger role in Germany, Great Britain, 
and Japan than in the United States, we measure household income net of income 
taxes and Social Security contributions in all countries. After-tax income provides a 
more accurate measure of the living standards attained by individuals and households. 
Estimating Income Tax Burdens for Current Population Survey (CPS) 
Households Using the National Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM Model. The 
CPS did not directly question its respondents about their federal income tax payments. 
Rather, Unicon Group at RAND simulated these payments based on a set of questions 
on income, filing characteristics, filing status, and number of exemptions. However, 
income from each source (e.g. wages and salaries, interest, etc.) in the CPS is top 
coded and those, whose with income above the top coding threshold are assigned a top 
coded value.  Since the nominal income of the population rises each year, the share of 
the income distribution that is affected by top coding will change. This is also the case 
when the Census Bureau periodically changes the nominal value of the top codes.  As 
a result, taxes that were calculated based on a top-coded in that way income values are 
likely to be influenced by top coding decisions. To address this issue, we impose  
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consistent top coding solutions on each source of income, and sum over each of these 
sources to generate our measure of an individual’s income in a given year. We do this 
by top coding income at the same percentile of the income distribution from that 
source for all years.  That is, we determine in which year the largest portion (lowest 
percentile) of the income distribution from that source was affected by this censoring, 
then top code all years to reflect that portion. We do this for each source of income.  In 
this way, all sources of income are consistently top coded at the same point in the 
distribution in all years (See Burkhauser, Couch, Houtenville, and Rovba, 2004 for a 
more detailed discussion of this process and a table showing the income sources, share 
of the population affected by the top code and the most constrained year).
 31 
We develop an alternative federal income tax estimation procedure that 
approximates the income tax burdens available in the CPS for the years 1979 through 
2000 and that can be used with consistently top-coded income variables in CPS to 
estimate income tax burdens. See Data Appendix for details. 
3.4 Trends in Income and Income Inequality  
  Table 3.1 shows mean and median income as well as the 90/10 ratio and Gini 
coefficients for the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan over the peak 
                                                 
31 Burkhauser, Butler, Feng and Houtenville (2004b) argue that despite the changes in the methods the 
Census Bureau has used to collect and report earnings between 1975 and 2001 (see Ryscavage 1995, 
Polivka 1996, and Jones and Weinberg 2000) in the March CPS data, these data can be used to 
consistently estimate trends in earnings inequality. Burkhauser et al. (2004a) extend the top coding 
procedure Burkhauser et al (2004b) used to capture earnings to capture household size-adjusted income. 
We use those same procedures here for post-tax post-transfer income. Our income measure produces 
Gini coefficients that are significantly lower than those for the full sample since we are systematically 
cutting off the upper tail of the distribution of income in all years, but as Burkhauser et al. (2004a) 
show, there is no significant difference in the trends between the Gini coefficients produced by the 
Census Bureau based on their internal CPS data and our Gini coefficients both before the major change 
in their top coding rules in 1992 and afterward. (See: DeNavas-Walt and Cleveland 2002, p.20-22, 
Table A-3, for internal Census Gini values.) Burkhauser et al. (2004a) results mirror the results found 
by Burkhauser et al (2004b) with respect to earnings. Hence we believe our income trends provide an 
accurate measure of income inequality in the United States between 1979 and 2000.   
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years of their respective business cycles for the entire population and for older and 
younger persons. 
32  
The values for the United States show that household size-adjusted after tax 
income (both mean and median) increased over both the 1980s and 1990s business 
cycles.  Real mean household size-adjusted income increased by 10.93 percent over 
the 1980s (Column 4) and 7.27 percent over the 1990s while median income increased 
by 5.95 percent and 7.10 percent respectively over these periods.  Hence, average 
income increased substantially over both United States business cycles.  But the fruits 
of economic growth were much more equally shared in the 1990s than in the 1980s.  
Income inequality rose substantially over the business cycle of the 1980s whether 
measured by the 90/10 ratio (23.67 percent) or by the Gini coefficient (14.17 percent).  
In contrast, income inequality fell over the 1990s business cycle whether measured by 
the 90/10 ratio (-6.82 percent) or the Gini coefficient (-2.24 percent).
33 
  Real average household size-adjusted after tax income increased even more in 
Great Britain over the 1990s than in the United States whether measured by mean 
(20.61 percent) or median (20.84 percent) and income inequality fell either measured 
by the 90/10 ratio (-6.78 percent) or the Gini coefficient (-3.59 percent).  In contrast, 
while real mean (median) income in Germany increased by about the same amount as 
in the United States, 7.07 percent (5.62 percent), income inequality grew dramatically 
whether measured by a change in the 90/10 ratio (9.59 percent) or in the Gini 
coefficient (8.18 percent).  As a result, income inequality in Germany, which was 
substantially below income inequality in Great Britain at the beginning of the 1990s 
business cycle, was by the end approximately equal to income inequality in Great 
                                                 
32 Income and inequality values for all years are available from the authors upon request. 
33 Burkhauser et al. (2004a, 2005) using before tax income find similar trends.  
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Britain.  But the level of after tax income inequality in both Great Britain and 
Germany still were considerably below the level of after tax income inequality in the 
United States. In Japan, mean (median) real income increased over the 1990s by 6.04 
(5.73) percent, while the magnitudes of the percentage changes in income inequality 
were near those experienced in the Germany during the 1990s. As a result Japan 
moved closer to the levels of income inequality in the United States than to those in 
Great Britain and Germany by the end of the period. 
Table 3.1 also reports changes in the income level and within group income 
inequality of older and younger persons in the four countries.  Mean (median) income 
of older persons in the United States grew dramatically over the 1980s business cycle 
both absolutely--19.95 (16.96) percent--and relative to younger persons—from 83.3 to 
90.7 (see last row of columns 1 and 2).  While real mean (median) income was higher 
at the end of the 1990 business cycle than at the start—it grew by 2.31 (5.45) percent, 
the mean income of older persons fell relative to younger persons—from 90.7 to 86.0 
(see last row of columns 2 and 3). In Japan, over the business cycle of the 1990s, 
relative income of older persons fell from 94.1 to 89.8 percent. In contrast, the average 
real income of older persons in both Great Britain and Germany grew substantially 
over the 1990s business cycle and relative to their younger populations (see last row of 
columns 6 and 7 and of 9 and 10).  In all four countries, income inequality fell among 
older persons over the 1990s.  In the United States this decline was in sharp contrast to 
substantial increases over the 1980s.    
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Table 3.1 Post-tax Post-transfer Household Size-Adjusted Income and Income Inequality, by Age  
in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan 
    United States    Great Britain    Germany    Japan 
  
1979 
(1) 
1989 
(2) 
2000 
(3) 
Percent 
Change 
1979-
1989 
(4) 
Percent 
Change 
1989-
2000 
(5)  
1990 
(6) 
2000 
(7) 
Percent 
Change 
(8)  
1991 
(9) 
2001 
(10) 
Percent 
Change 
(11)  
1989 
(12) 
2001 
(13) 
Percent 
Change 
(14) 
 All  Persons       
Mean      22,494 24,954 26,767  10.93  7.27   11,539 13,917  20.61   17,377 18,605  7.07   3,205 3,399  6.04 
Median    20,892 22,135 23,707  5.95  7.10   10,583 12,788  20.84   16,146 17,054  5.62   2,829 2,991  5.73 
90/10    4.71  5.82  5.42  23.67  -6.82   3.89  3.63  -6.78   3.1  3.39  9.59   4.24  4.65 9.64 
Gini     0.301  0.344  0.336  14.17  -2.24     0.274  0.264  -3.59     0.231  0.25  8.18     0.298  0.315 5.84 
  Older Persons (aged 65 and older)       
Mean  (A)    19,078 22,884 23,413  19.95  2.31   8,146 10,683  31.16   14,289 16,259  13.79   3,048  3,150 3.35 
Median    15,805 18,486 19,493  16.96  5.45   6,819  9,279  36.07   12,908 14,740  14.19   2,486  2,679 7.76 
90/10    5.21  5.61  5.41  7.72  -3.60   3.3  3.25  -1.7   3.15  3.012  -4.38   5.36  4.73  -11.75 
Gini    0.34  0.37  0.35  7.14  -4.03   0.262  0.258  -1.57   0.241  0.239  -1.15   0.342 0.327  -4.46 
  Younger Persons (aged 64 and younger)       
Mean  (B)    22,911 25,237 27,222  10.15  7.87   12,413 14,862  19.73   17,937 19,113  6.56   3,241  3,507 8.20 
Median    21,472 22,643 24,335  5.46  7.47   11,522 13,897  20.61   16,758 17,663  5.4   2,900  3,137 8.17 
90/10    4.55  5.81  5.37  27.72  -7.61   3.67  3.46  -5.73   2.97  3.43  15.45   4.00  4.38  9.54 
Gini    0.29  0.34  0.33  15.52  -2.10   0.257  0.251  -2.46   0.225  0.249  10.89   0.287 0.308  7.41 
                               
Ratio (A)/(B)     83.27  90.68  86.01           65.62  71.88        79.66  85.07        94.05  89.84    
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the March CPS Annual Demographic Files (1980-2001) in the United States, the Household Panel Survey 
(1991-2001) in Great Britain, the Socio-Economic Panel (1992-2002) in Germany, and the Japanese Survey of Income Redistribution (1990 and 2002). 
Notes:  
a Income values are in 2000 United States dollars;  
b Income values are in 2000 British pounds 
c Income values are in 2000 euros;     
d Income values are in 2000 yens   
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The growth in the average income of younger people over both United States 
business cycles was approximately the same.  Average income also increased at 
younger ages in Great Britain, Germany, and Japan in the 1990s.  But the changes in 
income inequality among younger persons in the four countries were quite different 
over their 1990s business cycles.  Unlike the substantial increases in income inequality 
experienced among younger persons in the United States in the 1980s, income 
inequality among younger persons in the United States fell as measured by both the 
90/10 ratio (-7.61 percent) and Gini coefficient (-2.10 percent) in the 1990s.  In Great 
Britain, income inequality also fell substantially over the 1990s business cycle, while 
in Germany and Japan it rose substantially among younger persons.  By the end of 
their 1990s business cycles, there was about the same level of inequality among 
younger persons in Germany than was the case for younger people in Great Britain. 
Comparing post-tax post-transfer income values and relevant measures of 
inequality in Table 3.1 to pre-tax post-transfer incomes and corresponding 90/10 ratio 
and Gini coefficients in Appendix Table IV.1, we observe the inequality reducing 
effect of taxation: post-tax post-transfer income inequality is lower than pre-tax post-
transfer income inequality, whether measured by 90/10 ratio or Gini coefficient, for 
every sub-population and country in our analysis. Also, it is worthwhile to note that 
taxes have a moderate equalizing effect on relative well-being of older population. 
While the mean pre-tax post-transfer income of older persons relative to younger 
persons, for instance, in the United States in 2000 is 75.6 percent, the corresponding 
figure for post-tax post-transfer income is 86.0 percent. Similar findings apply to all 
four countries.   
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3.5 Measuring Changes in the Income Distribution Using Kernel Density 
Estimation 
The 90/10 ratio and the Gini coefficient are well-established methods for 
summarizing inequality in an income distribution. (See Atkinson, 1983, for a 
discussion of these inequality measures.) By design, however, they summarize an 
entire distribution with a single value. Because few distributions with known 
properties can be completely described by one or even two parameters, the use of 
these summary indices produces an incomplete view of the underlying distribution of 
interest. Table 3.1 showed that changes in income inequality as measured by a 
percentage change in the 90/10 ratio or the Gini coefficient differed in magnitude over 
the period of our analysis.  For example, income inequality as measured by the 90/10 
ratio fell by -7.61 percent over the 1990s business cycle among younger people in the 
United States, while income inequality for this same population as measured by the 
Gini coefficient fell only by -2.10 percent. 
Kernel density estimation is an elegant alternative to using traditional summary 
statistics to measure income inequality and changes in economic well-being. It 
provides a picture of the entire income distribution in terms of the income density 
function, from which we can observe the distribution's location, spread, and modality 
simultaneously. It can also capture absolute increases in income levels via shifts in the 
density function to the right. Hence, it can show that increases in inequality arise from 
a variety of changes in the shape of the density function. One type, a "squashing 
down" in the middle combined with a "stretching" at each end, is typically discussed 
in the literature. But this is only one possibility, as our results will show. Changes in 
modality are also revealed by changes in "clumping" at different points along the 
income scale. For these reasons we use kernel density estimation here to evaluate how  
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the income distribution changed in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and 
Japan for the total population as well as for the older and younger subpopulations. 
In their simplest forms, kernel estimators are smoothed histograms. Data in a 
neighborhood around a point are used to estimate the distribution of a variable of 
interest (e.g., income) over a population. However, while histograms restrict 
observations to any one neighborhood group, kernel estimators theoretically allow an 
observation to be included in an infinite number of neighborhood groups, which 
results in a smoothing of the distribution shape. In practice, an observation is included 
in a finite number of groups, where the number of groups is equal to the sample size. 
The idea underlying kernel density estimation is a viewing window that slides over the 
data; the estimate of the density depends on the number of observations that fall within 
the window as it passes along the income scale.  
Kernel estimators are well established in the statistics and econometrics 
literatures; an excellent reference on kernel estimators is Silverman (1986). For a more 
technical discussion of the kernel density method employed here in the context of 
measuring economic well-being, see Burkhauser, Cutts, Daly and Jenkins (1999) and 
Burkhauser et al. (2004a).  
  Table 3.1 used summary measures of the income distribution to show first, that 
the distribution of the fruits of growth in the United States were more equitably 
distributed over the business cycle of the 1990s than the business cycle of the 1980s 
and second, that while the United States and Great Britain experienced substantial 
economic growth in the 1990s while decreasing income inequality, Germany and 
Japan did so with substantial increases in income inequality.  We now more fully 
explore how the distribution of income changed in each of these countries by  
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estimating the probability density function of household size-adjusted income of their 
populations.
34   
  Figure 3.1 shows that in 1979 the distribution of household size-adjusted after 
tax income in the United States had the traditional inverted U shape with the great 
mass of the population bunched around the mode of the distribution.  But by the end of 
the 1980s business cycle in 1989, the distribution had become much flatter.  The 
middle mass of the distribution around the mode fell (fewer people were in the middle 
of the distribution) with the vast majority spilling toward the higher tail of the 
distribution and a much smaller but still important group spilling toward the lower tail 
of the distribution. Later we will demonstrate using the same methods developed in 
Burkhauser et al. (1999) that, while the number of people in the middle of the 
distribution fell significantly, the great majority became unequally richer as they 
spread out along the right tail of the distribution.
35 
  In contrast, the entire income distribution moved to the right in the United 
States between 1989 and 2000, the two peak years of the 1990s business cycle.  More 
formally, the income distribution in 2000 attained first order stochastic dominance 
over the 1989 distribution. At every percentile of the 2000 distribution, the level of 
income is higher in 2000 than in 1989, the previous business cycle peak year. While 
not everyone gained at the same rate, everyone in the distribution gained.  
                                                 
34 These estimates are based on Epanechnikov kernels with adaptive bandwidths. 
35 Burkhauser et al. (1999) used data from the CPS to look at how the income distribution changed over 
the 1980s business cycle in the United States and data from the Households Below Average Income sub 
file of the United Kingdom Family Expenditure Survey to do the same for the United Kingdom over 
their 1980s business cycle. We use a consistently top coded version of the CPS data to replicate their 
findings for the United States here as well as the finding of Burkhauser et al. (2004a) for the 1990s 
business cycle. Our data for Great Britain comes from the BHPS whose first income year is 1991.  
Burkhauser et al. (1999) found that income inequality in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom increased over this period with the middle mass of the distribution falling into the two tails. 
But in both countries, the vast majority of the declining middle mass became unequally richer.   
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Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the March CPS Annual Demographic Files,  
1980, 1990, and 2001. 
 
Figure 3.1: Total United States Income Distributions in Peak Business Cycle Years 
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Figure 3.2, shows the income distribution of the older United States 
population.  Once again, in 1979 the distribution has the traditional inverted U shape 
with an even greater mass of the population bunched near the mode.  As was the case 
for the more general population, by 1989 the middle mass fell with the vast majority 
becoming unequally richer.  Over the 1990 business cycle there was much less 
movement overall.  The smaller decline in the middle mass around the mode of the 
distribution spilled only somewhat to the right, creating a noticeable bulge in the 
distribution. 
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Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the March CPS Annual Demographic Files,  
1980, 1990, and 2001. 
 
Figure 3.2: United States Income Distributions for Older Persons in Peak Business 
Cycle Years 
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  Figure 3.3 shows the income distribution of the younger United States 
populations.  In 1979, the distribution has the traditional inverted U shape and is much 
closer in shape to the overall population than was the distribution for older population 
in Figure 3.2.  This is also the case for the 1989 and 2000 distributions.  Over the 
1980s business cycle, the middle mass around the mode spilled primarily into the 
upper tail, but over the 1990s the entire distribution moved to the right. 
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Figure 3.3: United States Income Distributions for Younger Persons in Peak Business 
Cycle Years 
 
  Figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 capture the change in the income distribution for Great 
Britain over their 1990s business cycle.  As Table 3.1 showed, Great Britain 
$ 10,086 $ 36,417 
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experienced substantial economic growth.  Figure 3.4 shows that the 2000 income 
distribution attained first order stochastic dominance over the 1990 distribution.   
Furthermore, the noticeable second hill in the 1990 distribution is considerably 
smoother in 2000 distribution. The older (Figure 3.5) and younger (Figure 3.6) 
populations also shifted to the right over the 1990s.  In all three populations, while the 
mode values declined, a far larger proportion of the distribution remained bunched 
near the middle of the distribution than was the case in the United States.  None-the-
less, the income distribution movements in Great Britain and the United States were 
very similar over their 1990 business cycles.  And as can be seen in Figure 3.7, stand 
in stark contrast to the movement in the income distribution in Germany and Japan 
over their 1990s business cycles. 
0.00E+00
1.00E-05
2.00E-05
3.00E-05
4.00E-05
5.00E-05
6.00E-05
7.00E-05
0 4,000 8,000 12,000 16,000 20,000 24,000 28,000 32,000 36,000
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
1990
2000
 
 Post-Tax Post-Transfer Household Sized-Adjusted Income, 2000 Pounds 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the British Household Panel Survey, 1991 and 2001. 
 
Figure 3.4: Total Great Britain Income Distributions in Peak Business Cycle Years  
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Figure 3.5: Great Britain Income Distributions for Older Persons 
in Peak Business Cycle Years 
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Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the British Household Panel Survey, 1991 and 2001. 
 
Figure 3.6: Great Britain Income Distributions for Younger Persons  
in Peak Business Cycle Years 
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In 1991, the beginning year of their business cycle, the distribution in Germany 
also had the traditional inverted U shape with the great mass of the population near the 
mode of the distribution.  But unlike the United States or Great Britain, the income 
distribution in Germany at the end of their 1990s business cycle in 2001 did not attain 
first order stochastic dominance over their 1991 income distribution.  Rather, like the 
United States in the 1980s, the mass of the population near the mode of the 
distribution fell with the vast majority of people spilling to the right and becoming 
unequally richer and a smaller but important share becoming poorer. 
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Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, 1992 and 2002. 
 
Figure 3.7: Total German Income Distribution in Peak Business Cycle Years 
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In contrast, Figure 3.8 shows that the income distribution in the older German 
population at the end of their 1990s business cycle, like that of Great Britain’s, did 
attain first order stochastic dominance over the distribution at the beginning.   
However, Figure 3.9 shows that the spillage of the middle mass away from the mode 
of the income distribution for younger Germans over their 1990s business cycle more 
closely resembled the movement for younger persons in the United States over their 
1980s business cycle with a small but important group becoming poorer.  
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Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, 1992 and 2002. 
 
Figure 3.8: German Income Distributions for Older Persons in Peak Business Cycle 
Years  
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Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, 1992 and 2002. 
 
Figure 3.9: German Income Distributions for Younger Persons in Peak Business Cycle 
Years 
 
  A similar movement in the after tax income distribution occurred in Japan.  
Figure 3.10 shows that by the end of the 1990s business cycle in 2001, the income 
distribution in Japan had become much flatter.  The middle mass of the distribution 
around the mode fell with the majority spilling toward the higher tail of the 
distribution and a very small spilling toward the lower tail of the distribution.  
  Figure 3.11, shows the income distribution of the older population in Japan.  
Once again, the distribution has the traditional inverted U shape with an even greater 
mass of the population concentrated near the mode.  In contrast to the case for the total 
population, by 2001 almost everyone except become unequally richer, there is no 
movement of the mass from the middle towards the left end of the distribution.  
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Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the Japanese Survey of Income Redistribution,  
1990 and 2002. 
Figure 3.10: Japan, Total Income Distribution in Peak Business Cycle Years 
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Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the Japanese Survey of Income Redistribution,  
1990 and 2002. 
Figure 3.11: Japan, Income Distributions for Older Persons  
in Peak Business Cycle Years 
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In contrast, Figure 3.12 shows the income distribution in the younger Japanese 
population at the end of their 1990s business cycle. It demonstrates that the spillage of 
the middle mass away from the mode of the income distribution for younger Japanese 
over their 1990s business cycle closely resembled the movement for younger persons 
in the United States over their 1980s business cycle and in Germany over their 1990s 
business cycle with a small but important group becoming poorer.  
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Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the Japanese Survey of Income Redistribution, 1990 
and 2002. 
Figure 3.12: Japan, Income Distributions for Younger Persons in Peak Business Cycle 
Years 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of the Significance of Distributions Shifts.  In this 
section we will more precisely measure the statistical significance of the movements 
¥1,840  ¥3,868 
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in the income distribution we have described above and especially focus on the 
relative importance of movement out of the middle and into the two tails of the 
distribution in the United States over the 1980s business cycle and in Germany and 
Japan over the 1990s business cycle.  
We use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic to test whether the shifts in the 
distributions described above were statistically significant.  This test considers the null 
hypothesis that the distribution in one period is equal to the distribution in another 
period or H0: F1(x) = F2(x).  In practice, the cumulative distribution functions F1(x) 
and F2(x) may be calculated directly from the data or from the estimated kernel 
densities. We use the empirical cumulative distribution functions in our tests as they 
are easier to calculate and do not depend on our choice of kernel or bandwidth. 
Table 3.2 provides calculations of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for the 
pair-wise comparisons over the years covered by our study for the four countries. For 
the United States population we compare the 1979 and 1989 distributions, the 1989 
and 2000 distributions, and the 1979 and 2000 distributions.  For Great Britain, we 
compare the 1990 and 2000 distributions. For Japan we compare 1989 and 2001 
distributions and, for Germany, the 1991 and 2001 distributions.  All tests indicate that 
the changes in the income distribution are statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. Thus, we find statistically significant changes in the overall income distribution 
between peak-to-peak business cycle years in all four countries for the entire 
population, as well as for older and younger individuals. 
Where the Middle went during the 1980s in the United States and during the 
1990s in Germany and Japan.  We use a test based on the binomial distribution to 
more precisely examine how the spillage out of the middle of the income distribution  
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in the United States over the 1980s business cycle and in Germany and Japan over the 
1990s business cycle was distributed between the two tails of the distribution.  To do 
so we first define the left and the right tails of distribution. In the United States, for 
1979 and 1989 income densities, we define the left intersection, and the left tail, as the 
point in the distribution of household size-adjusted income at which the empirical 
income density in 1989 drops below the empirical income density in 1979. As can be 
seen in Figure 3.1, this intersection point is at $7,812 for the entire population. The 
right intersection point, which defines the start of the right tail, is the point in the 
distribution of household size-adjusted real income at which the income frequency 
density in 1989 rises above the income frequency density in 1979. This income 
intersection point is at $31,693 for the entire population. The intersections for other 
pairs of densities are defined in a similar way.  (See Figures 3.3, 3.7 and 3.9.) 
Table 3.3 shows the proportion of the population contained in the left tail, 
middle and right as defined by the peak-to-peak year density function intersections for 
the United States (columns 1 and 2) and Germany (columns 5 and 6) and Japan 
(columns 9 and 10) and their standard errors.
36 
In the United States 7.18 percent (column 3) of the entire distribution slid out 
of the middle of the distribution over the 1980s business cycle.  But the vast majority 
of that 7.18 percent (82.46 percent) became richer.  
                                                 
36 The proportions  p ˆ  can be estimated from the kernel density estimates or directly from the data. We 
have used the latter method in order to avoid complicated reliance on the asymptotic properties of the 
kernel estimators. Standard errors for the estimated population proportions are also included and are 
calculated according to   () ⎟
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1 ˆ 1 ˆ  , where  p ˆ  is the estimated proportion of 
interest.  
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Table 3.2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Differences in Income Distributions Across Paired Years 
 
   Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test statistic 
  United States  
Great 
Britain  Germany Japan 
Group 
1979 
versus 
1989 
1989 
versus 
2000 
1979 
versus 
2000 
1990 
versus 
2000 
1991 
versus 
2001 
1989 
versus 
2001 
Total  Population  5.85 3.9 5.95  7.982  21.732  8.652 
Aged 64 and younger  4.75  2.85  4.675  3.634  22.692  6.954 
Aged 65 and older  2.295  2.5  3.58  15.397  8.786  4.845 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the March CPS Annual Demographic Files (1980-2001) in the United States, the 
Household Panel Survey (1991-2001) in Great Britain, the Socio-Economic Panel (1992-2002) in Germany, and the Japanese Survey of 
Income Redistribution (1990 and 2002). 
Note: All test statistics are significant at 1 percent level.   
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Table 3.3 Change in the Distribution of the Population Mass over Paired Years in the United States, Germany, and Japan 
   United States  Germany   Japan 
1979 
b 1989 
b Difference 
c
Share of 
the 
Middle 1991 
b 2001 
b Difference 
c 
Share of 
the 
Middle  1989 
b 2001 
b Difference 
c
Share of 
the 
Middle  Income distribution 
group
a  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) (9)  (10)  (11) (12) 
  All Persons 
Less than left 
intersection  5.24 6.50  -1.26 -17.54  4.69 5.63  -0.94  -11.42  7.18  7.60 -0.42  -6.80 
  (0.053) (0.062)  (0.082)    (0.109) (0.092) (0.142)    (0.068) (0.069) (0.094)   
Middle of distribution  77.86 70.68  7.18  100.00  74.17 65.94  8.23  100.00  69.37  63.19  6.18  100.00 
  (0.099) (0.114)  (0.151)    (0.243) (0.201) (0.316)    (0.112) (0.150) (0.186)   
Greater than right 
intersection  16.90 22.82  -5.92  -82.46  21.14 28.43  -7.29  -88.58  23.45  29.21  -5.76  -93.20 
   (0.089) (0.106)  (0.138)    (0.231) (0.193) (0.301)    (0.096) (0.125) (0.142)   
  Younger Persons (aged 64 and younger) 
Less than left 
intersection  14.13 16.19  -2.06 -26.18 9.96 12.43  -2.47  -22.47  10.12  11.35  -1.23  -14.22 
  (0.084) (0.095) (0.127)    (0.163) (0.142) (0.216)   (0.073) (0.096) (0.123)   
Middle of distribution  69.30 61.43  7.87 100.00 64.89 53.90  10.99  100.00  62.90  54.25  8.65  100.00 
  (0.115) (0.130) (0.174)    (0.273) (0.226) (0.354)   (0.140) (0.158) (0.170)   
Greater than right 
intersection  16.57 22.38  -5.81 -73.82 25.15 33.67  -8.52  -77.53  26.98  34.40  -7.42  -85.78 
   (0.095) (0.113) (0.148)    (0.252) (0.216) (0.332)   (0.102) (0.112) (0.156)   
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the March CPS Annual Demographic Files (1980-2001) in the United States and the Household Panel 
Survey (1991-2001) in Great Britain, the Socio-Economic Panel (1992-2002) in Germany, and the Japanese Survey of Income Redistribution (1990 and 
2002). 
Note:   
a  See Figures 3.1, 3.3, 3.7, and 3.9 for the exact income values at the point of intersection of each density pair. 
b Standard errors are in parentheses.  All distribution changes are significant at 1 percent level according to tests based on  p Z  statistic 
c Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Over the German business cycle of the 1990s an even greater percentage of the 
middle mass around the mode of the distribution (8.23 percent) slid into the two tails.  
But once again the vast majority (88.58 percent) became richer. In Japan, over the 
1990s business cycle, 6.18 percent of the middle mass moved to the tails, mostly to the 
right tail (93.20 percent). None-the-less, in the United States (17.54 percent), in 
Germany (11.42 percent), and in Japan (6.80 percent) a small minority became poorer 
as income inequality rose in four countries. 
Table 3.3 shows that the movement out of the middle for young persons was 
even greater in the United States (7.87 percent), Germany (10.99 percent), and Japan 
(8.65 percent) than for the population as a whole. Furthermore, the share of that 
middle that dropped into the left tail was also greater in the United States (26.18 
percent), Germany (22.47 percent), and Japan (14.22).  None-the-less, in all countries 
the overwhelming majority of the increase in inequality was caused by younger people 
becoming unequally richer. 
Significance Tests of Changes in the Tails of the Distribution. To more 
rigorously demonstrate this, we test the statistical significance of the density changes 
in the tails of the income distribution reported in column 3 for the United States, 
column 7 for Germany, and column 11 for Japan using a binomial-based test statistic 
to determine whether the density masses contained in the left (or right) tails of two 
distributions differ. Specifically, letting p1 and p2 denote the probability that a 
randomly chosen individual will have an income in the tail of the distribution in years 
1 and 2, respectively, we test whether these two proportions are the same using 
() () 2 1
2 1
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
p V p V
p p
Z p
+
−
= . 
The variances of the estimated proportions are given by  
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p p p V
1
2
2
ˆ 1 ˆ ˆ , 
for each year i =1, 2. The  p Z   statistic is asymptotically distributed standard normal. 
For all pair-wise comparisons, we strongly reject the null hypothesis that the masses in 
the tails are the same for our paired years.   
3.6 Conclusion 
The economies of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan all 
grew over their 1990s business cycles, propelling their average household size-
adjusted income measured either at the mean or median upward. But the fruits of that 
economic growth were distributed differently across the four countries. The household 
size-adjusted income distribution of the United States and of Great Britain at the end 
of their 1990s business cycle achieved first order stochastic dominance over their after 
tax income distribution at the beginning. This was a remarkable change from what had 
happened in both countries over in the 1980s. Burkhauser et al. (1999) first showed 
using before tax income and we confirm here using after tax income that over their 
1980s business cycle, the middle of the United States income distribution fell, with the 
vast majority of people becoming unequally richer, and a statistically significant but 
relatively small share becoming poorer. Burkhauser et al. (1999) report similar 
findings with respect to before tax income for the United Kingdom over their 1980s 
business cycle. Hence, unlike their experiences in the 1980s, all people in the United 
States and Great Britain shared the gains of economic growth in the 1990s. Moreover, 
in contrast to the 1980s, measured after tax income inequality fell both in the United 
States and in Great Britain over this period.   
In contrast, measured after tax income inequality in Germany and Japan grew 
substantially over their 1990s business cycle.  Like the United States in the 1980s, the  
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middle mass of the distribution around the mode fell. While the greatest share of the 
middle mass slid to the right as people became unequally richer, a statistically 
significant but smaller share became poorer.  More remarkably, the relative movement 
out of the middle and into the two tails in Germany and Japan is very similar in 
magnitude to that of the United States. About 83 percent of the decline in the middle 
in the United States over the 1980s was accounted for by people becoming richer 
while about 89 percent were accounted for by a movement to the right in Germany and 
about 93 percent by a movement to the right in Japan. 
  In all four countries, the average household size-adjusted income of older 
persons grew in the 1990s but the growth in Great Britain and in Germany was greater 
both absolutely and relative to their younger populations. And, in all four countries 
income inequality fell among their older populations over the period.  
While the average household size-adjusted after tax income of younger persons 
also grew in all four countries over the 1990s, only in the United States were the gains 
greater among this population. It was in this subpopulation that the differences in how 
the fruits of economic growth were shared are greatest across the four countries. In 
both the United States and Great Britain the income distribution among younger 
people at the end of the 1990s business cycle achieved first order stochastic 
dominance over their income distribution at the start, while this was not the case in 
Germany and Japan. In the United States and Great Britain income inequality fell and 
in Germany and Japan it increased. In Germany, the middle mass of the income 
distribution of their younger population fell with the vast majority spilling to the right.  
But a statistically significant but small share fell to the left. Once again the comparison 
with events in Germany and Japan in the 1990s and the United States in the 1980s are 
remarkably similar. In the United States 74 percent of the decline is explained by  
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younger people becoming richer. In Germany 78 percent of the decline is so 
explained. In Japan 86 percent of the decline is so explained. 
 This paper has focused on measuring what have been quite different changes 
in the income distribution of four major industrial countries over their 1990s business 
cycle. The causes for these differences are not clear.  In the United States, the 
confluence of significant economic growth and work-based welfare reforms 
dramatically improve the employment and economic well-being of single women with 
children relative to the rest of the population and more generally did so for lower 
skilled workers.  This may in part explain why economic growth in the 1990s was 
more equally shared in the United States than it was in the 1980s.
37  
In Germany it may be that reunification which occurred in 1989 not only 
dramatically changed the population of Germany relative to the population living in 
the former western states of Germany but may have changed the political and 
economic makeup relative to that in the pre-unification western states. This paper is 
capturing the changes in the income distribution over reunified Germany’s first 
business cycle. It remains to be seen if this is simply a short term outcome that was 
inevitable given the significantly unequal market skills of the eastern and western 
states populations that will quickly fade away. Or, whether this is only the first round 
of a much longer term trend in a country where the greater inequality in market skills 
created with unification will continue to yield increases in income inequality for 
generations to come.  
Post-World War II Japan has long been characterized as a homogeneous 
                                                 
37 See Burkhauser et al. (2004a) and Couch and Daly (2004) for a thorough review of literature on this 
issue. The trends in Great Britain appear to be similar to that in the United States (see Goodman and 
Shephard, 2002 for a detailed discussion).  
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society and one with a relative low degree of income inequality. (Vogel, 1979)  But 
the rise in inequality over its 1990s business cycle suggests that by 2001, Japan could 
no longer be thought of as a "90 percent middle-class society".  By 2001 the level of 
after tax income inequality in Japan was closer that of the United States than to 
Germany or Great Britain. The exact causes of this increase are not clear but may 
result from a complex interplay of demographic and economic factors, including 
population aging, greater heterogeneity in generational configurations within 
households, and most importantly the fuller emergence of a market-oriented economy, 
including a shift from a lifetime employment/ seniority wage system to a more 
performance-based one. Finally, the steep rise in land and share prices during the 
“bubble economy” of the late 1980s and its subsequent fall over the 1990s may have 
increased inequalities in the distribution of assets.  
This paper used kernel density estimation to look behind summary measures of 
income inequality to see how the entire distribution of income shifted over the 1990s 
business cycle in four major industrialized countries. It distinguished between 
increases in inequality caused by the middle of the distribution falling into the two 
tails, from increases in inequality caused by the population as a whole becoming 
unequally richer.  If did so because, other things equal, declines in income inequality 
are preferred to increases in income inequality. But increased inequality in a country 
where economic growth is making everyone richer is surely preferred to an outcome 
where the rich are getting richer at the expense of the rest of the population. 
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Appendix IV.  Additional Tables for Chapter 3 
 
Appendix Table IV.1 Pre-tax Post-transfer Household Size-Adjusted Income and Income Inequality, by Age in the United 
States, Great Britain, and Germany 
  United States 
a   Great  Britain 
b   Germany 
c 
 
1979 
(1) 
1989 
(2) 
2000 
(3) 
Percent 
Change 
1979-
1989 
(4) 
Percent 
Change 
1989-
2000 
(5)  
1990 
(6) 
2000 
(7) 
Percent 
Change 
(8)   
1991 
(9) 
2001 
(10) 
Percent 
Change
(11) 
 All  Persons 
Mean  28,697 31,708 34,334  10.49  8.28   14,160 16,818  18.77    23,015 25,178  9.40 
Median  25,195 26,597 28,500  5.56  7.15   12,602 15,008  19.09    20,894 22,366  7.05 
90 / 10 Ratio  6.351  7.719  7.656  21.54  -0.82    5.027  4.574  -9.01    3.895  4.584  17.69 
Gini  0.352 0.387 0.387  9.94  0.00    0.316 0.304  -3.80   0.271 0.302 11.44 
  Older Persons (aged 65 and older) 
Mean (A)  21,216  25,988  26,728  22.49  2.85    8,627  11,182  29.62    15,931  18,251  14.56 
Median 16,069  19,082  20,191  18.75  5.81    6,874  9,330  35.73    13,735  15,985  16.38 
90 / 10 Ratio  6.081  6.708  6.586  10.31  -1.82    3.576  3.498  -2.18    3.470  3.240  -6.63 
Gini  0.391 0.418 0.405  6.91  -3.11    0.292 0.282  -3.42    0.265 0.264 -0.38 
  Younger Persons (aged 64 and younger) 
Mean  (B)  29,611 32,491 35,367  9.73  8.85   15,597 18,482  18.50   24,304 26,696  9.84 
Median  26,372 27,778 29,902  5.33  7.65   14,324 16,987  18.59   22,399 23,926  6.82 
90 / 10 Ratio  6.141  7.759  7.67  26.35  -1.15    4.628  4.204  -9.16    3.640  4.590  26.10 
Gini  0.342 0.380 0.381  11.11  0.26    0.290 0.281  -3.10    0.258 0.295 14.34 
    
Ratio (A) / (B)  0.717  0.800  0.756        0.553  0.605      0.656  0.684   
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the March CPS Annual Demographic Files (1980-2001) in the United States, the Household Panel Survey 
(1991-2001) in Great Britain, and the Socio-Economic Panel (1992-2002) in Germany. 
Notes:  
a Income values are in 2000 United States dollars; 
b Income values are in 2000 British pounds; 
c Income values are in 2000 euro 
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Appendix Table IV.2 Household Size-Adjusted Income and Income Inequality for 
Total Population, in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany 
 
  United States 
a   Great  Britain 
b   Germany 
c 
  Post-tax Post-transfer Income 
  1979 1989 2000 
Percent 
Change 
1979-
1989 
Percent 
Change 
1989-
2000   1990 2000
Percent 
Change 
1990-
2000   1991 2001
Percent 
Change 
1991-
2001 
                    
Mean    22,494 24,954 26,767  10.93 7.27   11,539 13,917 20.61   17,377 18,605 7.07
Median 20,892 22,135 23,707  5.95 7.10   10,583 12,788 20.84   16,146 17,054 5.62
90/10  4.71 5.82 5.42  23.67 -6.82   3.89 3.63 -6.78   3.10 3.39 9.59
Gini  0.301 0.344 0.336  14.17 -2.24     0.274 0.264 -3.59     0.231  0.25 8.18
  Pre-tax Post-transfer Income 
  1979 1989 2000 
Percent 
Change 
1979-
1989 
Percent 
Change 
1989-
2000   1990 2000
Percent 
Change 
1990-
2000   1991  2001
Percent 
Change 
1991-
2001 
                    
Mean    28,697 31,708 34,334  10.49  8.28    14,160 16,818 18.77  23,009 25,178 9.43
Median 25,195 26,597 28,500  5.56  7.15    12,602 15,008 19.09  20,894 22,366 7.05
90/10  6.35 7.72 7.66 21.54 -0.82    5.03 4.57 -9.01  3.89 4.58 17.74
Gini  0.352 0.387 0.387  9.94  0.00     0.316 0.304 -3.8    0.271 0.301 11.07
  Pre-tax Pre-transfer Income 
  1979 1989 2000 
Percent 
Change 
1979-
1989 
Percent 
Change 
1989-
2000   1990 2000
Percent 
Change 
1990-
2000   1991  2001
Percent 
Change 
1991-
2001 
                    
Mean    26,649 29,579 32,092  11 8.5   12,959 15,069 16.28  19,615 20,620 5.12
Median 23,805 24,945 26,647  4.79 6.82   11,882 14,030 18.08  18,681 18,685 0.02
90/10  17.93 20.23 16.37  12.86 -19.07   15.71 16.76 6.68  46.17 73.14 58.41
Gini  0.4045 0.434 0.432  7.31 -0.52     0.391 0.393 0.51    0.388  0.44 13.40
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the March CPS Annual Demographic Files (1980-
2001) in the United States, the Household Panel Survey (1991-2001) in Great Britain, and the Socio-
Economic Panel (1992-2002) in Germany. 
Notes:  
a Income values are in 2000 United States dollars 
b Income values are in 2000 British pounds 
c Income values are in 2000 euros 
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Appendix V: Data Appendix for Chapter 3 
Estimating taxes from the CPS data using TAXSIM model 
The outline of this section is as follows. First, we discuss issues surrounding 
the estimation of income taxes and clarify some terms that are used throughout this 
paper (Appendix Table V.1). Next we talk briefly about the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) TAXSIM model. Then we discuss our methodology for 
creating and constructing TAXSIM input variables using CPS data. Also, in Appendix 
Table V.2, we compare (a) the CPS tax estimates provided by Unicon with the 
TAXSIM tax estimates based on (b) raw public use CPS data and on (c) consistently 
top-coded data. Finally, we compare our CPS tax estimates with those obtained from 
PSID using TAXSIM that are widely used in economic research. We conclude that our 
TAXSIM estimates are a reasonable approximation to the CPS tax estimates for 1979 
through 2000.  
The CPS provides information on both family and individual income and 
resources. Both the CPS tax program and the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) TAXSIM program estimate the income taxes of tax units. What makes 
computing family income tax estimations difficult is that while families may share 
resources, families do not necessarily file taxes as families. It is possible that different 
groups within the family file taxes separately. 
For this reason, to calculate a family tax burden it is necessary to first 
determine the number of tax units in a family and to then estimate each tax unit’s 
burden separately. To do this one not only has to assign those with income to the 
appropriate tax unit but also assign dependents—with and without their own personal 
income—to the appropriate tax unit. In making our assumptions about tax filing units  
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and dependent status, we use tax filing status variable provided by Unicon Group for 
each person in CPS. We assume the head and dependent spouse (regardless of whether 
the spouse has her own income source) are a single tax filing unit, each dependent 
with income (except the spouse) is a tax filing unit and every nondependent family 
member (this can include married or unmarried persons who are blood relatives) is a 
tax filing unit. Dependents without income are assigned to the tax unit of their 
provider. In this way every individual within a family is assigned to a tax unit either as 
head of a tax unit, as a dependent within a tax unit, or both. The tax liabilities of 
within-family tax units are then summed to obtain the family tax liability. 
Each tax unit is assigned one of four possible tax filing statuses. All legally 
married couples are assumed to file taxes jointly and their tax filing status is defined as 
“married.” Together they file one joint tax return that captures the joint income of the 
married couple. Thus, married tax filing units can have one or two earners. The 
number of earners, however, is irrelevant because each married tax filing unit files 
only one joint tax return. We assume unmarried individuals with dependents file taxes 
as single persons and their tax filing status is defined as “head of household.” Further, 
we assume unmarried individuals without dependents file taxes as single persons and 
their tax filing status is defined as “single.” Finally, we assign dependents with income 
who appear on parents’ tax return to a category “single dependent on parents return”, 
therefore for everyone in this category no personal exemption can be claimed. Head of 
household or single tax filing units have only one income earner. 
TAXSIM Model. The NBER TAXSIM model is a micro-simulation program 
that estimates both federal and state taxes for the United States. The program uses 
information on income and deductions to estimate tax liabilities. For more information 
on the TAXSIM model itself see Feenberg and Counts (1993). While in this paper we  
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compare the federal income tax burden estimates of the TAXSIM model with CPS tax 
program estimates, we have also calculated state income tax using the TAXSIM model 
as well as Social Security tax burdens for CPS families using our own programs. All 
these values are available upon request from the authors.  
TAXSIM Input Variables. A number of input variables are required for the 
TAXSIM model. These variables are case identification number, tax year, state, tax 
filing status, number of dependent exemptions, number of age exemptions, wage and 
salary income, dividend income, other property income, pension, gross Social Security 
income, other transfer income, rent paid, property taxes paid, amount of itemized 
deductions, unemployment compensation, and child care expenses.  
Constructing most of the income variables is straightforward since much of the 
data are already available in the CPS. However there are a few variables, such as tax 
filing status—the correct tax unit to which members of the family belong—and 
number of dependent exemptions, whose construction is more complicated. Appendix 
Tables V.1 and V.2 list the input variables required for the TAXSIM model and the 
CPS variables we used. This section of the paper discusses the assumptions we made 
in order to create these variables and how these assumptions compare to those made in 
the CPS. 
Marital Status. For income and tax purposes, the CPS considers two persons to 
be married if they have been living together for at least a year, regardless of their legal 
marital status. Legal marital status of heads and partners can be established using 
information provided in the CPS. However, this information is not available for other 
family members. For the TAXSIM model we treat a non-married cohabiting head and 
his partner in the CPS data as two separate individual tax filing units rather than as  
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members of a married tax filing unit. Federal and state tax laws do not permit non-
married cohabiting individuals to file taxes jointly. For this reason we use information 
on legal marital status to assign individuals to tax units. 
Appendix  Table  V.1   List of TAXSIM Input Variables and Corresponding CPS 
Variables  
 
  TAXSIM Input Variables  CPS Tax Unit Input Variables 
 
1  Case ID (must be numeric)  Tax Unit ID number 
2  Tax year (4 digits)  Income year (survey year minus 1) 
3  State (SOI codes. These run from 1 for Alabama to 
51 for Wyoming) 
State of residence in survey year 
4  Marital Status:  
1. single 
2. joint 
4. head of household 
8. single dependent on parents return (no personal 
exemption) 
Provided in the CPS by RAND 
5  Dependent Exemptions (usually children but can be 
any age) 
Created 
6  Age exemptions  number of taxpayers over 65 years of 
age (maximum is 2) in tax unit 
7  Wage and salary income of Taxpayer (include self-
employment) 
labor income of primary earner in tax 
unit 
8  Wage and salary income of Spouse (include self-
employment) 
labor income of secondary earner in 
tax unit 
9  Dividend income  dividend income in tax unit 
10  Other property income  includes interest, rent, alimony, 
fellowships and other income not 
above enumerated. This is the only 
dollar amount that may be negative. 
11  Taxable Pensions  Sum of other retirement income in tax 
unit 
12  Gross Social Security Income  Sum of Social Security income in tax 
unit 
13  Other non-taxable transfer Income such as welfare, 
municipal bond interest, and child support that 
would affect eligibility for state property tax rebates 
but would not be taxable at the federal level 
Sum SSI, VA pensions, worker’s 
compensation, AFDC, and other 
welfare income in tax unit 
14  Rent Paid (used only for calculating state property 
tax rebates) 
Set to zero 
15  Property taxes paid  Set to zero 
16  Itemized deductions other than state income tax and 
local property tax  
Set to zero 
17  Child care expenses  Set to zero 
18  Unemployment compensation received  Sum of unemployment compensation 
in tax unit 
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Tax Filing Status. The CPS staff calculated tax burdens for married couples, 
household heads, and single person tax units. In the CPS tax program, each married 
couple is assumed to file one tax return that represents the couple’s joint income, 
regardless of their legal marital status. Individuals are assigned a tax filing status of 
head of household if: they are unmarried, divorced, separated, widowed, or never 
married; and they have one or more dependent children or other dependent relatives 
living in the family; and they pay more than half the expenses of the family. 
Individuals who are unmarried (never married, divorced, separated, or widowed) and 
have no dependents are assigned a tax filing status of single. In our TAXSIM 
simulation we follow the CPS conventions of assigning persons to tax filing units with 
the one exception of cohabitants who are not legally married. 
Itemization. Depending on their level of taxable income, homeowners without 
a mortgage may or may not have been assigned the standard deduction. The TAXSIM 
model requires information on the amount of itemized deductions. We assume that all 
tax units, including married tax units, take the standard deduction. This assumption 
will undoubtedly overestimate the actual tax burden of tax units who itemized their 
deductions. 
Dependents.  The assignment of dependents is important for calculating the 
number of dependent exemptions per tax unit and thus estimating taxes. The tax code 
allows tax units to reduce their taxable income for each dependent person they claim 
to support. The CPS rules for defining dependents in a tax unit are that family 
members who are not a head or spouse are considered dependents if they are less than 
age 16 and have an annual income of less than $10,000 or older than 16 and have an 
annual income of less than $5,000. All family members are looked at to determine 
whether they can be considered dependents. Once dependency is established,  
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dependents are assigned to the appropriate tax unit. For tax purposes, dependents with 
their own income are assigned to their own tax units because they must file their own 
tax returns.  
However, because these individuals are dependents of their parents, they are 
still counted as exemptions within their parents’ tax units. We use these same CPS 
rules, which approximate IRS rules, to determine dependent status in our TAXSIM 
estimates. 
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Appendix  Table  V.2   Estimating Income Tax Burdens for Current Population Survey (CPS) Households Using the National 
Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM Model 
  PSID, TaxSim  CPS, provided by Unicon  CPS, TaxSim, based on consistently 
top-coded income
CPS, TaxSim, based on raw cps public 
use income values
 
HH 
Federal 
Taxes 
HH 
State 
Taxes 
HH 
Payroll 
Taxes 
Total 
HH Tax
HH 
Federal 
Taxes
HH 
State 
Taxes
HH 
Payroll 
Taxes
Total 
HH Tax
HH 
Federal 
Taxes
HH 
State 
Taxes 
HH 
Payroll 
Taxes
Total 
HH Tax
HH 
Federal 
Taxes
HH 
State 
Taxes
HH 
Payroll 
Taxes
Total 
HH Tax
1979  2,961 504  922 4,387 2,865 548 1,007 4,420 3,064 511 1,029 4,604 3,066 512 1,030 4,608
1980  3,456 552  991 5,000 3,222 612 1,047 4,881 3,491 547 1,111 5,149 3,495 547 1,112 5,154
1981 3,937  604  1,180  5,721  3,480 609 1,268 5,357 4,111 603 1,309 6,023 4,118 604 1,310 6,032
1982 3,767  628  1,233  5,630  3,393 661 1,341 5,395 4,152 660 1,374 6,187 4,158 661 1,375 6,194
1983 3,834  736  1,336  5,907  3,279 739 1,418 5,437 4,042 755 1,455 6,252 4,050 756 1,456 6,262
1984 4,648  857  1,631  7,138  3,533 829 1,559 5,921 4,557 841 1,643 7,041 4,565 842 1,643 7,050
1985 4,644  859  1,735  7,240  3,843 929 1,753 6,525 4,878 870 1,757 7,504 4,887 871 1,757 7,515
1986 4,937  902  1,862  7,705  4,200 1,012 1,880 7,092 5,178 915 1,879 7,973 5,187 917 1,880 7,983
1987 4,239  934  1,964  7,141  4,122 1,172 1,986 7,279 4,429 949 1,975 7,353 4,437 950 1,976 7,364
1988 4,393  1,031  2,213  7,640  4,195 1,190 2,195 7,579 4,513 948 2,146 7,607 4,521 950 2,148 7,619
1989 4,581  1,041  2,304  7,928  4,631 1,415 2,365 8,411 4,956 1,063 2,307 8,326 4,964 1,065 2,308 8,337
1990 4,769  1,101  2,468  8,342  4,671 1,430 2,467 8,567 4,971 1,090 2,418 8,479 4,981 1,092 2,419 8,493
1991 4,877  1,171  2,540  8,593  4,496 1,269 2,533 8,297 4,907 1,124 2,479 8,511 4,917 1,127 2,481 8,525
1992 5,173  1,254  2,669  9,107  4,556 1,335 2,601 8,492 4,914 1,182 2,545 8,642 4,923 1,185 2,547 8,655
1993 6,531  1,511  2,911  9,906  5,098 1,479 2,700 9,277 5,224 1,245 2,643 9,111 5,232 1,247 2,644 9,123
1994 6,342  1,491  2,990  10,009  -- -- -- -- -- --  -- -- -- -- -- --
1995 6,341  1,499  3,049  10,350  5,579 1,650 2,887 10,116 5,662 1,357 2,839 9,858 6,452 1,477 2,876 10,805
1996 6,151  1,443  3,146  10,582  5,932 1,764 3,012 10,708 5,915 1,397 2,959 10,271 6,812 1,527 2,998 11,338
1997 --  --  --  --  6,585 1,939 3,208 11,732 6,442 1,495 3,107 11,045 7,506 1,647 3,156 12,309
1998 6,727  1,704  3,329  11,760  6,891 2,096 3,373 12,360 6,495 1,505 3,281 11,282 7,809 1,701 3,331 12,842
1999 --  --  --  --  7,346 2,264 3,557 13,167 6,929 1,575 3,461 11,965 7,845 1,715 3,498 13,058
2000 8,394  1,984  3,642  14,020  7,677 2,391 3,697 13,765 7,222 1,614 3,630 12,466 8,841 1,844 3,697 14,382
Note: All income values are in current dollars 
  173
References 
Artis, M.J., R.C. Bladen-Hovell and W. Zhang (1995), Turning points in the 
international business cycle: An analysis of the OECD leading indicators for 
the G7 countries, OECD Economic Studies 24, 125 – 165  
Atkinson, Anthony B. 1983. The Economics of Inequality, 2nd edition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Atkinson, A.B., L. Rainwater, T. M. Smeeding. 1995. Income Distribution in OECD 
Countries: Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study. (LIS).  Social Policy 
Studies No. 18, OECD Paris, October. 
Boskin, Michael J., Ellen R. Dulberger, Robert J. Gordon, Zvi Griliches, and Dale W. 
Jorgenson. 1996. Toward a More Accurate Measure of the Cost of Living. 
Final report to the Senate Finance Committee from the Advisory Commission 
to Study the Consumer Price Index, December 4, 1996. 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/boskinrpt.html. 
Bradbury, Katharine L.  1996.  “The Growing Inequality of Family Incomes:  
Changing Families and Changing Wages.”  New England Economic Review, 
(July/August), 55-82. 
Burkhauser, Richard V., Barbara A. Butrica, Mary C. Daly, and Dean R. Lillard. 2001. 
“The Cross-National Equivalent File: A Product of Cross-National Research.” 
In Irene Becker, Notburga Ott, and Gabriele Rolf (eds.) Soziale Sicherung In 
Einer Dynamischen Gesellschaft. Frankfurt, Germany: Campus Verlagi, pp. 
354-376.  
Burkhauser, Richard V., Amy Crews Cutts, Mary C. Daly, and Stephen P. Jenkins.  
1999. “Testing the Significance of Income Distribution Changes Over the 
1980s Business Cycle:  A Cross-National Comparison.”  Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, Vol. 14, 253-272. 
Burkhauser, Richard V., Amy D. Crews, Mary C. Daly, and Stephen P. Jenkins.  1996. 
Income Mobility and the Middle Class, AEI Studies on Understanding 
Economic Inequality.  Washington, DC: The AEI Press. 
Burkhauser, Richard V., Kenneth A. Couch, Andrew J. Houtenville, and Ludmila 
Rovba.  2004a. “Income Inequality in the 1990s: Re-Forging a Lost 
Relationship?” Journal of Income Distribution, 12 (3-4), 8-35. 
Burkhauser, Richard V., J.S. Butler, Shaizhang Feng, and Andrew Houtenville.  
2004b. “Long Term Trends in Earnings Inequality:  What the CPS Can Tell 
Us.”  Economics Letters, 82 (2), 295-299.  
  174
 
Burkhauser, Richard V., Philip Giles, Dean R. Lillard and Johannes Schwarze. 2003. 
“Changes in the Economic Well-Being of Widows Following the Death of 
Their Husband:  A Four Country Comparison,” Schmollers Jahrbuck:  Journal 
of Applied Social Studies, 123 (1), 151-162. 
Burkhauser, Richard V., Timothy M. Smeeding, and Joachim Merz. 1996. “Relative 
Inequality and Poverty in Germany and the United States Using Alternative 
Equivalency Scales,” The Review of Income and Wealth, 42(4) (December): 
381-400. 
DeNavas-Walt, Carmen and Robert W. Cleveland. 2002. “Money Income in the 
United States: 2001,” Current Population Reports, US Census Bureau 
(September). 
Feng, Shuaizhang, Richard V. Burkhauser, and J.S. Butler. 2005. “Levels and Long-
Term Trends in Earning Inequality:  Overcoming Current Population Survey 
Censoring Problems Using GB2 Distribution.” Working Paper, Department of 
Policy Analysis and Management, Cornell University. 
Couch, Kenneth. A. and Mary C. Daly. 2004. “The Improving Relative Status of 
Black Men,” Journal of Income Distribution, 12 (3-4) 
Fukawa, Tetsuo. 2002. “Income Distribution and Retirement Income in Japan” In: The 
Japanese Journal of Social Security Policy, Vol.1,No.1 (August 2002), pp. 27-
36. 
Goodman, A and A. Shephard. 2002. Inequality and Living Standards in Great Britain 
Some Facts, IFS. Briefing Note 19. 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication_id=1768 
Jacobs D. 2000. Low Inequality with Low Redistribution? An Analysis of Income 
Distribution in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan Compared to Britain. Centre 
for Analysis of Social Exclusion No.33, London School of Economics. 
Jones, Arthur F. Jr. and Daniel H. Weinberg. 2000, “The Changing Shape of the 
Nation’s Income Distribution”, Current Population Reports, US Census 
Bureau, (June). 
Karoly, Lynn A.  1992.  “Changes in the Distribution of Individual Earnings in the 
United States:  1967-1986.”  Review of Income and Statistics, 74(1), 107-115.  
Karoly, Lynn A., and Gary Burtless.  1995.  “Demographic Change, Rising Earnings 
Inequality, and the Distribution of Personal Well-Being, 1959-1989.” 
Demography, Vol. 32 (3), 379-405.  
  175
Lillard, Dean R. (with the assistance of Phillip Giles and Markus M. Grabka). 2004. 
“Codebook for the Cross-National Equivalent File 1980-2002. BHPS – 
GSOEP – PSID – SLID.” Mimeo, Department of Policy Analysis and 
Management, Cornell University. 
Lynch, Robert G.  2003.  “Estimates of Income and Income Inequality in the United 
States and in Each of the Fifty States:  1988-1999.”  Journal of Regional 
Science, 43(3), 571-587. 
Polivka, Anne. 1996. “Using Earnings Data from the Current Population Survey After 
the Redesign.” Bureau of Labor Statistics Working Paper, No. 306.  
Ryscavage, Paul. 1995. “A Surge in Growing Income Inequality?” Monthly Labor 
Review, August 1995, 51-61. 
Silverman, Bernard W. 1986. Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis. 
London: Chapman and Hall. 
Smeeding T.M. 1997. US Income Inequality in a Cross National Perspective: Why Are 
We So Different? Luxembourg Income Study, Working Paper No.157. 
Terasaki, Yasuhiro. 2002. The Impact of Changes in Family Structure on Income 
Distribution in Japan, 1989-1997 Rising Inequality of Household Income 
Reconsidered. In: The Japanese Journal of Social Security Policy Vol.1, No.1 
(August 2002). 
Tachibanaki, Toshiaki. 1996. "Wage Determination and Distribution in Japan" Oxford 
University Press. 
 